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Summary 
 
In China, the so-called “tidal wave” of rural-urban migrant workers since the 
early 1980s has created unique challenges for the government, one being migrant 
children’s education in cities.  In 2001, the central government adopted a policy of “two 
priorities” (liangweizhu) towards the provision of compulsory education for these 
children, where the two areas of focus would be management by local governments in 
receiving areas – which, in the case of municipalities like Beijing, refers primarily to the 
municipal and district governments – and education in public schools.  This 
decentralization of responsibilities, however, has created space for differential policy 
implementation, and, in Beijing, this has meant that many migrant children still attend 
poor quality, often unlicensed migrant schools that are vulnerable to government 
closures and demolition.   
Though migrant children’s education is attracting increasing government and 
societal attention, the effects of decentralization on privately-run migrant schools and 
their students remain largely unexplored.  In light of the policy of “two priorities,” this 
thesis highlights the development of two trends in Beijing: 1) the emergence of 
variation between district policy approaches and 2) increased civil society involvement.  
Using Haidian, Shijingshan, and Fengtai districts as cases, this study draws on evidence 
from qualitative interviews and policy document analysis to examine the interaction 
between these two trends and the consequences for migrant schools.  It addresses 
critical questions concerning how policy implementation operates in an increasingly 
important but complex policy area and why, including the roles of policy history and 
local context, and illustrates that the municipal and district-level policy approaches 
shape the situations of migrant schools and their students directly and indirectly 
(through their impact on civil society).  These findings shed light on the complexities of 
the implementation process and the implications for trends in social stratification, 
creating a stronger foundation upon which to improve educational opportunities for 
migrant children in Beijing. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
During its 30 years of economic reform and opening up, China has undergone 
extraordinary social and economic change.  A major part of this transformation has been 
increased internal mobility, especially rural-urban migration.  Since the early 1980s, 
migration without a change of hukou (household registration) status1 has increased 
steadily, leading many to point to a “tidal wave of rural migrant labor [mingong chao]” 
and “the largest flow of migrant labor in history” (Roberts 1997, 250; see also Li 1996; 
Chan 1999; Bai and He 2003).  According to the Fifth National Population Census of 
2000, China’s “floating population”2 – people residing in areas outside their place of 
household registration – reached 144 million, including 120 million rural migrant 
workers (Zheng et al. 2008, 1).   
This has not only led to a redefinition of internal boundaries but has also resulted 
in a rapidly changing Chinese society.  The National Population and Family Planning 
Commission of China estimated that the country’s floating population grew by ten 
million in 2010 and reached 221 million in 2011, of which almost three-quarters were 
rural-urban migrant workers (Wong 2011).  According to the National Bureau of 
Statistics, China’s urban population (690.79 million) surpassed its rural population 
                                                     
1
 The hukou household registration system divides citizens by their place and type of registration 
(rural or urban, agricultural or non-agricultural). 
2
 As will be discussed in Chapter 3, usage of the terms “floating population” (liudong renkou) and 
“migrant workers” (nongmingong), the latter of which is technically a subset of the former, is often 
unclear and inconsistent.  Throughout this study, the effort is made to use the same terms as originally 
used by the authors being cited.   
2 
(656.56 million) for the first time in 2011 (Wines 2012).3  It is projected that an 
additional 300 million workers will migrate from rural to urban areas over the next 30 
years (Wong 2011).   
This large-scale migration has given rise to unique policy challenges for the 
Chinese government, one being educational provision for migrant children in cities.  
Along with factors like higher salaries and standards of living, education has been an 
important motive for the high levels of rural-urban migration (Kwong 2004; Lu and 
Song 2006, 339, table 1).  Many migrant parents view education in the cities as an 
opportunity for their children to break out of poverty and improve their social status 
(Kwong 2004, 1077).4  This has contributed to an increasing number of migrant workers 
who take their children with them or have children in the cities (Guo 2002, 358; Kwong 
2004, 1076-1077).  It was estimated that there were already close to 20 million children 
in the floating population by 2000 (Xinhua News Agency 2004).  These migrant 
families also tend to remain in the cities for longer amounts of time, often for over a 
decade (cited by Postiglione 2006, 15).   
This surge in the number of school-aged migrant children in cities since the 
early to mid-1990s has increased the urgency of issues concerning the provision of basic 
education for this group (Lu and Zhang 2004, 65).  Despite China’s Compulsory 
Education Law (1986) (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yiwu jiaoyufa), which stipulated 
that the government would provide nine years of education to all children at the primary 
                                                     
3
 That is, 51.27 percent of China’s citizens now reside in cities, compared to about 10 percent in 1949 
(Wines 2012). 
4
 Some scholars highlight the need to challenge the notion of education in different contexts and to 
adopt a critical approach towards education and reforms that is driven by values like equality (e.g., Willis 
1977; Castells et al. 1999; Dolby and Dimitriadis 2004).  In China, however, education is generally seen 
by migrant workers in a positive light, as a channel for improving their children’s social status (even if 
educational arrangements in the cities often end up reinforcing the social exclusion of their children).  
Education in this study is therefore being approached based on such perceptions of and expectations 
placed on education in the Chinese context. 
3 
and middle school levels free of tuition,5 migrant children began to attend poor quality, 
makeshift schools that were set up and run by migrants themselves.  In Beijing, these 
schools – commonly referred to as migrant schools, or dagong zidi xuexiao – emerged 
in the early 1990s as a “self-help” (zili jiuji) mechanism in a context in which migrant 
workers were unable to pay the expensive fees required for their children to enroll in 
local public schools (Han 2001, 1-4).6  The result was the emergence of a “rural-urban” 
gap in education within urban areas themselves, contributing to the image of migrant 
workers and their children as a “community outside the system [tizhiwai qunluo]” (Li 
1996, 1144) and “willing workers, invisible residents” (Roberts 2002).   
In China, the development of the education sector is frequently discussed as a 
priority for national development and the building of a “harmonious society” (hexie 
shehui), a central theme of the Communist Party of China (CPC) under Hu Jintao that 
emphasizes social and economic development based on democracy, the rule of law, 
equity, justice, sincerity, amity, and vitality.  According to China Education and 
Research Network (2004), with a total of 318 million students enrolled in educational 
institutions at various levels (the highest in the world), China’s government “prioritizes 
education as a fundamental and guiding cause with an overall importance to social and 
economic development.”  At the UNESCO-sponsored Fifth High-Level Group Meeting 
on Education for All in November 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized that China’s 
education agenda would prioritize the spreading of compulsory and vocational 
education, the elimination of illiteracy, and the development of education in rural areas.  
He asserted: 
                                                     
5
 In China, children of compulsory school age are usually defined as being between the ages of six 
and 15. 
6
 The translations of quotes from Chinese materials and interviews cited throughout this thesis are my 
own. 
4 
As a large developing country with 1.3 billion people, China is running the largest 
education system of the world.  Our experience has driven home to us that only by speeding 
up education development and improving the quality of the entire citizenry can we turn our 
huge population from a sheer pressure into an enormous resource, put economic 
development in the orbit of progress in science and technology, and improve the living 
quality and standards of the entire population. (Wen 2005) 
He further stated: 
Fairness is the soul of education for all.  There is no social justice to speak of without 
equitable education opportunities.  By tradition the Chinese lay great store by education, 
and the age-old saying, “In education there should be no class distinction,” remains an 
enduring exhortation to this day.  The Chinese government is working to ensure children’s 
equitable right to education, promote balanced development in compulsory education, and 
bridge the gap between urban and rural areas and between regions in education development. 
(Wen 2005) 
The government’s desire to promote educational equality has also been reflected 
in central policies concerning migrant children’s education since the early 2000s.  Most 
significantly, in 2001, the central government adopted a policy of “two priorities” 
(liangweizhu) towards the provision of compulsory education for migrant children, 
where the two areas of focus would be management by local governments in receiving 
areas (liuru diqu zhengfu) – which, in the case of municipalities like Beijing, refers 
primarily to the municipal and district governments – and education in public schools 
(gongban xuexiao) (see also Qu and Wang 2008, 178-179; Han 2009).  This 
decentralization of responsibilities, however, has created space for differential policy 
implementation at the local level, and, in the case of Beijing, this has meant that many 
migrant children still attend privately-run migrant schools.  Though these schools have 
grown in number and size since the 1990s, they remain poor in condition, offer poor 
quality education, and often lack state recognition.  Nevertheless, they continue to be a 
more feasible option than public school education for many migrant children due to 
factors like flexible enrollment procedures and low fees.7  Thus, while overall access to 
education in China has been increasing (Postiglione 2006, 3), the quality of and access 
                                                     
7
 See also Kwong (2006, 172) and Chen and Liang (2007, 125-126) for additional discussion of the 
role of migrant schools in the provision of education for these children. 
5 
to compulsory education have become a serious problem for the children of the massive 
population of migrant workers. 
The Chinese government has been making efforts to improve the quality of rural 
education in areas like teaching and facilities to reduce the rural-urban gap in 
education.8  Though such efforts might eventually increase the incentive for children to 
attend school in rural areas, the current reality is that a growing number of migrant 
workers choose to migrate with their children or have children in the cities, making 
migrant children’s education a critical policy issue.9  Yet the problems surrounding 
educational provision for these children have not been afforded equal importance: 
[T]here is a growing segment of the population that does not fit neatly into the rural-urban 
dichotomy traditionally characterizing the economy and the school system.  The children of 
the rural-to-urban migrants that are flooding China’s cities have fallen into a conspicuous 
gap in the provision of public education. (Rural Education Action Project 2009) 
According to Kwong (2006, 175), the educational problems faced by migrant children 
stem from the following:  
The situation is largely the fallout from the lag between educational legislation and the 
unanticipated nature and pace of social changes introduced by the market economy and the 
more liberal official stand on population and other social policies.  In education, the 
problem is both cultural and structural, and the responsibility does not lie within the 
educational system alone. 
Although migrant children’s education has been garnering an increasing amount 
of attention from the government and society, there remain serious gaps in knowledge.  
For example, there is a tendency among academics to attribute the obstacles migrant 
children face in attaining basic education to the hukou system.  As a result, even though 
the policy of “two priorities” calls for the decentralization of responsibilities to 
receiving governments, there has been little exploration of the role of policy 
implementation in producing or sustaining the problems of migrant schools mentioned 
                                                     
8
 See Hannum, Wang, and Adams (2010, 127-129) for a discussion of key policies concerning rural 
education.   
9
 As Postiglione (2006, 14) maintains, “the unleashing of market forces on rural China has led to 
more stress on the urban education system as a way to integrate rural children into the urban mainstream.”   
6 
above.  There is also a tendency to discuss the general problems of migrant children and 
migrant schools at the municipal level, with little attention given to district-level 
dynamics.  Since the central government sets policies in a way that often gives lower 
levels of government flexibility in interpreting them, much can be gained from an in-
depth analysis of the effects of policy implementation on migrant children’s education – 
and the situations of migrant schools in particular – in one city.  The purpose of this 
thesis is to provide such an analysis for the case of Beijing. 
 
Towards a More Nuanced Understanding of the  
Local Implementation of Policies and Its Impact on Migrant Schools in Beijing 
Beijing attracts migrant workers from across the country.  According to the 
Beijing Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission, the city had a floating 
population of about 5.4 million by 2007, almost 30 percent of its total population (Shan 
2007).  Based on data from the 2005 One-Percent Population Survey of China and a 
2006 one-percent floating population survey conducted in Beijing by Renmin 
University of China, it was calculated that there were about 504,000 children in 
Beijing’s floating population aged 14 and under by the mid-2000s (Zhai, Duan, and Bi 
2007; Duan and Yang 2008, 23).  By 2002, over 300 migrant schools had already been 
established in the city (cited by Kwong 2006, 171).  As of mid-2010, 66 had been 
licensed by the government.   
Since the policy of “two priorities” calls for the key role of public schools in 
educating migrant children, one might be tempted to assume that migrant schools are 
increasingly unimportant.  This thesis emphasizes that migrant schools continue to serve 
a critical function for migrant communities in Beijing.  Yet, nearly two decades after 
their first appearance in the capital city, they still lack the resources to provide a 
learning environment on par with urban public schools and, according to Lai et al. (2012, 
7 
15-16), even rural schools.  Despite central policies calling for increased management of 
and support for these schools, migrant schools in Beijing have not received much 
assistance from the municipal government.  Most are unlicensed and remain vulnerable 
to government closures.  What’s more, the city’s pursuit of urbanization has meant that 
the schools (and the migrant enclaves in which they are usually located) have been 
threatened with ongoing rounds of demolition.  The resulting situation is one in which 
the demand for migrant schools continues to exist, but they remain poor in condition 
and unstable.   
With the rising inflow of migrant families into Beijing, the educational 
opportunities available to migrant children are becoming an increasingly urgent issue.  
However, to date, no studies have analyzed in detail the potential causes and 
consequences of differential policy implementation in the area, especially at the district 
level.  In light of the policy of “two priorities,” this thesis highlights the development of 
two trends in Beijing: 1) the emergence of variation between district-level policy 
approaches towards migrant children’s education and particularly migrant schools and 2) 
increased civil society involvement.  It explores the interaction between these two 
trends and the consequences for migrant schools and their students.   
To address the bigger challenge identified, this thesis examines two sets of 
questions.  First, what policy attitudes and approaches have the Beijing municipal and 
selected district governments adopted towards migrant children’s education and why?  
How are they affecting the survival and development of migrant schools as a source of 
education for migrant children, and what has this meant for the quality of these schools 
in comparison to state-run public schools?  Second, what does this contribute to the 
understanding of policy implementation in the area, and what broader implications does 
this have for the future of migrant children’s education in Beijing and subsequently the 
8 
social exclusion of this segment of society?10  In tackling these questions, this study 
aims to: a) understand the policy history and local policy environment surrounding 
educational provision for migrant children in Beijing; b) explore how the selected 
districts are approaching the policy area and why; and c) examine how the municipal 
and district policy approaches are shaping the situations of migrant schools (both 
directly and indirectly, through civil society).  The objective is to shed light on the 
complex dynamics surrounding the survival and development of migrant schools, 
including the extent to which they are supported by government and society, and what 
this ultimately means for the future provision of education to migrant children in the 
capital city.   
Drawing on evidence from qualitative interviews and analysis of policy 
documents acquired during fieldwork, this thesis argues that the situations of migrant 
schools in Beijing are not only shaped by a general lack of support from the municipal 
government, but they are also substantially impacted by district-level policy 
implementation.  Using Haidian, Shijingshan, and Fengtai districts as cases, it finds that 
district-level policy approaches towards migrant schools vary based on local 
circumstances and shows that exploring the interaction between the government and 
civil society – including the extent to which district-level policy implementation affects 
civil society involvement and vice-versa – is crucial to understanding the situations of 
migrant schools in Beijing.  As will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the general lack 
of consistent, up-to-date data on migrant children in China makes it difficult to assess 
the impact of such policy processes on educational outcomes like academic 
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 As de Haan (1998, 12-13) maintains: “[Social exclusion] refers to exclusion (deprivation) in the 
economic, social and political sphere.  It goes beyond the analysis of resource allocation mechanisms, and 
includes power relations, agency, culture and social identity.  Social exclusion can refer to a state or 
situation, but it often refers to processes, to the mechanisms by which people are excluded.  The focus is 
on the institutions that enable or constrain human interaction.”  In the words of L. Wang (2008, 695), it 
“includes not only access to services but also discrimination in the delivery of those services through 
differences in quality, reach and effectiveness.” 
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performance and completion rates.  Still, this thesis illustrates that policy 
implementation – and the policy environment in which it operates – has a critical impact 
on migrant schools at the municipal and district levels, including the amount of outside 
support they and their students receive. 
The significance of examining these questions can largely be understood from 
two angles.  First, it enhances the understanding of differential policy implementation 
within a Chinese city, as well as how local policy processes in an increasingly important 
but complex policy area operate and the various motives and pressures involved.  It 
highlights the basic need to analyze the implementation process, including its 
relationship to policy history and local context, to more fully understand its 
consequences, and it illustrates the significance of looking beyond the role of 
institutional factors like the hukou system in driving policies concerning rural-urban 
migrants in China.  The findings provide evidence to support the idea that 
implementation is not simply a separate activity that occurs after policy decisions or an 
administrative process meant to resolve the problem identified in the policy (as treated 
by the linear model of policy processes) and is, in actuality, highly complicated.  This 
study therefore makes a major contribution to the conceptualization of policy processes 
in an urban Chinese context, particularly valuable in light of the general lack of 
literature on policy processes in the realms of migration and education in China.   
Second, while it is difficult to envision what Chinese society will look like in 
another 30 years from now, this exploration sheds light on wider issues that may surface 
in the future, including the longer-term impacts of economic reforms and policy on 
trends in social stratification and the intergenerational transmission of poverty in China.  
Thus, this study strengthens the grasp of potential future trends concerning both policy 
processes and societal development.  As Zhong (2003, 4) notes: “[E]conomic reform 
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and decentralization in the past decade have brought about significant changes to local 
government and politics; these may provide crucial clues as to where China’s future 
development is heading.” 
Ultimately, conducting research concerning policy processes in China is a 
fundamentally difficult task.  As Howell (2003, 198) emphasizes: 
Fathoming processes of policy change is inexorably complex, not least because change can 
rarely be reduced to a single agent.  In the case of China, charting the policy process is 
particularly challenging.  Though there is greater openness and transparency than in the pre-
reform era, institutional structures and decision-making mechanisms remain opaque, 
information is limited and access by researchers to key players is constrained. 
Nevertheless, this thesis contributes a useful case study that examines the range of 
factors shaping the situations of migrant schools and their students at the municipal and 
district levels.  It sheds light on the complexities of decentralization and policy 
implementation and how they may be contributing to an increasingly stratified urban 
society.  Such an analysis of the local policy environment and the actors involved – 
including their roles, motives, and willingness and capacity to assist migrant schools – 
will provide a much needed framework for state and civil society actors to understand 
the dynamics surrounding differential policy implementation and will serve as a 
foundation upon which to identify a set of realistic, effective steps to improve 
educational provision for migrant children in Beijing.   
 
Chapter Summary  
 The first section of this thesis provides the necessary background information 
and creates a framework for analysis.  Chapter 2 examines the main bodies of literature 
relevant to this study.  It starts by discussing the key migration patterns and policies in 
China over time and the central government’s shift towards the more positive treatment 
of migrant workers in the early 2000s.  It then identifies important gaps in the 
understanding of migrant children’s education, including how and with what 
11 
consequences policies in the area are implemented, and proposes an analytical 
framework that draws on the broader literatures on policy processes and 
decentralization, as well as literature concerning migration-education linkages, 
educational inequality, urbanization, and policy processes in China.  Within this 
framework, the roles of policy history, local context, and civil society are explored as 
potential factors shaping policy implementation.  Chapter 3 discusses the rationale 
behind the selection of Beijing and Haidian, Shijingshan, and Fengtai districts as field 
sites and the methods of data collection used during fieldwork.    
 The second section analyzes the policy environment in Beijing and its impact on 
the situations of migrant schools and their students at the municipal and district levels.  
Chapter 4 evaluates the central and municipal policies on migrant children’s education, 
highlighting the interaction between migration and education patterns and policies 
against the backdrop of China’s economic reforms.  It identifies major themes in the 
evolution of the central and Beijing municipal policies, including key differences 
between them, and points to the need to understand the internal dynamics operating 
within cities.  Chapter 5 emphasizes the importance of district policy approaches and the 
role of local context.  It examines the approaches adopted by the Haidian, Shijingshan, 
and Fengtai district governments and identifies fundamental differences between the 
three trajectories.  Chapter 6 then analyzes the impact of the municipal and district 
policy approaches on migrant schools in Beijing and draws attention to the gap between 
central-level policy ideals and the local reality.  Evidence is used to show that migrant 
schools in Beijing still face some of the same basic problems as they did during the 
1990s – a general lack of resources and poor physical conditions, a low quality of 
teaching, instability, and difficulties acquiring licenses – and that both the municipal 
and district policy approaches have shaped the situations of the schools in these four 
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areas.  Chapter 7 assesses the role of the civil society actors involved, mainly academics 
and researchers, the media, university student organizations, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), migrant school principals’ and teachers’ associations, and 
migrant parent activists.  It argues that, due in large part to the local policy environment 
(including district-level dynamics), the capacity of these actors to significantly impact 
the situations of migrant schools and their students remains low. 
 The final section, Chapter 8, summarizes the conclusions of the study and draws 
implications for understandings of policy implementation and migrant children’s 
education in Beijing.  This is followed by a list of policy and program recommendations 
and suggestions for future research.  Based on the findings, the chapter emphasizes the 
urgent need to adopt targeted measures to assist and improve migrant schools in the city, 
at least in the short term, and offers suggestions as to how this can be achieved. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
EDUCATIONAL PROVISION FOR MIGRANT CHILDREN:  
A LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
Despite increased scholarly attention, there remain serious gaps in the 
understanding of migrant children’s education in China, particularly in terms of the 
impact of policy implementation.  In light of the increasing urgency of the subject, this 
chapter reviews the relevant bodies of literature and proposes an analytical framework 
that will allow for a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics surrounding migrant 
children’s education in Beijing and ultimately create a stronger foundation for 
improving the situations of migrant schools in the city.   
The chapter starts by highlighting key migration patterns and policies in China 
since 1949, providing useful historical background and motivating a closer examination 
of educational provision for migrant children.  It then explores the literatures on 
migration-education linkages, rural-urban migration and urbanization, and educational 
inequality in China and how they relate to migrant children’s education and trends in 
social stratification.  The discussion shows that research on the subject often focuses on 
describing the situations of migrant schools but fails to analyze the potential range of 
factors leading to those outcomes in the first place.  Much of the literature on China’s 
internal migration also emphasizes the hukou system’s impact on policies regarding 
rural-urban migrants, resulting in a tendency to overlook the effects of differential 
policy implementation within localities.  Given these gaps, the chapter turns to the 
policy processes literature, in which policy history, local context, and civil society are 
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increasingly relevant considerations, and creates a framework for analyzing policy 
implementation and its consequences for the situations of migrant schools and their 
students. 
 
Internal Migration Patterns and Policies since 1949 
1949-1978 
 Though internal migration in China is often discussed in the post-1978 context 
of China’s economic reforms, it is useful to highlight some of the pre-1978 
developments, given that “[t]he roots of China’s present migration problems lie in the 
policies of the first decades of the People’s Republic” (Davin 1999, 18).  Before 1978, a 
substantial amount of migration was initiated and controlled by the state.  As Liu and 
Chan (2001, 76) write: “The state regulated and directly intervened in the migration 
process through a complex network of institutions, the most important of which were 
labor planning, the state’s employment monopoly, residential control, mobilization and 
the work unit system.”1   
Still, migration outside these initiatives did occur.  The period between 1951 and 
1960 was one of increasing rural-urban migration; about 19.8 million people migrated 
from rural to urban areas between 1953 and 1956 alone (Roberts 1997, 255; Liang 2001, 
500).  This, according to Lary (1999, 34), “was an ideological problem for the 
Communist leadership, whose development strategy was posited on rural revolution, on 
bringing a better life to peasants; this did not mean letting them run away to the cities.”  
The result was the emergence of policies to address this migration, most notably the 
                                                     
1
 Such migration was often driven by the government’s desire to achieve policy objectives like 
economic growth via state planning (Lary 1999, 30-31).  According to Fan (1999, 956): “The most vivid 
examples include the transfer of millions of people to inland ‘Third Front’ locations during the 1950s and 
1960s (Naughton, 1988) and the ‘rustification’ (xiafang) of urban youths and intellectuals to the 
countryside and remote regions during the 1960s and 1970s (Cheng, 1991).” 
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Ministry of Public Security’s “Interim Regulations on Urban Household 
Administration” (Chengshi hukou guanli zanxing tiaoli) (July 1951).  The regulations 
set up the hukou system in urban areas, primarily meant to monitor, rather than control, 
population mobility (Cheng and Selden 1994, 649; Chan and Zhang 1999, 819-820).2   
As rural-urban migration increased, however, the government strengthened 
efforts to end the “blind flows” of rural labor.  The “Joint Directive to Control Blind 
Influx of Peasants into Cities” (Guanyu jixu guanche quanzhi nongmin mangmu liuru 
chengshi de zhishi), issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Labor in 
March 1954, is an early example; it stipulated that the state would be responsible for 
regulating labor mobility and employment.  In December 1954, the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress issued the “Regulations for Public Security 
Substations” (Gongan paichusuo zuzhi tiaoli) and the “Organic Regulations of Urban 
Street Offices” (Jiedao banshichu zuzhi tiaoli).  Both increased government control over 
migration within and between rural and urban areas (Cheng and Selden 1994, 654-655).   
In June 1955, the State Council’s “Directive Concerning the Establishment of a 
Permanent System of Household Registration” (Guanyu jianli jingchang hukou dengji 
zhidu de zhishi) extended the hukou system to rural areas.  This led to the “Regulations 
on Household Registration in the People’s Republic of China” (Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo hukou dengji tiaoli), issued by the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress in January 1958 (Cheng and Selden 1994, pp. 655-656, 662).  The 
regulations applied the hukou system to all citizens, “establish[ing] a fully-fledged 
hukou institution and grant[ing] state agencies much greater powers in controlling 
citizens’ geographical mobility through a system of migration permits and recruitment 
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 The “Decision on Labor Employment Problems” (Guanyu laodong jiuye wenti de jueding), issued 
by the State Council in August 1952, is another example.  It was one of the earliest policies to more 
thoroughly tackle the issue of rural-urban migration, though it did not create ways to regulate or stop the 
population flows (Cheng and Selden 1994, 650). 
16 
and enrolment certificates” (Chan and Zhang 1999, 820).  Citizens would be divided by 
their place of registration (hukou suozaidi), rural or urban, and type of registration 
(hukou leibie), agricultural or non-agricultural.3  The impact was extensive: 
New migrants without a certificate of employment or of school admission had now to obtain 
a moving-in certificate (zhun qian zhen[g]) from the police in the city to which they 
intended to move (Hukou Regulations, 1958, article 10).  Without this approval they were 
unable to obtain a moving-out certificate (qian yi zhen[g]), which they needed to leave their 
home area.  The effect was that after 1958 rural people could no longer seek employment in 
the cities at will.  Urban enterprises were still permitted to recruit labour from the 
countryside when they required it, but increasingly sought short-term contract workers who 
were not given the job security or social benefits of permanent workers, and had to return to 
their place of origin at the end of their contracts. (Davin 1999, 8) 
By 1956, the household registration system had already created “a deep but not 
impermeable divide between urban and rural areas, between workers and collective 
farmers, between the state sector and the collective sector” (Cheng and Selden 1994, 
660-661).  
 
Post-1978 
While levels of hukou migration have been relatively stable since 1978,4 
migration without a change in household registration has been rising since the early 
1980s (see Table 2.1).5  This post-1978 rural-urban migration can be broken down into 
four stages6:  
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 See Chan and Zhang (1999, 821-823) for an explanation of this dual classification system. 
4
 Hukou migration involves a formal change of residency (Chan and Buckingham 2008, 590). 
5
 Several factors contributed to this wave of migration: “(1) rural decollectivization, which has set 
free surplus labourers previously tied to the place of residence in the countryside; (2) rapid expansion of 
the urban economy, especially in the labour intensive sectors, creating ten of millions of low-skilled jobs; 
(3) continuing large gaps in living standards between cities and the countryside in many regions, 
especially since the mid-1980s; (4) concurrent relaxation of migratory controls and development of urban 
food and labour markets; (5) increasing regional specialization of skills, partly based on different 
traditions; and (6) the development and expansion of migrant networks (see Mallee 1988; A. Liu 1991; 
Chan 1994; Nolan 1993; Zhao 1994)” (Chan 1999, 50). 
6
 Much of this migration has been chain migration, where “[e]arlier migrants provide information and 
assistance with moving, finding jobs and accommodation to later migrants from their own villages, thus 
linking specific origins with specific destinations” (Mallee 2003, 143).  Native-place networks have 
helped guide migrants into various sectors, jobs, and destinations (Ma and Xiang 1998; Roberts 2002, 
150).  Most of this migration has also been circular (i.e., every year some migrants leave for the cities and 
others return) (Davin 1996, 662). 
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The early 1980s witnessed the start of this mobility, which was largely confined to 
movements within the coastal region.  It was estimated that no more than two million 
farmers were involved, based on their county of origin.  During the mid-1980s (1984-1988), 
rural sector reforms quickly took off and township and village enterprises grew rapidly.  
These enterprises began to absorb a large amount of rural labor from within their provinces, 
estimated at about 63 million by a retrospective study funded by the Ford Foundation.  In 
the meantime, inter-provincial migration increased steadily as well.  The period between the 
late 1980s and mid-1990s witnessed perhaps the height of labor mobility, at the end of 
which time about 75 million people were on the move and about 25 to 28 million of them 
were inter-provincial migrants.  The scope of migration also widened significantly, 
involving multi-directional flows.  The late 1990s (since around 1997) showed a relative 
stabilization of migration, largely due to a macro economic slowdown.  By the end of 2000, 
approximately 70 million rural migrants were working and living in urban areas, according to 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. (Wu 2001, 60-61) 
 
Table 2.1 The Post-1978 Rise in Rural Labor Migration  
Year Out of Township Migrants (Millions) 
1982 2.0 
1989 30.0 
1993 62.0 
1997 77.2 
2001 89.6 
2004 102.6 
Source: These figures were cited in Wang and Cai (2007, 16, table 4). 
 
To understand this chronology, it is useful to examine the interaction between 
these migration patterns and key policy changes.  As internal migration started to 
increase in the early 1980s, the government responded by adopting a policy of 
promoting small towns and rural industry to minimize rural-urban migration and keep 
migrants out of cities with populations of at least 500,000 people (Davin 1999, 40).7  
Concerns about migration also led to the State Council’s “Measures for the Custody and 
Repatriation of Vagrants and Beggars in Cities” (Chengshi liulang qitao renyuan 
shourong qiansong banfa) in May 1982, which stated that cities would need to create 
“custody and repatriation stations” (shourong qiansong zhan) for rural beggars in cities, 
urban vagrants and beggars, and other people without homes and send them back to 
their place of hukou registration (see Li 2004, 17). 
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 To an extent, the results were significant; the number of rural enterprises, for example, increased 
from 1.5 million to 18.5 million between 1978 and 1990 and reached 23 million in 1996 (cited by Davin 
1999, 41). 
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By the mid-1980s, however, it became clear that this strategy could not solve the 
problems posed by large-scale rural-urban migration, resulting in new rules for 
temporary residence.  The “Interim Regulations on the Management of Temporary 
Residents in Cities and Towns” (Guanyu chengzhen zanzhu renkou guanli de zanxing 
guiding), issued by the Ministry of Public Security in July 1985, stipulated that migrants 
who were 16 or older and were residing in towns and cities for a period of over three 
months would need to apply for temporary residence permits (Wang and Cai 2007, 17-
18).8  The objectives can be summarized as follows: 
It was hoped that the system of temporary registration would restore some control of the 
migrant population to the local authorities, assist with the maintenance of social order and 
help urban planners.…  The system also enabled local administrations to raise revenue from 
the migrant population in the form of registration fees.  The existence of a temporary 
registration system allows local governments to reduce migrant populations selectively 
when they so wish by expelling all unregistered outsiders.  This also gives them a rough-
and-ready way of distinguishing between the more successful and stable migrants who are 
more likely to register, and unemployed or underemployed transients. (Davin 1999, 43) 
This regulation, along with the introduction of an identity card system in 1986, was 
designed to discourage, or even control, rural-urban migration.  Registration assigned 
temporary migrants a status that would prevent them from enjoying the same privileges 
and services as urban residents (Davin 1999, pp. 21-22, 43-44, 46).  It can be argued, 
though, that the document actually led to a relaxation of barriers to migration.  As Yang 
and Guo (1999, 932) assert, “the government started relaxing its control over urban 
residence in the mid-1980s, allowing rural peasants to live in urban places as temporary 
residents provided they meet their own employment, housing and other service needs.” 
Indeed, the 1985 regulation enabled many migrants from rural areas to stay in 
urban areas for substantial amounts of time and, as a result, helped stimulate rural-urban 
migration in the late 1980s.  The government response was, again, to introduce 
measures to try to limit such migration.  This included new measures concerning hukou 
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 After paying for the permits, migrants occasionally had to pay an additional fee to the local public 
security bureau for using urban services (Davin 1999, 43). 
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transfers and sales.  Many cities, for example, started selling permanent registration 
certificates, with prices ranging, for instance, from 3,500 to 60,000 RMB.  Such 
measures allowed cities to selectively attract wealthier permanent residents (cited by 
Davin 1999, pp. 36, 44-46). 
Still, internal migration continued to increase in the early 1990s.9  In 1992, Deng 
Xiaoping’s southern tour stimulated further economic growth, and the resulting 
development of private economic sectors increased the demand for rural laborers, 
leading to higher levels of interregional migration (Wang and Cai 2007, 15-16).  The 
sheer magnitude of migration in the late 1980s and early 1990s set the stage for a 
tightening of policies in the mid-1990s.  The government made increasing efforts to 
limit the flow of rural laborers, as well as the jobs and services they would be eligible 
for at the destination.  For example, the Ministry of Labor issued the “Interim 
Regulations on the Management of Cross-Provincial Employment of Rural Workers” 
(Nongcun laodongli kuasheng liudong jiuye guanli zanxing guiding) in November 1994.  
The document stated that rural migrants must acquire an employment registration card 
from the local labor and employment agency before departing and an employment 
registration certificate after reaching their destination.  Together, the card and certificate 
would serve as an employment certificate, which would function as an identification 
card and make them eligible for services offered by career centers.  The regulation also 
introduced restrictions on the capacity of urban employers to hire employees from other 
provinces; a worker from another province could only be hired when there were no 
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 The 1990s was also a period during which street children began to attract more attention.  
According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, there were at least 150,000 street children in Chinese cities by 
the mid-2000s, and most came from poor rural areas (Xinhua News Agency 2005a).  According to Wu 
(2001, 87): “The most common ways of making a livelihood for street children are scavenging, begging 
and stealing, polishing shoes, selling flowers, and working temporarily on construction sites.…  With 
unstable living arrangements, most street children seek shelter on construction sites, in abandoned 
buildings, in parks and bus terminals, and on the street.  Some children come with migrant parents or 
other adults, and are taken care of by the adults.” 
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qualified local workers and when the local labor and employment agency had approved 
(see Li 2004, 22; Wang and Cai 2007, 19).10   
Moreover, the “blue stamp hukou” (lanyin hukou), formally introduced in 1992, 
became widespread in big cities during the mid- to late 1990s (Chan and Zhang 1999, 
836-840; Fan 2002, 108).  Such a hukou entitled one to the same privileges as local 
residents in terms of education and welfare (cited by Shen and Huang 2003, 53-54).  Its 
attainment, however, would depend on a considerable fee and conditions involving age, 
skills, education, and major investments or home purchases, making most rural migrants 
ineligible (Chan and Zhang 1999, 838; Fan 2002, 108).  Also during this period, many 
cities, including Shanghai and Beijing, resorted to more forceful measures, including 
sending migrants back to their places of registration and demolishing migrant villages 
(Li 1996, 1123).  Such measures corresponded to a period in which rural-urban 
migration continued to increase, albeit at a slower speed (Mallee 2003, 143). 
 Starting in the early 2000s, rural-urban migration sped up once again (Wang and 
Cai 2007, 16-17).  This can be attributed to efforts by the central government to 
facilitate migration and improve the treatment of migrant workers in a context in which 
issues concerning migrant workers’ rights had begun to attract more attention (due, for 
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 The document provided the impetus for local governments to introduce their own regulations.  In 
1995, Shanghai’s labor bureau issued the “Administrative Measures for the Categorized Usage and 
Employment of Labor from Outside Shanghai by Local Employers” (Shanghaishi danwei shiyong he 
pinyong waidi laodongli fenlei guanli banfa), which introduced three categories of jobs: jobs that allowed 
outside laborers, jobs that allowed only the limited employment of outside laborers, and jobs that were not 
open to outside laborers.  Similarly, in 1996, Beijing’s labor bureau issued “The 1996 List of Industries 
and Jobs for which the Usage of People from Outside Beijing is Allowed or Restricted” (1996 nian benshi 
yunxu he xianzhi shiyong waidi renyuan de hangye gongzhong fanwei) and the “Notice of the Beijing 
Bureau of Labor on Issues Concerning Employers Recruiting Workers from Outside Beijing” (Beijingshi 
laodongju guanyu yongren danwei zhaoyong waidi wugong renyuan youguan wenti de tongzhi), which 
were both based on the notion of “urban first, rural second” and “Beijing first, outside second” (Li 2004, 
22-23). 
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instance, to occurrences like the Sun Zhigang incident).11  As Huang and Zhan (2005, 
72) describe: 
In the period 2000-2004, the Chinese leadership made a serious effort to fundamentally 
review the official approach to labour migration.  Several policy initiatives to free the labour 
market across China and guarantee more equitable opportunities for migrant labourers were 
undertaken. 
In March 2001, for example, the government made the decision to reform the 
hukou system, beginning with small towns.12  The reforms include the elimination of the 
fee previously charged to temporary residence permit applicants and restrictions on the 
length of stay.  Also in 2001, the State Development and Planning Committee (known 
as the State Development and Reform Committee since 2003) outlined a five-year plan 
to create a unified labor market, as well as remove restrictions on rural labor mobility 
and build an employment registration system and a new social security scheme.  In 
January 2002, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State 
Council issued the “Opinions on Carrying out Agricultural and Rural Work in 2002” 
(Guanyu zuohao 2002 nian nongye he nongcun gongzuo de yijian).  The document 
emphasizes the contributions of migrant workers to urban development since the 1980s 
and discusses rural-urban migration as a natural outcome of economic development.  It 
calls for efforts to provide migrants with better services and management and to treat 
them fairly and eliminate unreasonable restrictions (Huang and Pieke 2005, 113-114). 
 Of particular significance is the “Circular of the General Office of the State 
Council on Strengthening Employment Management and Service Work for Rural 
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 In 2003, Sun, a migrant worker and university graduate, was beaten to death at a clinic for vagrants 
and beggars in Guangzhou three days after being detained for not possessing a temporary residence 
permit (Liu 2003).    
12
 The new policies following the hukou reform can be summarized as follows: “Residency in small 
towns and townships is open to all rural workers who legally have a job and a place to live; [m]edium-
sized cities and some provincial capitals have abolished the cap on the number of rural laborers who can 
apply for permanent residence status; [and] [m]ega cities such as Shanghai and Beijing have adopted a 
policy of ‘widening the gate, raising the price,’ which still limits the number of rural laborers who can 
obtain permanent residence status” (Huang and Pieke 2005, 114).  
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Migrant Workers” (Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu zuohao nongmin jincheng wugong 
jiuye guanli he fuwu gongzuo de tongzhi), issued in January 2003, which Zhao (2003, 
168) refers to as “a turning point in public policy.”  The document emphasizes the 
importance of rural-urban migration to urbanization and industrialization and highlights 
key problems faced by migrants, including the lack of protection of their rights and 
limitations concerning job eligibility.13  It discusses several steps to address the 
unreasonable restrictions placed on migrant workers, such as improving living 
conditions and access to services like vocational training, and its comprehensiveness 
“makes it by far the most important policy statement of the central authorities in this 
area” (Huang and Pieke 2005, 115). 
In June 2003, the State Council also replaced the “Measures for the Custody and 
Repatriation of Vagrants and Beggars in Cities” (1982) – which, in the words of Li 
(2004, 17), “had become the nightmare of rural workers for more than 20 years” – with 
the “Administrative Measures for Assisting Vagrants and Beggars with No Means of 
Support in Cities” (Chengshi shenghuo wuzhe de liulang qitao renyuan jiuzhu guanli 
banfa).  Instead of “custody and repatriation stations,” vagrants and beggars are 
encouraged to go to “assistance stations” (jiuzhu zhan), which, for example, provide 
food and accommodation, send patients to hospitals, and provide assistance in 
contacting family members or employers (see Li 2004, 17-18).   
Furthermore, in September 2003, the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Labor 
and Social Security, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Technology, Ministry of 
Construction, and Ministry of Finance launched the “Nationwide Training Plan for 
Rural Migrants (2003-2010)” (2003-2010 nian quanguo nongmingong peixun guihua), 
which calls for stronger efforts to provide basic training to migrant workers (Wang and 
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 Such sentiments were expanded on in 2004 and 2005 circulars (Davies and Ramia 2008, 142-143). 
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Cai 2007, 20).  In addition, the “Opinions of the State Council on Solving the Problems 
of Migrant Workers” (Guowuyuan guanyu jiejue nongmingong wenti de ruogan yijian), 
issued in January 2006, discusses protecting the rights of migrant workers and 
improving their treatment and the services available to them.  As Chan and Buckingham 
(2008, 601) contend, “the generally pro-mingong rhetoric of the document is a welcome 
move in setting a more positive tone for creating a better work and living environment 
for migrant labour.”  And, in June 2007, the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress approved the Labor Contract Law (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
laodong hetongfa), calling for a range of protections to enhance migrant workers’ 
capacity to acquire long-term jobs (China Labour Bulletin 2007). 
The above discussion illustrates a major shift towards improving the treatment 
of and services available to rural-urban migrants since the early 2000s.  Ultimately, 
however, “how many of these ‘good intentions’ will get implemented remains to be 
seen” (Chan and Buckingham 2008, 601).  Indeed, there remain serious questions 
surrounding the local effects of such recent policies, including the consequences for the 
children of these workers and their education in the cities. 
 
Migration-Education Linkages 
Since this study’s focus is on migrant children’s education, it is useful to first 
examine the linkages between migration and education.  Although there is little 
theoretical analysis of these linkages, one can draw on migration literature and 
empirical evidence from case studies to illustrate the importance of exploring them.  
There is, for example, increasing discussion of the educational attainment of migrants 
(e.g., Waddington 2003, 30-31; Quinn and Rubb 2005; Skeldon 2005, 14-19), as well as 
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education as a motive for internal and international migration (e.g., Todaro 1980, 377; 
Waddington 2003, 31; Hashim 2005, 18-21).   
Migration can also have a critical impact on children’s educational opportunities.  
In the United States, for instance, the children of migrant farmworkers are usually 
extremely poor and live in immigrant households.  Many work to support their families, 
and those that attend school typically face a range of educational problems given their 
socioeconomic status and high mobility (Branz-Spall, Rosenthal, and Wright 2003, 55-
56).  Kandel and Kao (2001, pp. 1206, 1227) find that, while the financial gains of 
Mexican labor migration to the United States may help in allowing migrants’ children to 
continue their education, migration has also led to the “reproduction of low-skilled, low-
paid immigrants within the U.S. labor market and a barrier to higher educational 
development in Mexican migrant-sending communities.”  In Europe, migrant students 
can be at a disadvantage in terms of enrollment and dropout rates, length of schooling, 
achievement indicators, and types of diplomas obtained, though educational attainment 
among them is generally greater in countries with stronger preschool and childcare 
systems and less economic inequality (Heckmann 2008, 74).  In Bangladesh, children 
who migrate from rural to urban areas – on their own, with other children, or with 
family members – can face different situations as well.  In cases where families migrate, 
children’s schooling depends on factors including the reasons behind the family’s 
decision to migrate and how well they adjust to living in a city.  In cases of short-term 
migration and/or multiple movements, migrant children may be unable to go to school 
on a regular basis.  Autonomous migration can have complex effects on education that 
are closely tied to issues of child labor (Giani 2006, pp. 1, 16).  Thus, migrant children 
in different localities may face the combined impacts of migration, poverty, and cultural 
barriers in attaining education.  However, there is no universal relationship between 
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migration and education, and the nature and impact of these linkages are often shaped 
by the local context (Hashim 2005, 13; Quinn and Rubb 2005, 154; Whitehead and 
Hashim 2005, pp. 3, 27).   
In China, the relationship between internal migration and education is not 
straightforward.  On the one hand, migration can encourage expenditure on rural 
education (e.g., through remittances).  Migrants contribute financially to the household, 
which may increase parents’ investment in their children’s schooling (Murphy 2002, 97).  
Many migrants also view education in the cities as a tool to help their children break out 
of poverty and enhance their social status (Kwong 2004, 1077).14  On the other hand, 
many parents in rural areas may see education as being ultimately pointless since they 
can easily acquire unskilled jobs in cities, and they may see school-related fees as 
burdens inflicted by the government (Qin 1997, 60; Murphy 2002, 92-93).  Similarly, 
many rural children of middle school age may feel that an extra year or two of education 
will not substantially improve their job opportunities, so they stop attending school and 
migrate to cities (Murphy 2002, 93).  Many migrant children may also be pressured to 
make financial contributions to their families, which may sometimes lead them to work 
– e.g., selling flowers, shining shoes, or recycling garbage – rather than attend school 
(Wu 2001, 85; Murphy 2002, 107).   
Moreover, migration can negatively affect education for China’s “left-behind 
children” (liushou ertong), the children of migrant laborers who are left behind in rural 
areas, usually under the care of grandparents.  While official estimates suggest there are 
20 million left-behind children, a study by the All-China Women’s Federation used 
2005 census data to argue that there are 58 million left-behind children under 18 years 
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 One factor leading to the emergence of education as a motive for migration during the 1980s was 
the declining educational situation in rural areas, where economic and educational policies were limiting 
the number of schools and increasing the costs of educational provision.  The result was rural-urban 
stratification in the education system, prohibiting rural children from moving up the social ladder 
(Hannum 1999, 210).   
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old, making up 28 percent of all children in rural areas and 21 percent of all children in 
the country (cited by China Labour Bulletin 2008).  Lu (2007, 28, table 3.1) contends 
that left-behind children attending primary and middle school constitute 86 percent of 
all left-behind children.  Being left behind can have major consequences for their 
education; academic performance tends to decline after their parents migrate, and many 
suffer from behavioral and psychological problems (Lu 2007, pp. 151-156, 164-170; 
China Labour Bulletin 2008).   
Thus, the relationship between migration and education can be highly complex.  
Since China has the world’s most rapidly growing market economy, largest student 
population, and largest internal migrant population, much benefit could come from 
further research on the linkages between migration, educational inequality, and social 
stratification in China (Postiglione 2006, 18-19).   
 
Migrant Children’s Education in China 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, an increasing number of migrant workers take their 
children with them or have children in the cities (Guo 2002, 358; Kwong 2004, 1076-
1077).15  Based on data from the 2005 One-Percent Population Survey of China, the 
number of children in the floating population aged 14 and under had reached 18.34 
million, accounting for 12.45 percent of the floating population; this was a 30 percent 
increase from the figure provided in the Fifth National Population Census in 2000.  The 
2005 survey data also indicated that children of the floating population made up a 
significant proportion of the children in cities (e.g., one-third of the children in Shanghai 
                                                     
15
 The exact period during which migrant children began to move with their parents into cities on a 
large scale cannot be discussed with certainty.  There was a major underreporting of children in the 1982, 
1990, and 2000 censuses, and underreporting in 2000 was three times greater than that in the earlier 
censuses.  This was largely due to incentives faced by government officials and parents to underreport; 
for example, since the early 1990s, local officials have been held accountable in cases where family 
planning regulations were violated (Goodkind 2004, pp. 281-282, 288). 
27 
and 23.83 percent of the children in Beijing) (Bi 2009).  These families usually remain 
in the cities for longer amounts of time.  The average length of stay for migrants in 
Beijing, for instance, is roughly two years, but many migrant families stay for over a 
decade (cited by Postiglione 2006, 15).  This surge in the number of school-aged 
migrant children in cities since the early 1990s has increased the urgency of issues 
concerning their education (Lu and Zhang 2004, 65).  
Despite the policy reforms discussed earlier, migrant workers are not considered 
urban residents under the hukou system and have frequently faced “the discrimination of 
local government policy and non policy factors (such as the discrimination and spiting 
of local residents) in their employment … and daily life (health-care, schooling, and 
housing)” (Zhou 2000, 31-32).  They have, in the words of Li (2004, 28), become “the 
largest group of the underclass living in urban areas,” with important consequences for 
their children’s education.  China’s Compulsory Education Law (1986) stipulated that 
the government would provide nine years of primary and middle school education to 
students free of tuition; this would apply to “[a]ll children who have reached the age of 
six … regardless of sex, nationality or race,” adding that the start of schooling could be 
delayed to the age of seven in areas where this is not possible.  Under this system, local 
governments were only in charge of providing education to children with local 
household registration (Han 2001, 17; Kwong 2006, 168-169).   
As a result, in the early to mid-1990s, migrant parents began to find other ways 
to educate their children.  Initially, this involved tutoring or teaching classes in 
makeshift settings like vegetable sheds and shanties, and eventually migrants’ homes 
and deserted buildings (Han 2001, 1-5).  Over time, the number of migrant schools 
increased, particularly in major cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing, and 
Wuhan (Project Team on Rural Labor Migration 2001, 119).  In one Shanghai district, 
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for instance, the number of migrant schools grew from eight to 105 between 1995 and 
2000 (cited by Kwong 2006, 171).  These schools have become a critical source of 
education for migrant children due to factors like their low fees and the sense of 
community they offer (Chen and Liang 2007, 125-126).  
Yet knowledge of the nature and scale of the educational exclusion of migrant 
children remains limited.  First, there is a lack of consistent, up-to-date data.  For 
example, China’s Department of Basic Education reported in 1996 that the enrollment 
rate among migrant children in the country was 96.2 percent (cited by Nielsen et al. 
2006, 462).  Based on 1997 Beijing Migrant Census data, it was estimated that 88 
percent of Beijing’s migrant children were enrolled in school (Guo 2002, 357).  Another 
estimate, however, suggested that only 40 percent of Beijing’s migrant children aged 
five to 12 were attending school in 1995, compared to 100 percent of local children in 
the same age group (cited by Solinger 1999, 266).  In addition, whereas the China News 
Agency stated that as few as 12.5 percent of Beijing’s migrant children were attending 
school in 2001, the Xinhua News Agency claimed that nearly 80 percent of the city’s 
migrant children were in public schools in 2002 (cited by Kwong 2006, 169).  Such 
variation reflects to a large extent the challenges of establishing a sampling frame for 
migrant children and has greatly limited the understanding of the educational exclusion 
of this group and, ultimately, educational inequality in China (Hannum, Wang, and 
Adams 2010, 145).   
Additional problems also exist.  Official data may often only include migrants 
with temporary residence permits, leaving a large number uncounted, while statistics 
like those in the 1997 Beijing Migrant Census do not necessarily differentiate between 
government-sponsored schools and migrant schools (Guo 2002, pp. 359, 372).  
Moreover, many migrant children in school are overage, making it more difficult to 
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assess their situations (Lu and Zhang 2004, 63-64).  For example, a 2004 study by the 
National Working Committee for Children and Women and UNICEF estimated that 47 
percent of six-year-old migrant children were still not attending school and that a 
number of children aged 11 to 14 were only in the first or second grade (cited by 
Nielsen et al. 2006, 462). 
Second, there is a lack of extensive research.  Literature on migrant children’s 
education tends to be descriptive, usually discussing the common problems of migrant 
schools and general barriers to public school education.  To the best of my knowledge, 
only two major studies have compared aspects of migrant and public schools in Beijing 
(Song, Loyalka, and Wei 2009; Lai et al. 2012).  Both indicate gaps between migrant 
and public schools in terms of the quality of education and the educational performance 
of migrant children, though, due to limited access, the study by Lai et al. (2012) 
included only four public schools.  Indeed, serious difficulties gaining access to public 
schools remain, further limiting the understanding of migrant children’s education.   
What’s more, the discussion of policies on migrant children’s education tends to 
emphasize the impact of the hukou system and the general role of local governments in 
providing education for these children (see Guo 2002; Han 2003; Lu and Zhang 2004; 
Kwong 2006; Liang and Chen 2007; Z. Wang 2009).  It falls short of analyzing policy 
implementation, and there is also a tendency to discuss municipal-level situations, with 
little attention given to district-level dynamics (e.g., China Labour Bulletin 2008).  Li 
(2004, 28), for instance, writes that in some cities, like Beijing, the government exerts 
strict control over migrant schools, while in others, like Shanghai, the government is 
working to improve them.  Such generalizations inherently overlook potential variation 
within cities, making additional research critical. 
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Rural-Urban Migration, the Hukou System, and Urbanization 
As discussed earlier, the Chinese government initiated efforts to improve the 
treatment of rural-urban migrants in the early 2000s, raising important questions 
surrounding the continued relevance of the hukou system (Liang and Ma 2004, 484; Lu 
2008, 56).  Since the 1980s, a series of reforms have led to a relaxation of previous 
restraints on internal migration.  As Wu and Treiman (2004, 364-365) summarize:  
First, the abolition of the commune system and the introduction of the “household 
responsibility system” made individual households responsible for particular plots and 
allowed producers to sell any surplus grain on the open market, greatly improving the 
efficiency of agricultural production.  Peasants were thus freed from the land to seek jobs in 
the industrial and service sectors (Liang 2001; Lin 1988).  Second, the erosion of the rigid 
danwei-based rationing system created social space for rural migrants in urban areas (Liang 
and White 1997:322).  To enhance the development of the urban service sector, the 
government allowed peasants to enter cities and establish small businesses, such as shoe-
repair shops, barbershops, and restaurants (Wu and Xie 2003).  Furthermore, the growing 
market sector outside the redistributive system demanded more cheap labor.  Even some 
state-owned work units preferred to hire rural peasants either because they had no 
commitment to peasant-workers’ housing and other social benefits or because the jobs were 
unattractive to urban workers.  Hence, both push and pull factors increased the propensity to 
migrate from the countryside into the cities.   
Despite these reforms, there remains a tendency to emphasize the hukou 
system’s continued impact on trends in social stratification (see Davin 1999, 48; Wu 
and Treiman 2004; Chan and Buckingham 2008; Lu 2008) (see Table 2.2).  
Accordingly, it is also regularly discussed as being at the root of the educational 
problems of migrant children (see Guo 2002; Lu and Zhang 2004; Kwong 2006; Liang 
and Chen 2007; L. Wang 2008).  Chen and Liang (2007, 128), for instance, maintain: 
“Policies that would allow migrant children to be enrolled in local public schools 
without paying prohibitively high fees are ultimately linked to the reform of China’s 
hukou system.”  
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Table 2.2 The Hukou System and the Discourse on Internal Migration and 
Social Stratification in China 
 “Functioning as a legal Great Wall, a great floodgate, China’s hukou (household 
registration) system has divided people and regulated internal migration for more 
than a half century in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  Much of China’s 
profound gap between the rural and urban sectors, and among the different regions, is 
either directly created by or essentially maintained by the hukou system.  Despite 
repeated efforts at reforming it since the 1980s, the hukou system remains a 
fundamental institution that helps to define politics, social life, and economic 
development in the PRC today” (Wang 2010, 335). 
 “Under this [household registration] system, registered residence (hukou) plays an 
important role in resource allocation and interest distribution, and thus exerts a 
significant impact on social stratification and mobility.…  Despite the increasing 
social mobility ensuing from market-oriented transformation, the hukou hierarchy 
and its structural influence on mobility within the institutional framework persist.  
The strongly conglutinative nature of the household registration system has given rise 
to social disparities” (Lu 2008, 56).  
 “Although geographic mobility and change of employment have become relatively 
easier, the social concomitants of hukou status still persist.  No matter how similar 
their jobs are to those held by urban workers, employees with rural hukou status are 
still classified as ‘peasant-workers’ and thereby are not entitled to the many labor 
rights and benefits enjoyed by employees with urban hukou (Wang et al. 2002).…  In 
the reform era, the hukou system has remained largely in force and still greatly 
shapes socioeconomic status and life chances” (Wu and Treiman 2004, 365). 
 “[T]he current [hukou] system continues to inhibit the integration of China’s newest 
urban citizens.  Migrants without household registration status face daunting 
problems – in particular, difficulties in school enrollment for their children and 
limited access to health care, adequate housing, and employment opportunities” 
(Liang and Ma 2004, 484). 
 “The system now cannot directly block people’s migration, but many policies and 
measures that prevent the labor market from being developed root and obtain 
legitimacy from it.  First, because of it, a majority of rural laborers and their families 
cannot live in cities permanently and legitimately.…  Secondly, all the discriminative 
treatments to the non-local in employment policies, social security system and social 
service supply find their support in the household registration system.  Most social 
benefits are provided according to people’s hukou, and those without local hukou will 
be treated discriminatively.…  Thirdly, urban biased policies now have been or are 
being changed on many aspects, but as long as the hukou system exists, there is 
possibility of the revival of those policies.…  Restricting the access of the non-local 
to some jobs and positions, overcharging the floating population’s children for their 
education and other discriminative measures are all conducted by identity of hukou” 
(Cai 2003, 120). 
 
It is difficult to discuss rural-urban migration and social stratification in China 
without also mentioning urbanization.  Urbanization – which Gu and Wu (2010, 1-2) 
define as “a complex and multifaceted process involving population migration from 
rural to urban areas, rural and urban land conversions, spatial reconfiguration of 
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settlements, and changing governance and management” – has become a critical part of 
China’s post-1978 societal transformation (Heikkila 2007, 65).  Due to factors including 
the system of administrative hierarchy in urban areas and institutional barriers to labor 
migration like the hukou system, it is often referred to as “urbanization with Chinese 
characteristics” (Chan 2010, 65-70).  
 Though relatively slow between 1949 and 1978, urbanization has since entered 
into a period of rapid growth, involving a growing urban population and an increasing 
number of cities and towns (W. Zhou 2004, 445; Li and Piachaud 2006, 1).16  Despite 
being difficult to measure given the complexities surrounding urban borders and 
definitions of “urban” (Chan 2010, 64), estimates have been high.  Yusuf and 
Nabeshima (2008, 1-2, table 1.2) draw on data from various sources to argue that, 
between 1980 and 2005, the percentage of China’s population residing in urban areas 
increased from 19.6 percent to 42.9 percent, and the urban population grew from 191.4 
million to 562.1 million.17  A key factor contributing to this trend has been rural-urban 
migration (Heikkila 2007, 68).18  Such migration has increased the pressures on local 
governments in large cities, with major implications for migrant workers (Li and 
Piachaud 2006, 7; Saich 2008, 181).19   
Indeed, while it can be viewed as “the best long-term solution to the problems of 
inequality in service provision, which primarily reflect urban-rural differences” (Saich 
2008, 182), urbanization has had major consequences for the exclusion of rural-urban 
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 See W. Zhou (2004) and Li and Piachaud (2006) for an overview of urbanization in China since 
1949. 
17
 The most urbanized populations in China are in the eastern and coastal provinces and 
municipalities (Chen 2006, 104).   
18
 Though pre-reform urbanization was government-controlled, post-1978 urbanization has been 
driven by industrial development in rural areas, the market economy, and large-scale rural-urban 
migration (Li and Piachaud 2006, 6). 
19
 The focus on urbanization in small cities and towns has, since the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-
2010), also been extended to large cities (Li and Piachaud 2006, 11). 
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migrants in areas like service provision and housing.  The implications are serious.  As 
Yusuf and Nabeshima (2008, 24) contend: “By focusing on physical infrastructure, 
governments … defer essential and complementary investments in human capital, 
which builds manufacturing and technological capabilities.  Investing in human capital 
is also the best insurance against unemployment and urban crime.” 
Thus, rural-urban migration, the hukou system, urbanization, and social 
stratification in China can be seen as closely interlinked: 
In many important ways the ongoing urbanization process is built on the shoulders of an 
emerging underclass, most of whom have rural designated hukous.…  These workers are 
essential to successful urbanization, yet that very success can undermine their ability to 
partake in it, as housing costs and basic services are priced beyond their reach. (Heikkila 
2007, 77-78) 
Yet a part of this picture that remains largely unexplored is the politics surrounding 
policy implementation and the potential outcomes for migrant families and the services 
available to them.  While it is difficult to deny the basic importance of the hukou system, 
the tendency to emphasize its impact on policies concerning migrants might lead to the 
conclusion that such institutional mechanisms operate in relative isolation.  Deeper 
analyses of the local policy processes at work would shed much needed light on the 
extent to which central-level objectives to improve the treatment of rural-urban migrants 
are being realized and why. 
 
Educational Inequality and Social Stratification in China 
The significance of examining the consequences of policy implementation for 
migrant children’s education in particular can be understood by looking at the basic 
relationship between educational inequality and social stratification in China.20  China’s 
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 In the realm of human resource development, there are several key “energizers,” mainly education, 
health and nutrition, employment, the environment, and economic and political freedom.  Though all 
interconnected, education is often treated as the foundation for improving the rest (cited by Rong and Shi 
2001, 108).  If provided equally and efficiently, it can help break the intergenerational transmission of 
poverty (Todaro and Smith 2009, 371). 
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student population totaled 234 million by 1996 (including roughly 136 million at the 
primary school level) and grew to 318 million by late 2002, the largest in the world 
(cited by UNDP 1998, 39; China Education and Research Network 2004).  Access to 
education in the country is at an all-time high.  Though it has only allotted a small 
proportion of its GDP to education over recent decades,21 it has achieved rates of 
enrollment at the primary and middle school levels surpassing that in the majority of 
other low-income countries (Postiglione 2006, 3).  Its primary school net enrollment 
rate increased from 97.8 percent to 98.7 percent between 1990 and 2003, and the gross 
enrollment rate for middle school increased from 66.7 percent to 90 percent between 
1990 and 2002 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and 
United Nations System in China 2005, 22).   
Still, such figures are only part of the picture, and there is general consensus that 
education is an increasingly crucial factor influencing patterns of social stratification 
and inequality in China (see Hannum 1999, 210-211; Rong and Shi 2001; Li 2003, 62; 
Ding and Lu 2006, 25; Ross 2006).  Between 1978 and 1996, China’s GDP increased by 
nearly fourfold, bringing an overall improvement in living standards (cited by Wu and 
Xie 2003, 426-427).  Post-1978 economic reforms, however, have also contributed to 
rising inequalities; according to Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular (2008, 20, table 1.3), for 
example, the Gini coefficient in China rose from 0.395 to 0.450-0.468 between 1988 
and 2002.  This has had major consequences for education.  As Postiglione (2006, 3) 
asserts, “educational inequalities continue to widen, compliments of a hot-wired market 
economy and the easing of pressure on the central government over the responsibility to 
ensure access and equity.”   
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 In 1990, the Chinese government spent 2.5 percent of its GNP on education, ranking 114th in the 
world (Rong and Shi 2001, 120).  Despite numerous pledges to allocate 4 percent of its GDP to education 
since 1993, the target has yet to be reached, and educational expenditure was still only 3.33 percent of the 
GDP in 2008 (Chen 2010).  The problem is amplified by the failure to fully utilize existing resources for 
education (Tsang 1994, 309). 
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Indeed, economic reforms have created disparities in the allocation of 
educational investment, leading to gaps in educational attainment and opportunities and 
consequences for income and work-related disparities (Rong and Shi 2001, 121).22  
These inequalities exist in terms of area (between and within urban and rural areas); 
region (western, central, and eastern/coastal); gender; and ethnicity.  In fact, the rural 
poor, girls, ethnic minorities, and the children of migrants have the lowest enrollment 
and highest dropout rates (Postiglione 2006, 3-5).  For instance, based on 2000 census 
data, the enrollment rate for children aged seven to 16 was 89 percent in rural areas and 
94 percent in urban areas, and the percentage of the population that was not enrolled in 
school and had less than middle school attainment was 13.17 percent in rural areas and 
3.75 percent in urban areas (Hannum, Wang, and Adams 2010, pp. 132, 141, table 6.8).  
By the early 2000s, roughly one-fifth of China’s inhabited rural areas had not yet been 
able to guarantee nine years of compulsory education.  What’s more, by the mid-2000s, 
about 70 percent of school-aged children under 11 years of age who were not attending 
school were female (Postiglione 2006, 3-4).  These groups can also overlap.  Hannum, 
Wang, and Adams (2010, 135, table 6.5), for example, reported an enrollment rate of 
nearly 77 percent for rural minority girls between seven and 16 years old, compared to 
almost 92 percent for urban minority girls of the same age in 2000.   
Such trends can significantly impact patterns of social stratification (Hannum 
1999, 210-211).  As Postiglione (2006, 6) contends:  
China is approaching a key historical educational juncture in education – the first time that 
children from nearly every family, region, and nationality in China will attend school.  As 
schooling reaches into virtually all regions and households, it comes to play a larger role in 
determining China’s social stratification.   
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 Furthermore, as Zhang and Kanbur (2005, 194) assert: “The government’s share in total education 
expenditure declined from 64.6% in 1990, when the data were first available, to 53.1% in 1998, while the 
share of tuitions and incidental fees rose from 2.3% to 12.5% in the 9-year period.  With the increasing 
out-of-pocket expenses on education, children in the poor families may have difficulties in finishing the 
basic 9-year schooling, likely leading to more uneven access to education.” 
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The educational exclusion of migrant children can therefore have serious implications 
for trends in social stratification, motivating a deeper exploration of the local dynamics 
shaping their educational situations.  The rest of this chapter turns to the policy 
processes literature to create a framework for analyzing policy implementation and its 
consequences for migrant children’s education.  This will shed light on the potential 
range of factors affecting the situations of migrant schools and their students in one city, 
strengthening the capacity to improve educational opportunities for these children at the 
local level.  
 
 Examining Policy Implementation in the Realm of Migrant Children’s Education  
This section draws on existing knowledge on policy processes and 
decentralization, in general and in China, and identifies key themes that can be applied 
to analyzing the implementation of policies on migrant children’s education in Beijing.  
There is a vast amount of literature surrounding policy processes.  Most simply, the 
term refers to “the process through which policy is made and implemented” (Blaikie 
and Soussan 2001, 11).  The linear model (or the rational or mainstream model) 
discusses policy-making as “a problem-solving process which is rational, balanced, 
objective and analytical” (Sutton 1999, 9).  According to this model, policy decisions 
are the result of several stages: agenda-setting, investigation of the options for 
addressing the problem, assessment of the costs and benefits of those options, decision-
making, implementation, and possible evaluation (IDS 2006, 7).   
There is, however, growing agreement that policy processes are not linear and 
rational.  Instead, they are “incremental, complex and messy” processes in which facts 
and values interact, “overlapping and competing agendas” are present, and the 
perspectives of the vulnerable and marginalized are frequently ignored (IDS 2006, 8; 
37 
see also Sabatier 1986; Thomas and Grindle 1990; Crosby 1996; Sutton 1999; de Vibe, 
Hovland, and Young 2002).  Following from this logic, policy processes can be 
understood by examining the roles of knowledge and discourse (what is the narrative 
and how is it being framed), actors and networks (which individuals and groups are 
involved and how are they related), and politics and interests (what power dynamics are 
involved) (IDS 2006, 9).   
Policy processes tend to be context-specific and can even differ within political 
systems (Atkinson and Coleman 1992, 157).  Still, a few general themes are worth 
highlighting.  First is the importance of implementation, which Lampton (1987, 4) 
defines as “the stage between the high politics of policy formulation and feedback once 
the effects of policies become apparent.”  The linear model treats it as a separate process 
that occurs after policy decisions, one that is meant to resolve the problem as 
understood in the policy and is administrative in nature.  It is increasingly argued, 
however, that implementation itself can be intensely complex and political (Thomas and 
Grindle 1990; Crosby 1996; Sutton 1999, 22-23; Little 2008, 14-17).  It can be non-
linear and interactive and require management through, for instance, collaboration, 
involvement from stakeholders, and the mobilization of resources (Grindle and Thomas 
1991; Sutton 1999, 22-23).  Lipsky (1980), for example, introduced the idea of “street 
level bureaucracies” to describe the role of actors like schools in shaping 
implementation and policy outcomes.   
Second is the role of policy history.  Key policy milestones are critical in 
understanding policy-making and implementation.  These can include previous policies 
and legislation; major conferences, projects, and events; media and public campaigns; 
and global policy developments (Blaikie and Soussan 2001, 10).  Third, policy 
processes can be significantly influenced by the local social, economic, political, and 
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governance contexts (Grindle and Thomas 1989; Blaikie and Soussan 2001, 10).  The 
interaction between local contextual factors and differing levels of involvement among 
actors and networks can have major consequences for the policy process, including 
implementation (Keeley and Scoones 2000, 90).  As Little (2008, 16) writes: 
The process of implementation is influenced by the content of the policy (in terms of 
interests affected, types of benefits expected, the extent of change envisioned, sites of 
decision-making, the number and type of programme implementers and resources 
committed) and the context of implementation (power, interests and strategies of actors 
involved, institution and regime characteristics, compliance and responsiveness).   
Within this discussion of local context, decentralization is often discussed as an 
important factor (e.g., Blaikie and Soussan 2001).  There is a large body of literature on 
decentralization.  In many developing countries and transition economies, the term 
refers to the transfer of actual decision-making power to the local level.  In countries 
where centralized control has been long-established (like China and India), it commonly 
refers to the transfer of responsibilities in implementing policies.  There is also a 
distinction between political and administrative decentralization and fiscal 
decentralization (Bardhan 2002, 186).  For example, in discussing the decentralization 
of responsibility for the provision of basic education, King and Cordeiro Guerra (2005, 
179) write:   
[A] growing number of countries throughout the world, including those in East Asia, are 
transferring this responsibility away from the center, typically as part of a broader reform to 
decentralize government functions.  This transfer has taken various forms, including 
devolving fiscal responsibility and management to lower levels of government, making 
public schools autonomous, requiring the participation of communities in operating schools, 
expanding community financing, allowing families to choose their schools, and stimulating 
private provision of education.  
Decentralization is frequently seen as a way of increasing accountability and the 
efficiency of governments (Bardhan 2002, 185).  Yet there is growing discussion in the 
policy processes literature of its complex effects; it can, for instance, lead to “new 
challenges for citizen action, the negotiation of expertises and participation in the policy 
process” (Keeley and Scoones 1999, 6).  Ultimately, its outcomes vary and are often 
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shaped by local political, institutional, and social circumstances (Azfar, Kähkönen, and 
Meagher 2001, 8).  As Shankland (2000, 7) maintains, “an extensive literature has 
already documented the fact that [participation and decentralisation] are also far from 
unproblematic, and that there is a need for a better understanding of what they mean in 
specific policy contexts.”   
In China, the decentralization of power and responsibilities to local governments 
extends back to the 1950s (Lin, Tao, and Liu 2006, 308).  Starting in the 1980s, 
decentralization significantly increased the role of local governments in the delivery of 
services (Davis 1989).  According to Heilmann (2008, pp. 1, 28), decentralization in 
China, or “decentralized experimentation” – where local officials are encouraged by the 
central government to experiment with different methods of problem resolution, and 
these experiences are subsequently fed back into central-level policy-making – can be 
highly political due to “competing interests, ideological frictions, personal rivalries, 
tactical opportunism or ad hoc policy compromises.”  It has therefore become a key 
factor influencing policy-making and implementation.  
The role of civil society can then be an additional factor in the policy process.  
Indeed, decentralization increases the number of stakeholders and can create space for 
civil society to influence policy processes (King and Cordeiro Guerra 2005, 200).  As 
Teets (2008, 7-8) argues for the case of China since the 1980s: 
Decentralization devolved responsibility for public policy and spending to lower levels of 
government, which also opened new channels for groups to access embedded decision 
makers.  While responsibility was devolved, in many cases funding decisions were not, 
creating a common problem within decentralized systems of unfunded mandates, where 
local governments were responsible for certain services yet unable to fund delivery through 
formal budgets.  Thus, simultaneously as local governments must provide increased welfare 
services without a substantial increase in transfers from the central government, they also 
suffer decreased capacity through downsizing.  This confluence of institutional reforms 
creates a space for civil society organizations to take over many aspects of service delivery 
formerly controlled by the local state. 
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Policy processes in China have, as a result, become “increasingly fragmented, localized 
and messy” (Howell 2007, 21).23 
Yet knowledge of policy processes in China remains limited, particularly in the 
realms of migration and education.  Much of the academic discourse on policy-making 
and implementation in China is focused on structural aspects like bureaucratic 
hierarchies and central-local relations, often in rural areas (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 
1988; Bo 2000; Zhong 2003; Lieberthal 2004).  There have been some efforts to apply 
aspects of the policy processes literature to China.  Lampton (1987, 3-4), for instance, 
highlights the absence of references to China in the literature on implementation and the 
importance of understanding the interaction between policy content, the institutional 
context of policy implementation, and the broader social and political environment.  A 
more recent example is Bloom et al. (2008), which examines the making and 
implementation of health policies in China, Cambodia, and Lao PDR, including the 
roles of policy networks and different stakeholder interests. 
In the academic discourse on migrant children’s education, however, there has 
been a general lack of attempts to analyze the implementation process, including the 
roles of policy history and local context.  Moreover, despite increasing discussion of 
civil society in China in areas like the environment (e.g., Ho 2001) and, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 7, labor and gender, few studies have explored the role of civil 
society in migrant children’s education, perhaps the only exception being Kwong (2004).  
Thus, knowledge of how policies on migrant children’s education are implemented, 
including which actors are involved and why, remains limited.  Yet, as King and 
Cordeiro Guerra (2005, 179) maintain: “In countries as large and diverse as China … , 
generating local solutions to educational problems and mobilizing local energies and 
                                                     
23
 Relevant literature on civil society in social welfare provision in China will be discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
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resources can yield dividends for all.”  The opportunity then arises to think about how 
existing understandings of policy processes may resonate in the realm of migrant 
children’s education.  This would not only shed light on the local politics surrounding 
policy implementation in this area and the consequences for migrant schools, but it 
would also help in identifying more targeted ways to improve educational provision for 
migrant children in Beijing.   
This study draws on the above discussion – including the work of Grindle and 
Thomas (1989); Sutton (1999); Blaikie and Soussan (2001); King and Cordeiro Guerra 
(2005); IDS (2006); Howell (2007); Little (2008); and Teets (2008) – to analyze the 
local policy environment concerning migrant children’s education in Beijing.  In light of 
the decentralization of responsibilities called for by the policy of “two priorities,” it 
explores the potential impacts of three key areas on policy implementation: 1) policy 
history (including central and municipal policies); 2) local context (including municipal 
and district-level factors); and 3) the role of civil society actors (including their capacity 
to interact with the government) (see Figure 2.1).  As Blaikie and Soussan (2001, 2) 
emphasize, analyses of policy processes must include the impacts on the people the 
policies are meant to affect.  Examining the consequences of the above for migrant 
schools and their students is therefore critical to the research, informing the 
understanding of educational provision for this group and larger trends in social 
stratification. 
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Figure 2.1 Factors Shaping the Implementation of Policies on Migrant 
Children’s Education and the Situations of Migrant Schools in 
Beijing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2009-2010). 
 
The way central policies on migrant children’s education are designed has given 
lower levels of government flexibility in implementing them.  In Beijing, the municipal 
government sets the tone of the local policy environment by interpreting central policies 
and designing local ones and by setting guidelines for district governments to follow.  
The framework proposed above involves examining the policy approaches adopted at 
the municipal and district levels and the reasons behind them, shedding light on the 
nature of this flexibility and the roles these two levels of government play in the policy 
area.  Analysis also shows, however, that the shift towards local responsibility for 
educating migrant children has increased the number and range of local actors involved.  
In addition to actors within the government, academics and researchers, the media, 
university student organizations, NGOs, businesses, migrant school principals’ and 
teachers’ associations, and migrant parent activists have become involved as well.  This 
has increased the potential for interaction in the policy process, not only between the 
government and civil society, but also amongst civil society actors themselves (see 
Figure 2.2).   
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Figure 2.2 Potential Areas of Interaction between Government, Civil Society, 
and Migrant Schools in Beijing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2009-2010). 
 
This study explores the roles of the government and civil society actors involved, 
including the extent to which there is room for such interaction and how their 
relationships with each other and with migrant schools shape the environment in which 
education is provided to migrant children in Beijing.  It tackles questions involving the 
balance of power between stakeholders, why some voices are included or excluded, and 
what the consequences are for migrant schools and their students.  Given the unique 
historical development of the migration policies and patterns discussed earlier and the 
distinctive nature of Chinese policy-making, such an analysis will make a valuable 
contribution to the discourse on policy implementation in China. 
Ultimately, this framework allows for a deeper examination of the potential 
complexities surrounding policy implementation, including the effects of local context 
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at the municipal and district levels, and the consequences for migrant schools and their 
students.  This will shed important light on the local policy environment, including the 
relationship between decentralized decision-making and local politics, and the 
implications for broader trends in social stratification.  Furthermore, this exploration 
will help demonstrate that assumptions about the hukou system’s predominant impact 
on policies concerning rural-urban migrants are grounded in a more linear interpretation 
of policy processes, in which such institutional regulations operate in a relatively 
straightforward and insulated manner.  The above discussion makes it clear that policy 
processes are far from straightforward.  By applying this framework to migrant 
children’s education in Beijing, this study underscores the need to look beyond the 
hukou system and creates a more nuanced understanding of the situations of migrant 
schools and their students at the local level.   
China has a long history of decentralization and therefore provides useful 
lessons, including those concerning “the factors that have affected [its] experiences, the 
sources of resistance or support … encountered, and the risks and challenges that have 
emerged” (King and Cordeiro Guerra 2005, 196).  Drawing on existing knowledge on 
policy processes, as well as migration, urbanization, and educational inequality in China, 
this study fills major gaps in the understanding of how policies in this area are 
implemented (including which actors are involved), why certain approaches are adopted 
(including the roles of policy history and local context), and what the consequences are 
for migrant schools and their students (including district-level outcomes).  This will 
greatly enhance the understanding of why migrant schools and their students face the 
situations they do at the municipal and district levels, with the ultimate objective of 
creating a stronger foundation upon which to improve educational opportunities for 
these children.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EXPLORING THE SITUATIONS OF MIGRANT SCHOOLS IN BEIJING:  
FIELD SITE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION  
 
 
 
The previous chapter created a framework for analyzing the impact of policy 
implementation on migrant schools and their students in Beijing, including the roles of 
policy history, local context, and civil society.  This chapter focuses on the methods 
used to apply this framework to address the questions surrounding the nature and impact 
of municipal and district-level policy implementation outlined in Chapter 1.  Following 
from the earlier review of migration patterns and policies and migrant children’s 
education in China, the chapter starts by highlighting the substantial growth in the 
number and size of migrant schools in Beijing since the early 1990s, providing useful 
background information that motivates this study’s focus on Beijing.  It then discusses 
the rationale behind the selection of Haidian, Shijingshan, and Fengtai districts as cases.  
The rest of the chapter outlines the methods of data collection used, mainly qualitative 
interviews and policy document analysis, as well as key challenges encountered in 
conducting the research.   
 
The Growth in the Number and Size of Migrant Schools in Beijing 
Beijing attracts migrants from across China, and, according to the city’s 
population and family planning commission, the size of its floating population was 5.4 
million by 2007, almost 30 percent of the total population (Shan 2007).  Based on the 
1997 Beijing Migrant Census, roughly one-third of migrants in Beijing were already 
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family units (Mallee 2003, 153).  Based on data from the 2005 One-Percent Population 
Survey of China and a 2006 one-percent floating population survey conducted in 
Beijing by Renmin University of China, it was estimated that there were about 504,000 
children aged 14 and under in the city’s floating population by the mid-2000s, an 
increase of about 310,000 since 2000 (Zhai, Duan, and Bi 2007; Duan and Yang 2008, 
23).  By late 2002, there were around 350 migrant schools in the city (Han 2003, 402).  
Focusing on Beijing therefore provides a good sample of the problems migrant children 
can encounter in a large city and rich data for a meaningful but manageable study. 
The discovery of the existence of migrant schools in Beijing is generally 
attributed to a local researcher named Zhao Shukai, whom one principal referred to as 
“the Columbus of Beijing’s migrant schools” (HL1P1).  While conducting research on 
migrant workers in 1996, Zhao came across a migrant school after enquiring about some 
young children he had seen in a migrant village.  He went on to bring the issue to the 
attention of the media and subsequently the government and society.  Despite extensive 
media coverage, however, research on migrant children’s education in Beijing was 
limited during the 1990s and early 2000s.  The main studies conducted during this 
period were Lu (2007) and Han (2001); much of the early knowledge of this subject is 
based on this research.   
According to Han (2003, 404-406), the emergence and development of migrant 
schools in Beijing can be divided into three stages: the appearance of migrant schools 
(1993-1997), a period of competitive development (1998-2000), and a period of 
expansion and self-improvement in attempt to acquire legal status (2001-2003).  The 
first appearance of migrant schools in the city occurred in the early 1990s.1  These 
schools – set up for children whose parents made up the lower income segment of the 
                                                     
1
 The earliest migrant schools in Shanghai were established in 1992, while Shenzhen’s earliest 
migrant schools appeared around 1985 (cited by Han 2003, 404).  
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floating population2 – were run without government permission and operated as 
“underground schools” (dixia xuexiao).  They emerged as a “self-help” (zili jiuji) or 
“self-resolution” (zixing jiejue) mechanism in a context in which migrants were unable 
to pay fees like the temporary schooling fee (jiedufei) and sponsorship fee (zanzhufei) to 
enroll their children in public schools (Han 2001, pp. 1-4, 6).   
That is, migrant workers themselves took on the responsibility of educating 
migrant children – children of their friends and relatives, children of other migrants 
from their home provinces, and even their own children – to prevent them from 
becoming illiterate.3  Classes were held in makeshift settings or small buildings in 
migrant enclaves (Han 2001, 1; Han 2003, 403-404).  As the founder of one of the city’s 
earliest migrant schools described during an interview in the 1990s: 
Around 1990, my relatives came to Beijing one after another to work and do business.  
Their greatest hardship was that it was difficult for their children to get an education.  If 
they left them in our hometown, there would be no one to look after them, but, if they took 
them with them, they could not afford the sponsorship fees required by public schools in 
Beijing, ….  Facing this dilemma, and filled with helpless anxiety, they suddenly begged 
me to open a school, ….  I had once taught at a private school for ten years.  Under the 
repeated advice and encouragement of my relatives, and with a feeling of responsibility, I 
could not simply look on helplessly as the children of my relatives became the new 
illiterates.  Without too much consideration, I agreed to do it.  Soon after, we went to the 
bookstore to buy primary school textbooks, and everyone helped me build a small shed in a 
vegetable field to serve as a classroom.  Using bricks and wooden boards, we made desks 
and stools.  It was in this way that our migrant school was created. (Han 2001, 4) 
The number of migrant children in Beijing continued to rise during this period.  
According to the 1997 Beijing Migrant Census, the city’s floating population (Beijing 
diqu wailai liudong renkou) reached 2.859 million (including a resident outside 
population, or zai Jing juzhu de wailai renkou, of 2.299 million, accounting for 21.18 
percent of the total registered population, or huji renkou).  This included 162,030 
                                                     
2
 The higher income segment of the “floating population” could usually afford to enroll their children 
in public schools or private “aristocratic” schools (guizu xuexiao) (Han 2001, 14). 
3
 The backgrounds of these early principals varied.  While some had teaching experience, others 
came from backgrounds like selling vegetables or growing crops, and their educational attainment ranged 
from no schooling to junior college graduate (Lu 2007, 231-232).  
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children under the age of 15 and 66,392 children between six and 15 years of age.  Also, 
32.84 percent of the city’s outside population were family units by 1997, and many 
were beginning to stay for longer periods of time; the census found that 19.42 percent of 
the outside population had already been in Beijing for over three years, and 10.4 percent 
had been in the city for at least five years (Han 2001, 1).  At the same time, however, 
the percentage of migrant children in the city that were attending school remained low.  
Lu and Zhang (2004, 63), for example, write that only 12.5 percent of migrant children 
aged six to 14 were enrolled in school around the late 1990s.4  In addition, based on the 
1997 Beijing Migrant Census, the dropout rate among children of the floating 
population was estimated to be 13.9 percent (Han 2001, 4).  These dropouts would 
sometimes enter the workforce at an early age (Lu and Zhang 2004, 64).   
As a result, there was a remarkable increase in the number of migrant schools 
between 1998 and 2000, during what Han (2003, 404) refers to as “a period of 
competitive growth” (chengzhang jingzheng qi).5  Lu (2007, 227) estimated that, by 
1999-2000, Beijing had 150-160 migrant schools with 15,000-20,000 students, while 
Han (2001, 2) estimated that there were at least 200 migrant schools with over 40,000 
students by late 2000.  By late 2002, the estimate had risen to about 350, with nearly 
100,000 students.  It was not uncommon for villages to have more than one migrant 
school, and some schools opened multiple branches.6  This was then followed by a stage 
                                                     
4
 Of those attending school, many were overage; it was not unusual for there to be a five or six year 
age gap between children in the same grade level (Lu 2007, 195).   
5
 For example, in the study by Lu (2007, 226), 57 percent of the 114 schools surveyed in 1999-2000 
were established from 1998 onwards. 
6
 An important result of this second stage was the emergence of a tendency, particularly among 
academics and researchers, to discuss migrant schools as part of a trend of marketization (e.g., Han 2001, 
4; Lu 2007, 233).  The following quote is a case in point: “As the number of migrants rose, the potential 
profitability of meeting the growing demand for migrant schools attracted all kinds of entrepreneurs – 
even some without any background in teaching.  Because migrant schools were privately run and mostly 
unregulated, there were no standards.  Success in providing education and the general quality of 
individual schools varied tremendously” (Rural Education Action Project 2009).  As will be discussed in 
Chapter 7, this continues to penetrate current views.   
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of expansion and self-improvement between 2001 and 2003, in which many schools 
strove to acquire licenses from the government (Han 2001, 3; Han 2003, pp. 402, 404-
406).   
Given the high mobility and often illegal status of migrant schools, figures for 
the numbers of these schools at any given time have varied.  Overall, however, 
estimates for the number of migrant schools in Beijing – as well as the number of 
children attending these schools – have substantially increased since the mid-1990s (see 
Figure 3.1).  Almost two decades after their first documented appearance in Beijing, it 
was estimated that there were still over 300 migrant schools, with more than 90,000 
students (Rural Education Action Project 2009).  At the time of fieldwork, 66 had been 
licensed by the government.7  
Not only has there been a considerable rise in the number of migrant schools in 
Beijing over time, but their average size has also increased.  According to Lu (2007, 
225), the size of these schools varied early on; among the 114 schools surveyed in 1999-
2000, the number of students ranged from 7 to over 1,300 (though the average was 93).  
There does continue to be a range.  Within this study’s sample of 22 schools, the 
number of students at any particular location ranged from 280 to over 1,600, and the 
number of teachers ranged from slightly over ten to over 70 (see Table 3.1).  However, 
the average size has increased.  For example, nine of the 22 schools had at least 900 
students.8  Indeed, as will be further discussed in Chapter 6, migrant schools remain a 
critical source of education for migrant children in Beijing, motivating a closer 
examination of their situations. 
                                                     
7
 According to a prominent principal in the sample, the first district to start licensing migrant schools 
was Tongzhou in 2001, followed by Changping in 2002, Haidian in 2003, and Shijingshan, Chaoyang, 
and Daxing in 2004.  By 2004, fewer than 30 had been licensed (CCTV 2004). 
8
 The number of students at one school in the sample grew from 22 to over 900 between 1997 and 
2010 (SL1P1).  In another case, the number grew from 60-some in 1995 to over 2,600 students across 
three branches in 2010 (HL1P1). 
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Figure 3.1 Estimated Numbers of Migrant Schools and Migrant Children in 
Beijing 
Panel A. Number of Migrant Schools 
 
 
Panel B. Number of Students in Migrant Schools 
 
 
Panel C. Number of School-Aged Children of Migrants 
 
Source: Rural Education Action Project (2009), reproduced with permission.  The graphs combine 
estimates from different studies to show the general trends over time. 
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Table 3.1 A General Overview of the Migrant Schools in the Sample 
District Legal Status 
Year 
Created 
Number of 
Students** 
Number of 
Teachers** 
Haidian 
Licensed (unlicensed branch)* 1994 >900 >50 
Licensed 1999 ≈900 ≈40 
Unlicensed 1994 ≈360 ≈16 
Unlicensed 1994 >300 >10 
Unlicensed 1995 400-500 >20 
Unlicensed 1996 >400 17 
Shijingshan 
Licensed 1997 ≈900 ≈40 
Licensed 1998 1,600-1,700 >70 
Licensed 1998 ≈1,400 58 
Unlicensed 1999 >800 ≈35 
Unlicensed 2000 >480 19 
Unlicensed 2000 ≈280 14 
Unlicensed 2000 ≈520 20 
Fengtai 
Licensed 2000 ≈1,300 50 
Licensed 2005 >1,100 45 
Unlicensed 1999 >800 46 
Unlicensed 2005 >600 18 
Chaoyang Licensed 1998 >1,000 >40 Licensed 2007 400-500 ≈16 
Changping Licensed 2000 >1,000 46 Unlicensed 2003 ≈400 14 
Daxing Unlicensed 1996 712 29 
* Though this school is referred to as licensed, only one of its three branches has a license.  Information 
provided for this school in this and subsequent tables is based on data concerning one of the unlicensed 
branches.   
** Some figures for the numbers of students and teachers are more precise than others due to the often 
high levels of student and teacher mobility, as well as the fact that some principals kept closer records 
than others. 
 
The Selection of Haidian, Shijingshan, and Fengtai Districts as Cases 
At the time of fieldwork, Beijing was divided into 18 administrative divisions: 
the city proper (Dongcheng, Xicheng, Chongwen, and Xuanwu districts); the inner 
suburbs (Chaoyang, Fengtai, Shijingshan, and Haidian districts); and the outer suburbs 
(Mentougou, Fangshan, Tongzhou, Shunyi, Changping, Daxing, Huairou, and Pinggu 
districts and Miyun and Yanqing counties) (see Figure 3.2).9  Since policy 
implementation may vary between districts and have differing consequences for migrant 
schools, a comparative analysis is a crucial step towards a stronger understanding of 
                                                     
9
 In mid-2010, it was announced that Chongwen and Xuanwu would be merged with Dongcheng and 
Xicheng, respectively, making the new number of divisions 16 (Guo and Li 2010).   
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migrant children’s education.  This study’s focus is on three of the four inner suburban 
districts: Haidian, Shijingshan, and Fengtai.   
Figure 3.2 Map of Beijing’s Administrative Divisions  
 
Map by author. 
 
The general selection of inner suburban districts is based primarily on their high 
concentrations of migrant workers and the presence of rural-urban transition areas (see 
Table 3.2).  The tendency for rural migrants to concentrate in the inner and to a lesser 
extent outer suburbs stems largely from the high demand for migrant labor in these 
areas, as well as considerations concerning housing.  As Gu and Shen (2003, 118) point 
out: 
This kind of spatial distribution of the floating population has much to do with the unique 
transitional urban housing system in Beijing.  The floating population generally does not 
have access to cheap public housing in Beijing and has to rely on the private housing market.  
Location and housing rents become key considerations. 
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According to the 1997 Beijing Migrant Census, 62.9 percent of the city’s floating 
population was already residing in the inner suburbs, compared to 21.1 percent in the 
outer suburbs and 16 percent in the city proper (Wu 2002, 92, table 1).  As a result, most 
migrant schools are also located in the inner and outer suburban areas (Lu and Zhang 
2004, 72).   
Table 3.2 Area and Population of Beijing’s Administrative Divisions 
Administrative 
Unit 
Area 
(km²)* 
Total 
Population 
(2000 
Census)** 
Total 
Population 
(2010 
Census)** 
Permanent 
Resident 
Population 
(changzhu 
renkou) 
(10,000 
persons)* 
Outside 
Population 
(wailai 
renkou) 
(10,000 
persons)* 
Outside 
Population 
as a 
Percentage 
of 
Permanent 
Resident 
Population 
Beijing (Total) 16,410.54 13,569,194 19,612,368 1633.0 419.7 25.7 
City Proper      
Dongcheng  25.34 535,558 919,000 55.2 10.1 18.3 
Xicheng  31.62 706,691 1,243,000 66.5 11.0 16.5 
Chongwen  16.52 346,205 -- 29.9 5.5 18.4 
Xuanwu  18.91 526,132 -- 55.3 10.9 19.7 
Inner Suburbs      
Chaoyang  455.08 2,289,756 3,545,000 300.1 96.3 32.1 
Fengtai  305.80 1,369,480 2,112,000 169.3 44.7 26.4 
Shijingshan  84.32 489,439 616,000 54.6 16.7 30.6 
Haidian  430.73 2,240,124 3,281,000 281.4 84.8 30.1 
Outer Suburbs      
Mentougou  1,450.70 266,591 290,000 27.0 3.2 11.9 
Fangshan  1,989.54 814,367 945,000 88.7 13.0 14.7 
Tongzhou  906.28 673,952 1,184,000 96.5 27.8 28.8 
Shunyi  1,019.89 636,479 877,000 73.6 17.3 23.5 
Changping  1,343.54 614,821 1,661,000 89.6 30.5 34.0 
Daxing  1,036.32 671,444 1,365,000 97.8 33.7 34.5 
Huairou  2,122.62 296,002 373,000 31.6 4.5 14.2 
Pinggu  950.13 396,701 416,000 42.4 3.2 7.5 
Miyun  2,229.45 420,019 468,000 44.9 4.0 8.9 
Yanqing  1,993.75 275,433 317,000 28.6 2.5 8.7 
* Source: Beijing Municipal Statistics Bureau and National Bureau of Statistics Beijing Survey Team 
(2008).  Figures in the last column were calculated based on the previous two columns. 
** Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2000, 2011); The Sixth National Census Leading 
Group Office of Beijing Municipality, Beijing Municipal Statistics Bureau, and National Bureau of 
Statistics Beijing Survey Team (2011). 
 
The selection of Shijingshan, Fengtai, and Haidian districts in particular 
provides a good basis for comparison in light of the basic physical, demographic, and 
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economic differences between them.10  Shijingshan is the smallest of the four inner 
suburban districts and, at 84.32 square kilometers, is less than one-fifth the size of 
Chaoyang district (the largest of the four).  By 2007, the district had a permanent 
resident population (changzhu renkou) of 546,000 and an outside population (wailai 
renkou) of 167,000.  Its GDP was 22.64 billion RMB, less than half of Fengtai’s and 
about one-eighth of Haidian’s (Beijing Municipal Statistics Bureau and National Bureau 
of Statistics Beijing Survey Team 2008).  Despite its smaller size, it is an important 
rural-urban transition area and industrial zone.  
Fengtai is the second smallest of the inner suburban districts.  At 305.80 square 
kilometers, it is roughly two-thirds the size of Chaoyang.  By 2007, its permanent 
resident population was 1,693,000, and its outside population was 447,000.  Its GDP 
was 46.32 billion RMB, about one-quarter of Haidian’s (Beijing Municipal Statistics 
Bureau and National Bureau of Statistics Beijing Survey Team 2008).  Fengtai is one of 
the city’s poorer districts; in 2007, it had a GDP per capita of about 27,361 RMB, 
compared to 41,465 RMB in Shijingshan, 64,988 RMB in Haidian, and 56,562 RMB in 
Chaoyang.11 
Haidian is the second largest of the inner suburban districts and, at 430.73 
square kilometers, is only 24.35 square kilometers smaller than Chaoyang.  By 2007, it 
had a permanent resident population of 2,814,000 and an outside population of 848,000.  
Its GDP was 182.88 billion RMB, the highest among the four districts (exceeding 
Chaoyang’s by more than 13 billion RMB) (Beijing Municipal Statistics Bureau and 
National Bureau of Statistics Beijing Survey Team 2008).  Haidian is also known for its 
high concentration of academic and research institutions, including Peking University 
                                                     
10
 Further information regarding the situations of these districts will be provided in Chapter 5. 
11
 This was calculated using figures for the permanent resident population in Beijing Municipal 
Statistics Bureau and National Bureau of Statistics Beijing Survey Team (2008). 
55 
and Tsinghua University, and is one of the country’s leading districts in terms of 
education (particularly higher education), science and technology, and high-tech 
industry. 
Following from the framework created in Chapter 2, exploring the policy 
environments in these three neighboring districts allows for an interesting look into the 
potentially different ways in which district governments approach migrant children’s 
education (including the nature of their relationships with migrant schools and civil 
society) and the consequences for the situations of migrant schools and their students.  
Moreover, the basic differences between the three districts provide an opportunity to 
examine the effects of local context on their responses to central and municipal policies, 
as well as their approaches towards civil society.  
The situations in Beijing’s other regions were not explored in depth.  Chaoyang, 
the largest of the city proper and inner suburban districts in area, is usually associated 
with its high concentration of foreign embassies, international organizations, and 
businesses.  It does, however, have a large number of migrant schools and, while not a 
core case, is referred to throughout the discussion.  The outer suburban districts were 
also not core cases, though visits were made to some schools in Changping and Daxing.  
Given the tendency of migrant workers to concentrate in the inner and outer suburbs, 
the city proper districts were not considered.   
 
Methods of Data Collection 
 Fieldwork was conducted between October 2009 and September 2010.  The first 
two months were spent building relationships with academics and researchers and other 
contacts and collecting official and secondary data concerning migrant children’s 
education.  The remaining period was spent conducting qualitative interviews and 
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collecting materials like policy documents from various interviewees and sources.  
Given the focus on policy processes and the framework set out in Chapter 2, interviews 
were conducted with key government and civil society actors, as well as migrant school 
principals and teachers and migrant families.  Interviews with education commission 
officials in the three selected districts were conducted in late 2009.  Visits to migrant 
schools were largely made between December 2009 and June 2010.  Interviews with 
civil society actors were primarily done during periods when schools were closed (e.g., 
between mid-January and early March of 2010 for Chinese New Year and during the 
summer).  Interviews with migrant families were conducted between March and July 
2010.   
 
Policy Document Analysis  
 To build an understanding of the municipal and district policy approaches and 
the reasons behind them (including the roles of policy history and local context), a 
significant part of the research involved identifying and examining central, municipal, 
and district-level policy documents.  Central and municipal-level policy documents 
were primarily accessed through government websites and local researchers, and 
district-level documents were mainly acquired through interviews.  A review of the 
latter was particularly useful in shedding light on the impact of local context on the 
policy approaches adopted in the selected districts.   
 
Interviews 
 To better understand how the municipal and district policy approaches have 
affected the situations of migrant schools and their students (both directly and through 
their impact on civil society), qualitative interviews were conducted with a range of 
57 
local actors.12  The main method of data collection was semi-structured interviews and 
short questionnaires, based on questions catered to each set of actors.  Information 
extracted from informal conversations and encounters served as an additional source of 
knowledge.  All interviews were conducted in Mandarin Chinese.  Since the research 
involved conversing with people from different provinces, each of which has its own 
dialect and accent, interviews were digitally recorded when consent was given.  Based 
on guidance from local researchers, interviews with migrant parents were not digitally 
recorded, allowing me to converse more freely with the individuals.13   
During fieldwork, I was able to gain access to 22 migrant schools in Beijing, 
including 17 in Haidian, Shijingshan, and Fengtai (see Table 3.3).  Of the 17, eight 
offered primary school education and at least two out of three years of middle school 
education, while the remaining nine only offered primary school education.  At each of 
the schools, the principal was interviewed to gain an understanding of the school’s 
history and situation, including key obstacles faced and the nature of its relationship 
with the local government and civil society.  To better understand the situations of 
migrant school teachers, interviews were also conducted with 26 teachers, who were 
selected based on availability and their willingness to participate.  In addition, 
information was collected from schools in nearby districts (two in Chaoyang, two in 
Changping, and one in Daxing), which were chosen based on available contact 
information and access.  Talking to principals and teachers from these schools allowed 
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 See Appendix A for a list of these actors and the coding of interviewees. 
13
 Throughout the fieldwork, I was aware that the information being gathered might be sensitive and 
personal.  I was, however, guided by my partners in China in terms of ethical requirements and standard 
practices in conducting this type of research, and issues of confidentiality and consent were taken into 
account.   
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me to contextualize my findings in the three core districts and better understand the 
larger situation of migrant schools in Beijing.14  
Table 3.3 Number and Type of Migrant Schools Visited during Fieldwork 
District 
Total 
Number of 
Licensed 
Migrant 
Schools 
Estimated 
Number of 
Unlicensed 
Migrant 
Schools* 
Number of 
Licensed 
Migrant 
Schools 
Visited 
Number of 
Unlicensed 
Migrant 
Schools 
Visited 
Total 
Number of 
Migrant 
Schools 
Visited 
Haidian 2 ≤19 2 4 6 
Shijingshan 3 ≈6 3 4 7 
Fengtai 3 ≈6 2 2 4 
* These figures are based on estimates from documents collected during fieldwork and interviews.  It is 
difficult to know the exact number of unlicensed migrant schools at any given time, especially since 
migrant schools are vulnerable to demolition and government closures and often move within and 
between districts (sometimes changing their names in the process).   
 
Due to the recognition that it would be easier to access licensed migrant schools, 
particularly those in Haidian and to a lesser extent Shijingshan, I started with these 
schools, followed by those in Fengtai.  Initial schools visited were accessed through 
local researchers, as well as principals I met during earlier stages of the research.  
Starting in March 2010, I began to visit unlicensed migrant schools in Haidian, 
Shijingshan, and then Fengtai.  These were largely chosen and contacted based on their 
proximity to the licensed schools, so that the schools visited would be in relatively 
similar demographic areas.  Various channels were used to acquire access.  In many 
cases, the principals interviewed provided contact information for nearby migrant 
schools.  In addition, though there is no official list of migrant schools in Beijing, two 
contact lists were obtained from a migrant school principal and a local researcher and 
served as an additional channel through which unlicensed migrant schools could be 
contacted.   
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 One of the schools visited was established through the sponsorship of a local foundation.  Though 
subsidized by the foundation and relatively better resourced, it faced certain obstacles similar to other 
migrant schools and was therefore included in the sample. 
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 Between March and July 2010, interviews were conducted with 40 migrant 
families (14 in Haidian, 16 in Shijingshan, and ten in Fengtai), with the aim of 
understanding their experiences and the obstacles they faced in terms of education, 
including the extent to which they had received support from the government and 
society.  Based on guidance from local researchers, access was gained primarily through 
teachers, and families were selected from one licensed and two unlicensed schools in 
each district.  At each school, it was requested that the contact list provided reflect a 
range in terms of grade level, educational performance, and family background, and the 
number of families interviewed was ultimately determined by availability and the 
willingness to participate.   
 To acquire an understanding of the district-level policy attitudes and approaches 
and the reasons behind them, interviews were conducted with education commission 
officials from the three selected districts (arranged through a local university).  Two 
researchers based in the central government also served as important sources of 
information throughout the fieldwork.  To gain deeper insight into the role of civil 
society, interviews were conducted with academics and researchers, university student 
volunteers, and individuals from 14 of the key local NGOs and international 
organizations involved in migrant children’s education in Beijing.  These actors were 
accessed through multiple channels, including previous contacts and conferences.  
NGOs in particular were selected based on their level of involvement and 
recommendations from principals and teachers, researchers, and other organizations. 
 
Key Challenges Encountered  
A few challenges were encountered while conducting this research.  One major 
challenge involved accessing migrant schools.  Many principals interviewed, for 
example, did not know the locations or contact details of nearby migrant schools.  In 
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addition, given the fundamental difficulties of counting and keeping track of these 
schools, the contact lists of migrant schools obtained during fieldwork included 
information that was sometimes incomplete and/or outdated.  One of the lists, for 
instance, was compiled around 2004 and therefore included some schools that no longer 
existed and excluded others that were established later.  Even when accurate contact 
information for a school was obtained, its inclusion in the sample was subject to the 
willingness of the principal.  Indeed, several declined to participate, saying that they 
were too busy, that their school was about to be closed, or, in some cases, that academic 
research would not benefit their schools.   
Access to migrant schools in Fengtai was especially difficult.  As will be 
discussed in Chapter 5, the district government’s extreme approach in shutting down 
migrant schools, particularly in the early 2000s, meant that there were essentially no 
migrant schools in the district for a period of time.  Around the mid-2000s, migrant 
schools began to appear again, albeit on a much smaller scale.  These schools are now 
relatively isolated, not only from each other, but also from migrant schools in other 
districts.  As a result, many principals, including a few in Fengtai itself, were unable to 
provide contact details for schools in the district.   
Moreover, the number of migrant families interviewed was limited by the 
inability of many parents to participate, often due to their long work hours.  Another 
obstacle was related to security concerns.  After several attacks on schools across China 
between March and May 2010 (Wong 2010), the Chinese government instructed all 
schools (public and private) to adopt stricter security measures.  Many migrant schools 
subsequently became hesitant to share parents’ contact information, even if it was 
purely for research purposes. 
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Access to public schools was attempted (e.g., through local researchers) but was 
not possible, given that such access in Beijing normally requires close relations with the 
government.  Analyzing the situations of migrant children in these schools is important, 
especially since public schools may vary in terms of, for instance, how accessible they 
are to migrant children and whether or not migrant students are integrated into their 
classrooms.  Access to these children would also provide a critical control group.  While 
the situations of migrant children in these schools were not explored in depth, I was able 
to acquire an understanding of key issues concerning their education through 
conversations with parents of migrant children in public schools, migrant school 
principals, and civil society actors, as well as by drawing on the findings of Song, 
Loyalka, and Wei (2009) and Lai et al. (2012) (see Chapter 2).   
In addition to these challenges, the basic lack of statistical data on migrant 
children made it difficult to assess the impact of policy implementation on educational 
outcomes like completion rates.  Official surveys and censuses are generally not made 
public in their entirety, and data that is public, including that in the annual education 
and area statistical yearbooks, does not usually include figures specifically on migrant 
children or migrant schools.  Indeed, official documents often only provide figures for 
the “outside population” (wailai renkou) or “floating population” (liudong renkou), 
neither of which refers specifically to rural-urban migrant workers.  Moreover, usage of 
the terms “children of the floating population” (liudong ertong) and “migrant children” 
(nongmingong zinü) is frequently inconsistent and unclear in Chinese documents.  The 
latter is technically a subset of the former, which includes children who do not have the 
local city’s hukou but are not the children of rural-urban migrant workers.  Some 
documents, however, use the terms interchangeably or only refer to the “children of the 
floating population,” making analyses of relevant policy materials more difficult.   
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This lack of consistency and clarity reflects the difficulties of collecting data on 
rural-urban migrants and has had major consequences for knowledge of migrant 
children’s education.  For example, according to a prominent researcher in the sample, it 
is likely that about 65 percent of the children in Beijing’s floating population are 
attending public schools, but there are no accurate estimates of the percentage of 
migrant workers’ children attending public schools.  Nevertheless, this study creates a 
picture of the problems of migrant schools and their students in Beijing and in the 
selected districts by drawing on figures from multiple sources, including interviews, 
policy documents, government surveys and censuses, research studies, and media 
reports.  When citing such sources throughout the thesis, the effort is made to use the 
same terms as originally used by the authors.   
In spite of the restrictions, this study makes a significant contribution to the 
understanding of migrant children’s education by shedding light on the nature and 
impact of the politics surrounding policy implementation in the area.  Given that this is 
a qualitative study, the results cannot be generalized to other cities, particularly in light 
of the diversity of experiences and differences in the pace and scale of policy reforms 
across localities in China.  However, since existing literature does not discuss the 
internal policy processes being examined, focusing on Beijing is a good starting point 
for future studies in other cities with large migrant populations, and the findings may 
have important implications for other localities in terms of the ways in which policy 
implementation and its impacts can be understood.   
Using the framework outlined in Figure 2.1, the rest of this thesis presents the 
main research findings.  Chapter 4 starts with an examination of policy history by 
exploring the central and Beijing municipal policies on migrant children’s education.  It 
also includes a brief discussion of the situations in other large cities like Shanghai and 
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Guangzhou to contextualize my research in Beijing.  This is followed by an analysis of 
the policy approaches adopted in Haidian, Shijingshan, and Fengtai districts (Chapter 5), 
the consequences of the municipal and district-level policy approaches for migrant 
schools and their students (Chapter 6), and the role of civil society (Chapter 7).   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
“UNDER THE SAME BLUE SKY”?  
CENTRAL AND BEIJING MUNICIPAL POLICIES ON  
MIGRANT CHILDREN’S EDUCATION  
 
 
 
As emphasized in Chapter 2, policies are typically influenced by previous 
developments and context-specific changes, making an understanding of policy history 
critical when analyzing policy processes (Blaikie and Soussan 2001, 10).  Despite 
increasing scholarly attention towards migrant children’s education in China, there has 
been little detailed examination of policies on the subject, particularly at the local 
levels.1  To the best of my knowledge, this chapter brings together for the first time the 
body of published and grey literature, complemented by primary fieldwork, to provide a 
more comprehensive picture of the policy history of migrant children’s education at the 
central and particularly Beijing municipal levels, laying the groundwork for a closer 
analysis of policy implementation.   
Drawing on previous research and information from policy documents collected 
during fieldwork, the chapter begins by exploring key central policies in the area.  It 
highlights that, with the policy shift towards the more positive treatment of migrant 
workers in the early 2000s (discussed in Chapter 2), central policies on migrant 
children’s education, the first of which was issued in 1996, shifted towards a focus on 
the equal treatment of migrant children and their right to basic education.  A closer look 
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 Recent exceptions include Qu and Wang (2008) and Han (2009), though their focus is primarily on 
central policies.  
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reveals that recent policies in this area not only emphasize the integral role of public 
schools, but they also call for increased support for migrant schools. 
With the introduction of the policy of “two priorities” in 2001, however, the 
central government gave the responsibility for migrant children’s education to local 
governments and public schools, creating space for different policy approaches across 
localities.  The rest of the chapter explores the nature of these differences.  Using 
evidence from Wuhan, Xiamen, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, it starts by shedding light on 
key areas in which municipal policy approaches can diverge and points to the 
importance of examining the effects of decentralization in different localities.  This is 
followed by a more detailed evaluation of the Beijing municipal policies on migrant 
children’s education.  Evidence from interviews and policy documents collected during 
fieldwork shows that, while Beijing municipal policies reiterate many of the general 
sentiments found in central policies, they have largely omitted discussion of support for 
migrant schools, resulting in a policy environment in which barriers to the fulfillment of 
central-level aspirations have emerged.  The discussion therefore raises critical 
questions about how central policies in this area are implemented and why, as well as 
the consequences for migrant schools and their students at the local levels. 
 
Central Policies on Migrant Children’s Education 
“Under the same blue sky, grow up and progress together” (tongzai lantian xia, 
gongtong chengzhang jinbu).  These were words written by Premier Wen Jiabao at a 
Beijing public primary school attended mainly by migrant children in 2003 and 
reflected a recognition at the central level of migrant children’s right to equal 
opportunities.  The policy goal of seeking educational equality is not a recent 
development.  Article 46 of the Chinese Constitution (1982) states: “Citizens of the 
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People’s Republic of China have the right and duty to receive education.”  Article 5 of 
the Compulsory Education Law (1986) stipulates: “All children who have reached the 
age of six shall enroll in school and receive compulsory education for the prescribed 
number of years, regardless of sex, nationality, or race.”  Article 9 of the Education Law 
of the People’s Republic of China (1995) (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyufa) 
asserts: “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China shall have the right and duty to be 
educated.  Citizens shall enjoy equal opportunity of education regardless of their 
nationality, race, sex, occupation, property, or religious belief etc.”  Article 36 maintains: 
“Education receivers shall, according to law, enjoy equal rights in areas such as going to 
school, entering schools of a higher level, and employment.”  In 2005, the Ministry of 
Education also drew up the “Outline for Educational Development in China by 2020” 
(2020 nian Zhongguo jiaoyu fazhan gangyao), which discusses approaches to reduce 
educational inequality (see J. Zhou 2004; Yang 2005, 234).   
Calls for educational equality have been echoed in recent statements made by 
high-level officials.  For example, at the Fifth High-Level Group Meeting on Education 
for All in November 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao stated:  
[N]ational education in China is not without its difficulties.  Disparities between urban and 
rural areas and between regions remain a stern reality.  The nation’s foundation for 
education as a whole is still weak.  We must keep on working hard to attain the goals of 
education for all. (Wen 2005) 
While chairing a study of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee 
concerning educational development and human resources in February 2011, President 
Hu Jintao urged schools to place more emphasis on the all-around growth of children, 
saying: “Education is the foundation for national prosperity and social progress.…  It 
carries hundreds of millions of families’ expectations for a better life” (Xinhua News 
Agency 2011). 
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Important questions then arise regarding the extent to which such sentiments 
have been articulated in policies concerning educational provision for migrant children.  
In light of the evolution of migration policies discussed in Chapter 2, this section 
examines the central policies on migrant children’s education.  It explores the common 
shift made by both sets of policies during the early 2000s and highlights the larger trend 
towards the more positive treatment of rural-urban migrants.   
For several years after migrant schools first began to appear in Chinese cities, 
the central government did not adopt an official position (see Table 4.1).  As Kwong 
(2004, 1079) explains: 
Schools for migrant children pose a dilemma for the Chinese government.…  They were not 
worried about the schools spreading subversive ideas, but they saw these schools as an 
encroachment on their jurisdiction.  But no government can deny the benefits of education 
to children, so the migrant children schools are on high moral ground.  Consequently, the 
government cannot condemn them for providing education to this sector of the population, 
or close them when there are few practical alternatives available.  
The result was a government strategy of “do not ban, do not recognize, let it run its 
course” (bu qudi, bu chengren, zisheng zimie) (Han 2001, 3; Kwong 2004, 1079).   
Table 4.1 General Policy Trends in Migrant Children’s Education  
Period General Situation Policy Response (Central Level) 
Policy Response 
(Beijing Municipal 
Level) 
Early to 
mid-
1990s 
• Rising number of 
migrant children 
in urban areas; 
emergence of 
migrant schools  
• No official response 
 
 
Late 
1990s 
• Rapid rise in the 
number of 
migrant schools 
in large cities 
like Beijing 
• Started attracting attention from 
the central government, leading 
to efforts to restrict the numbers 
of migrant children in cities  
• No major response  
Since 
2001 
 • Shift of responsibility for 
migrant children’s education to 
local governments and public 
schools, with an emphasis on 
migrant children’s right to 
education and equal treatment  
• Appearance of the 
municipality’s first 
policies directly 
addressing migrant 
children’s education 
Source: Han (2001, 2003, and 2009); Kwong (2004); Author’s fieldwork (2009-2010). 
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The lack of government action created space for migrant schools to rapidly grow 
in number.  This started to gain more attention by the mid- to late 1990s, which was also 
the period during which the government was tightening its policies towards migrant 
workers (see Chapter 2).  Indeed, the first two policies on migrant children’s education 
reflected the government’s broader desire to limit rural labor migration and the jobs and 
services migrant workers would be eligible for.  In 1996, the State Education 
Commission (known as the Ministry of Education since 1998) issued the “Trial 
Measures for the Schooling of Children and Youth among the Floating Population in 
Cities and Towns,” which was applied to six pilot sites (see Table 4.2).2  The document 
stated that sending governments should create a strict management system for 
monitoring compulsory school-aged children in their areas of jurisdiction to ensure that 
children who have guardians in their place of hukou registration receive their education 
in that locality.  Receiving governments should create the environment and 
opportunities for children of the floating population to receive basic education.  
However, only children who could not be taken care of in their place of hukou 
registration could apply to be educated as “temporary students” (jiedusheng) in public 
schools in receiving areas.   
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 See Appendix D for a list of the policy documents and materials examined in this chapter. 
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Table 4.2 Key Central Policies and Legislation on Migrant Children’s 
Education 
Year Document Key Content 
1996 “Trial Measures for the Schooling 
of Children and Youth among the 
Floating Population in Cities and 
Towns” 
Chengzhen liudong renkou zhong 
shiling ertong shaonian jiuxue banfa 
(shixing) 
 Applied to selected pilot sites 
 Sending governments should strictly monitor the 
mobility of compulsory school-aged children in 
their areas of jurisdiction [Article 6] 
 Only compulsory school-aged children without 
guardians in their place of hukou registration can 
apply to be temporarily educated in public 
schools in receiving areas [Article 9] 
1998 “Provisional Measures for the 
Schooling of Children and Youth in 
the Floating Population” 
Liudong ertong shaonian jiuxue 
zanxing banfa 
 Sending governments should strictly control the 
migration of children in their localities [Article 
3] 
 Children of the floating population without 
guardians in their hometowns can be temporarily 
educated in public schools; admission would 
require an application process, and public 
schools can charge them temporary schooling 
fees (jiedufei) [Articles 3, 8, and 11] 
2001 “Decision of the State Council on 
the Reform and Development of 
Basic Education” 
Guowuyuan guanyu jichu jiaoyu 
gaige yu fazhan de jueding 
 Importance should be attached to resolving 
education for children of the floating population, 
and the primary responsibility belongs to 
receiving governments (liuru diqu zhengfu) and 
public schools [Section 2, Article 12] 
2002 Law on Promoting Private 
Education 
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minban 
jiaoyu cujinfa 
 Private (minban) schools and public schools 
have the same legal status, and the country 
protects their autonomy [Section 1, Article 5] 
2003 “Circular of the General Office of 
the State Council on Strengthening 
Employment Management and 
Service Work for Rural Migrant 
Workers” 
Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu 
zuohao nongmin jincheng wugong 
jiuye guanli he fuwu gongzuo de 
tongzhi 
 Receiving governments (liurudi zhengfu) should 
increase support for migrant schools (referred to 
as shehui liliang xingban de nongmingong zinü 
jianyi xuexiao) and incorporate them into their 
educational systems and educational 
development planning [Section 6] 
 Educational departments should actively provide 
guidance for “simple schools” (jianyi xuexiao) 
in areas like teaching, provide assistance to 
improve school conditions, and gradually 
standardize how the schools are run; they must 
not simply adopt a strategy of shutting down 
schools, which would result in migrant children 
being unable to go to school [Section 6] 
 Receiving governments should specially set 
aside funding for migrant children’s education 
[Section 6] 
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2003 “Suggestions [of the Ministry of 
Education and Five Other 
Departments] to Provide Better 
Compulsory Education to the 
Children of Migrant Workers in 
Cities” 
Guanyu jinyibu zuohao jincheng 
wugong jiuye nongmin zinü yiwu 
jiaoyu gongzuo de yijian 
 The main responsibility for educating migrant 
children lies with receiving governments 
(liurudi zhengfu) and public primary and middle 
schools [Article 2] 
 Finance departments of receiving governments 
should provide subsidies for schools with 
relatively large numbers of migrant children 
[Article 5] 
 Receiving governments should formulate 
standards for the charging of fees, eliminate 
relevant fees, and ensure that migrant and local 
children are treated equally (yishi tongren) in 
terms of the fees required [Article 6] 
 Increased support and management should be 
provided for migrant schools [Article 8] 
2003 “Notification [of the Ministry of 
Finance and Four Other 
Departments] on Issues 
Concerning the Incorporation of 
Management Funds for Migrant 
Workers and Other Related Funds 
into the Scope of the Financial 
Budget and Expenditure” 
Guanyu jiang nongmingong guanli 
deng youguan jingfei naru caizheng 
yusuan zhichu fanwei youguan wenti 
de tongzhi 
 Funding for issues concerning migrant workers 
(such as public security management and 
community management) should be included in 
the regular financial budgets and expenditures of 
receiving governments (laodongli shurudi 
zhengfu) [Section 1] 
 Regional educational administrative departments 
should create a mechanism to guarantee funds 
for migrant children’s education [Section 6] 
2004 “Notification [of the Ministry of 
Finance] on Regulating the 
Management of Fees and 
Promoting Higher Incomes for 
Peasants” 
Guanyu guifan shoufei guanli cujin 
nongmin zengjia shouru de tongzhi 
 To protect the legal rights of migrant workers, 
unreasonable fees should be eliminated [Section 
4] 
 Migrant and local children should be treated 
equally (yishi tongren) in terms of the fees 
charged by public schools; aside from the 
collection of miscellaneous fees (zafei), tuition 
fees (xuefei), and accommodation and textbook 
fees, schools are not permitted to charge 
temporary schooling fees and school selection 
fees (zexiaofei), nor are they permitted to require 
migrants to pay subsidies or other costs [Section 
4] 
2005 “Suggestions of the Ministry of 
Education on Further Promoting 
the Balanced Development of 
Compulsory Education” 
Jiaoyubu guanyu jinyibu tuijin yiwu 
jiaoyu junheng fazhan de ruogan 
yijian 
 Local governments should make serious efforts 
to address migrant children’s education, 
including ensuring that migrant and local 
children are treated equally (yishi tongren) in the 
charging of fees and strengthening support and 
management of private (minban) schools 
accepting migrant children; local educational 
administrative departments at all levels and 
schools should adopt targeted measures to 
address the educational problems of left-behind 
children [Article 13] 
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2006 “Opinions of the State Council on 
Solving the Problems of Migrant 
Workers” 
Guowuyuan guanyu jiejue 
nongmingong wenti de ruogan yijian 
 Local receiving governments (shurudi zhengfu) 
should ensure that migrant children have equal 
access to basic education and should include 
them in their educational development planning 
and educational budget [Section 7, Article 21] 
 Public schools should treat migrant and local 
children equally in areas like the charging of 
fees and management and must not charge extra 
temporary schooling fees or other fees [Section 
7, Article 21] 
 To improve school quality, receiving 
governments should provide support and 
guidance for private (minban) schools educating 
migrant children in areas like school funding and 
teacher training [Section 7, Article 21] 
2006 “Suggestions of the Ministry of 
Education on Implementing 
‘Opinions of the State Council on 
Solving the Problems of Migrant 
Workers’” 
Jiaoyubu guanyu jiaoyu xitong 
guanche luoshi “Guowuyuan guanyu 
jiejue nongmingong wenti de ruogan 
yijian” de shishi yijian 
 To ensure that migrant children have equal 
access to compulsory education, educational 
departments in receiving areas should 
incorporate migrant children’s education into 
local educational planning and, based on local 
circumstances, allocate resources for basic 
education to public schools and fully tap into the 
capacity of public schools [Section 4, Article 13] 
 Support for and management of privately-run 
migrant schools should be strengthened and 
included in the management of private (minban) 
schools; educational departments should give 
special care and assistance to this type of school 
and should, in cooperation with other relevant 
departments, give vigorous support and 
guidance to the schools in areas such as location, 
school funding, teacher training, and teaching 
[Section 4, Article 17] 
 For migrant schools that do not meet the 
standards, deadlines for improvement should be 
set; schools with serious safety and health 
hazards and a low quality of teaching should be 
closed as quickly as possible, and arrangements 
regarding the continued schooling of the 
students should be made [Section 4, Article 17] 
2006 Compulsory Education Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (2006 
Amendment) 
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yiwu 
jiaoyufa (2006 xiuding) 
 Local governments (dangdi renmin zhengfu) are 
responsible for providing education to migrant 
children when both parents/guardians are 
residing/working outside their location of 
registration [Section 2, Article 12] 
2008 “Notification of the State Council 
on Waiving Tuition and 
Miscellaneous Fees for Compulsory 
School-Aged Children in Cities” 
Guowuyuan guanyu zuohao mianchu 
chengshi yiwu jiaoyu jieduan 
xuesheng xuezafei gongzuo de 
tongzhi 
 Local governments at all levels (difang geji 
renmin zhengfu) should incorporate migrant 
children into the public education system 
[Section 2] 
 Public schools should not charge tuition and 
miscellaneous fees (xuezafei) and temporary 
schooling fees [Section 2] 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2009-2010).  See also Qu and Wang (2008, 182-183, table 4.2) and Han 
(2009). 
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This was followed by the “Provisional Measures for the Schooling of Children 
and Youth in the Floating Population,” issued by the State Education Commission and 
the Public Security Bureau in 1998.  As Kwong (2004, 1080) argues, it represented a 
compromise between the central and local governments: 
In the temporary plan, the central government did not recognize the right of these children 
as citizens to receive an education.  It did acknowledge, however, that the children should 
attend schools in their place of domicile, and that local governments where they reside 
should provide educational facilities.  But with decentralization a major policy in the 1980s, 
secondary and primary education came under local jurisdiction.  The central government no 
longer dictated its decisions to the localities.  Instead it made four suggestions: admit the 
children into public schools, build new government schools, help enterprises build migrant 
children schools, and promote private schools.  These suggestions accommodated the 
heterogeneous interests of the local governments and gave them much room to manoeuvre.  
Local governments were to admit these children to the public schools, but they could collect 
extra fees from them.  They could build new schools for these children, depending on local 
conditions.  Local governments could choose the most appropriate strategy which in effect 
means they could pick one suggestion over another, or they could do nothing. 
According to the document, children of the floating population could be temporarily 
educated in public schools, but their admission would depend on an application process 
and various conditions.  In addition, public schools could charge these students 
temporary schooling fees each semester.   
In line with the central government’s efforts to improve the treatment of rural-
urban migrants, policies on migrant children’s education have shown a desire to 
improve educational opportunities for these children since the early 2000s.  Most 
significantly, the government introduced a policy of “two priorities” for educating 
migrant children, under which the two areas of focus would be management by local 
governments in receiving areas and education in public schools.  Indeed, according to 
the “Decision of the State Council on the Reform and Development of Basic 
Education,” issued in May 2001, receiving governments are responsible for providing 
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compulsory education to children of the floating population primarily via public 
schools.3   
Most policies since then have focused on ensuring migrant children’s right to 
education (Gu and Wang 2008, 73).  The “Circular of the General Office of the State 
Council on Strengthening Employment Management and Service Work for Rural 
Migrant Workers” (2003) (discussed in Chapter 2) states that migrant children’s right to 
compulsory education should be protected and that the provision of education to 
migrant and local children, including entrance requirements, should be equal.  In 
September 2003, the Ministry of Education and five other departments issued the 
“Suggestions to Provide Better Compulsory Education to the Children of Migrant 
Workers in Cities.”  The document stipulates that public primary and middle schools are 
mainly responsible for educating migrant children and that receiving governments 
should incorporate migrant children’s education into urban social development planning.  
It also maintains that access to compulsory education among migrant children should be 
the same as that enjoyed by local children and that migrant and local children should be 
treated equally in terms of the fees required.  The “Opinions of the State Council on 
Solving the Problems of Migrant Workers,” issued in January 2006, reiterates that 
migrant children are entitled to equal access to education and that it is the responsibility 
of local governments to ensure this.  What’s more, in June 2006, the Compulsory 
Education Law was amended to include a provision stating that receiving governments 
are responsible for providing education to migrant children when both parents/guardians 
are residing and working in that locality but are not registered there (see Mo 2006).   
                                                     
3
 Using 2003 documents as an example, Huang and Zhan (2005, 73-74) mention the goal of 
improving migrant children’s education as a part of the central government’s efforts to improve the 
treatment of migrant workers in cities during this period but do not explore this linkage in detail.  
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Not only do recent policies encourage the integration of migrant children into 
public schools, but they also highlight the need to support migrant schools.4  Deeper 
analysis shows that key policies – including the “Circular of the General Office of the 
State Council on Strengthening Employment Management and Service Work for Rural 
Migrant Workers” (2003), the “Suggestions to Provide Better Compulsory Education to 
the Children of Migrant Workers in Cities” (2003), the “Suggestions of the Ministry of 
Education on Further Promoting the Balanced Development of Compulsory Education” 
(2005), and the “Suggestions of the Ministry of Education on Implementing ‘Opinions 
of the State Council on Solving the Problems of Migrant Workers’” (2006) – call for an 
increase in both the management of (guanli) and support for (fuchi or zhichi) migrant 
schools (see Table 4.2).  The significance of these calls for increased support for 
migrant schools should be underscored, as they indicate the recognition at the central 
level of the continued role these schools play in providing education for migrant 
children.  
The above discussion demonstrates that central policies shifted towards 
improving educational opportunities for migrant children in the early 2000s.  Though 
recent policies emphasize the primary role of public schools in this area, they also point 
to the need to assist migrant schools, a major change compared to the government’s 
initial attitude towards these schools during the 1990s.  This more positive approach 
towards educational provision for these children reflects the government’s broader 
efforts to improve the treatment of rural-urban migrants, as well as reduce educational 
inequality.   
 
                                                     
4
 Qu and Wang (2008, pp. 182-183, 192-193) make brief mentions of the inclusion of support for 
migrant schools in certain central policies.   
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Decentralization and Municipal Policy Approaches towards  
Migrant Children’s Education 
Although the central government has adopted an increasingly positive stance 
towards migrant children’s education and migrant schools, the policy of “two priorities” 
also made it clear that the responsibility ultimately belongs to local governments.  
Decentralization has subsequently created serious problems for migrant children (X. 
Wang 2008).  Local governments have acquired an unprecedented level of autonomy, 
leading to unclear and conflicting views and approaches that can hinder successful 
policy implementation (Kwong 2004, 1087).  As Froissart (2003) argues, the way 
central policies in this area are designed has given local governments space for 
maneuver, illustrating the “unofficial slogan of decentralisation: ‘the centre proposes, 
local government disposes’ (zhongyang you zhengce, difang you duice).”  Indeed, there 
are “different rules, regulations and policies in different cities – as schooling in many 
ways is still a locally provided public service” (Rural Education Action Project 2009).   
 To demonstrate the importance of examining decentralized decision-making in 
this area and its effects at the municipal level, it is useful to briefly explore the 
situations in a few other cities, including the estimated proportion of migrant children 
attending public schools – though, for reasons discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the 
accuracy of such estimates is inevitably uncertain – and the amount of support given to 
migrant schools.  While the limited amount of research on migrant children’s education 
has, for the most part, been focused on Beijing (and to a lesser extent Shanghai), it is 
possible to shed some light on the variation between municipal-level situations by 
drawing on available information on Wuhan, Xiamen, Shanghai, and Guangzhou (see 
Table 4.3).5   
                                                     
5
 See also Qu and Wang (2008, 184-187) for some additional information on the general situations in 
different cities. 
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Table 4.3 Basic Information on Wuhan, Xiamen, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and 
Beijing (2008) 
 Wuhan Xiamen Shanghai Guangzhou Beijing 
Permanent Resident 
Population (changzhu 
renkou)  
8,970,000 2,490,000 18,884,600 10,182,000 16,950,000 
GDP Per Capita (RMB) 44,290 62,651 73,124 81,233 63,029 
Per Capita Annual 
Disposable Income of Urban 
Households (RMB) 
16,712 23,948 26,675 25,317 24,725 
Educational Expenditure 
(RMB millions) 5,609 
4,264 
(2010) 32,606 9,572 
26,300 
(2007) 
Educational Expenditure Per 
Capita (RMB)* 625 1,712 1,727 940 1,552 
Source: Beijing Municipal Statistics Bureau and National Bureau of Statistics Beijing Survey Team (2008, 
2009); Chen and Li (2009); Guangzhou Municipal Statistics Bureau and National Bureau of Statistics 
Guangzhou Survey Team (2009); Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau (2009); Shanghai Municipal 
Statistics Bureau and National Bureau of Statistics Shanghai Survey Team (2009); Wuhan Municipal 
Statistics Bureau (2009); Xiamen Municipal Statistics Bureau and National Bureau of Statistics Xiamen 
Survey Team (2009); Ye (2009); Xiamen Municipal Government (2010). 
* These were calculated based on figures for the permanent resident population from 2008. 
 
Evidence of variation can already be seen in the cases of Wuhan and Xiamen.  
According to a researcher in the sample, Wuhan was one of the earliest cities in China 
to allow migrant children to attend local public schools (see also Fan and Peng 2008, 
323).  Xinhua News Agency (2005b) reported that, with a migrant worker population of 
more than 400,000, the city had over 127,000 migrant students in 298 public schools 
and over 40,000 in 102 migrant schools by the mid-2000s (i.e., over 75 percent were in 
public schools).  The agency also reported that the city’s government waived over 44 
million RMB in temporary schooling fees for migrant children attending public primary 
and middle schools in 2005.  In addition, Wuhan is one of the few cities that permits 
migrant children to stay for high school, though they still need to return to their place of 
hukou registration for the university entrance exam (China Labour Bulletin 2008).   
The situation in Xiamen – a special economic zone where the size of the floating 
population has gradually been approaching that of its permanent resident population of 
over 1.8 million (Zhu 2011) – has been somewhat different.  There were roughly 30,000 
compulsory school-aged migrant children in the city by 2000, but, out of the over 9,000 
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migrant children estimated to be attending primary schools in 2002, only about one-
third were in public schools (L. Wang 2008, 692-693).  Xiamen’s approach towards the 
area has, instead, been focused more on the role of migrant schools:  
Realizing the limited capacity of public schools, it regards existing migrant schools as an 
important supplement means for the education of migrant children.…  Although the basic 
conditions for these schools are much lower standards than that for public schools, these 
regulated migrant schools at least ensure the basic hardware conditions and the number of 
subjects required by the national curriculum to be taught.  It is estimated that over 70% of 
the migrant children who are not in public schools in Xiamen are studying in regulated 
migrant schools.  Integrated into the management system of local education authorities, they 
are under the supervision of the local school inspection system and the teachers in these 
schools can participate in in-service training activities as public school teachers. (L. Wang 
2008, 700) 
 Yet, as a prominent researcher in the sample cautioned, due to the large size of 
Beijing’s migrant population, one can only compare the capital city’s situation with that 
of two other cities: Shanghai and Guangzhou (see Table 4.4).  A brief examination of 
the situations in these two cities also reveals fundamental differences between the policy 
approaches adopted towards migrant children’s education. 
Table 4.4 Estimated Numbers of Migrant Children in Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
and Beijing (2000) 
 Shanghai Guangzhou Beijing 
Number of Children in the Floating 
Population 470,000 300,000 250,000 
Children of the Floating Population as a 
Percentage of the Floating Population  10.99 34.52 9.76 
Number of School-Aged Children in the 
Floating Population ≈270,000 ≈270,000 ≈140,000 
Children of Migrant Workers as a Percentage 
of Children in the Floating Population  65.84 78.00 80.08 
Source: These figures were obtained from Zheng et al. (2008, 11, table 4) and are based on data from the 
Fifth National Population Census.   
 
In Shanghai, nearly one-fifth of the population is made up of migrant workers 
(Qian 2010).  Based on various estimates, the city has 500,000-700,000 compulsory 
school-aged migrant children, and the number of migrant schools reached 519 by 2001, 
including 124 licensed ones (see Ming 2009, 43, table 2.4).  It was estimated that 57.1 
percent of these children were attending public schools in 2007 (Dai 2008).  Not unlike 
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Beijing, migrant schools in Shanghai were poor in quality during the 1990s and early 
2000s (Zhu 2001).  However, since 2007 or 2008, Shanghai’s municipal government 
has adopted steps to both reduce the barriers migrant children face in attending public 
schools and improve the quality of migrant schools.  In 2009, Shanghai’s education 
commission announced plans to ensure that all compulsory school-aged migrant 
children would be attending either public schools or government-subsidized migrant 
schools by 2010 (H. Wang 2009).  To increase the number of migrant children in public 
schools, it reduced the requirement for migrant children to enroll in these schools from 
“five certificates” (wu zheng) to two; according to Ming (2009, 225):  
[This was] an important and visionary step towards fully opening public primary and middle 
schools for migrant students.  In China, Shanghai is often characterized as one of the cities 
with the least welcoming locals and the greatest level of discrimination towards outsiders.  
Hence, the fact that even Shanghai has found it worthwhile to invest in the human capital of 
non-local students should be a timely signal to other host city governments. 
Shanghai has also made efforts to improve the quality of migrant schools by closing 
substandard ones and helping to improve those in relatively better condition.  According 
to Beijing Migrant School Principals’ Association (2009), it adopted measures to license 
over 60 migrant schools per year.   
In 2009, the municipal government spent 3.69 billion RMB on increasing the 
number of migrant children enrolled in local schools, and, by early 2010, Shanghai’s 
education commission stated that 97.3 percent of the city’s 400,000 migrant children 
were attending either public schools or government-subsidized migrant schools, while 
2.7 percent were attending 22 remaining unlicensed migrant schools (Xinhua News 
Agency 2010).  It now provides a subsidy of 2,300 RMB (about 340 USD) per year to 
students attending licensed migrant schools, eliminating their need to pay tuition 
(Beijing Migrant School Principals’ Association 2009).6  Moreover, principals in the 
                                                     
6
 Unless otherwise noted, US dollar amounts provided in this thesis are based on the average 
RMB/USD exchange rate of 6.77 in 2010. 
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sample expressed that, due to government financial support, the average monthly salary 
of migrant school teachers in Shanghai is at least 1,500 RMB (roughly 220 USD), more 
than 500 RMB higher than that in Beijing.  According to an NGO working in both 
Beijing and Shanghai, migrant school teachers in Shanghai also receive regular training 
from the local education commission.   
Thus, in describing Shanghai’s progress, interviewees used words like “all-
around support” (gefangmian de zhichi), “assistance in all aspects” (suoyou buzhu), 
“proper management” (zhenggui guanli), and “open-minded” (kaiming).  In addition, 
migrant schools there were described as being in better condition than those in Beijing.  
As one researcher explained:  
In terms of Shanghai, and why it’s done relatively well now, it’s because the Secretary of 
the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee has attached a great deal of importance to the issue.  
He has treated it as an indication of [the city’s] image.…  He had previously come over 
from Hubei, which has done pretty well in the area.  His view is: If Hubei can do it, why 
can’t Shanghai? (A1) 
In contrast, Guangzhou has primarily promoted the role of private (minban) 
schools in providing education for migrant children, rather than focusing on increasing 
the numbers of migrant children in public schools.  The city’s migrant population was 
reported to be over five million by the mid-2000s (China Daily 2006).  By 2008, there 
were over 430,000 children in the city’s floating population (Zhang 2008).  It was 
estimated that roughly two-thirds were attending migrant schools (cited by China 
Labour Bulletin 2008).  As one researcher in the sample described, though the physical 
conditions of migrant schools in Guangzhou are relatively better than those in Beijing, 
the city’s reliance on private schools has placed much of the financial burden on 
migrant families themselves.  That is, unlike Shanghai, it has mainly been relying on 
migrant workers’ money.  At the same time, enrollment in public schools has become 
increasingly expensive for migrant children: 
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In 2006, the average annual fees for a student in a regular state-run school in Guangzhou 
amounted to 3,117 yuan.  However, one state-run primary school in a migrant area of 
Guangzhou asked for temporary student fees of 30,000 yuan, a ten-fold increase over the 
previous year.…  Between 2003 and 2005, the school selection fee in Guangzhou provincial 
grade middle schools was between 30,000 and 60,000 yuan. (China Labour Bulletin 2008) 
Ultimately, one should be cautious in generalizing about any particular city’s 
experiences.  Knowledge about the situations in these different cities remains limited, 
and, even in places with stronger reputations like Shanghai, restrictions may exist.  
Nevertheless, the basic variations highlighted above do demonstrate that cities can face 
different circumstances and adopt differing approaches towards migrant children’s 
education.  This existence of variation provides initial evidence to suggest that 
educational provision for these children can be influenced by factors beyond the hukou 
system and illustrates the fundamental importance of analyzing the nature and impact of 
policy implementation within different localities, especially in light of the potential 
implications it may have for trends in social stratification (see Chapter 2).  The rest of 
this thesis explores such local dynamics for the case of Beijing, creating a more nuanced 
understanding of the local politics surrounding migrant children’s education and the 
consequences for migrant schools and their students.  
 
Beijing Municipal Policies on Migrant Children’s Education 
In light of the central-level shift towards improving educational opportunities for 
migrant children, as well as the municipal-level variations discussed above, this section 
draws on information from policy documents and interviews to examine the policy 
response in Beijing.  The Beijing municipal government was relatively late in 
responding to the central government’s initial policies (discussed earlier).  While cities 
including Shanghai and Wuhan reportedly responded soon after the 1998 measure, 
Beijing’s only response in 1998 was a discussion paper entitled “Beijing’s Plan towards 
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School-Aged Children and Youth,” which, according to Kwong (2004, 1081), was “not 
very sympathetic towards the migrant children.”   
The municipal government did not begin to address migrant children’s education 
until the early 2000s.  The first major mention of the subject came in 2001 with the 
“Suggestions of the Beijing Municipal People’s Government on Implementing 
‘Decision of the State Council on the Reform and Development of Basic Education’” 
(see Table 4.5).  Its first policy focused solely on migrant children’s education – its first 
real response to the 1996 and 1998 central-level measures – was the “Provisional 
Measures for the Implementation of Compulsory Education for Children and Youth of 
the Floating Population in Beijing,” issued by Beijing’s education commission in 2002.  
Composed of 12 brief articles, the document reiterates the notion that children of the 
floating population who have guardians in their hometowns should return there for 
schooling and states that public schools can charge these children temporary schooling 
fees and other miscellaneous fees.  Though it does say that all school-aged children of 
the floating population who have migrated to Beijing with their parents should receive 
compulsory education, the language used in discussing how this would be achieved is 
vague.  Article 2, for example, says that all relevant departments and offices (including 
those related to education, public security, business, labor, prices, health, and housing) 
should carry out their respective responsibilities, and Article 3 states that educational 
departments should adopt measures to create the conditions for these children to attend 
school.  Yet there is a failure to specify what those responsibilities are and what specific 
measures should be adopted.  The document also sets the tone for the municipality’s 
approach towards migrant schools; Article 10 states that migrant schools may exist as 
long as they have been reviewed and approved by local educational departments, while 
Article 11 says that district and county educational administrative departments and 
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educational supervision departments should strengthen their “management and 
supervision” (guanli he jiandu) of these schools and close substandard ones. 
This was followed in 2004 by the “Suggestions on Implementing the General 
Office of the State Council’s Working Documents on Providing Better Compulsory 
Education to the Children of Migrant Workers in Cities.”  A response to the 2003 
central policy, the document was issued jointly by ten departments: Beijing’s education 
commission, development and reform commission, commission office for public sector 
reform, public security bureau, finance bureau, civil affairs bureau, health bureau, labor 
and social security bureau, land and resources bureau, and education supervision office.  
Using a more positive tone, it emphasizes the policy of “two priorities” and the need to 
protect the right of migrant children to receive compulsory education in Beijing.  
Moreover, school fees should be the same for local and migrant children, and, starting 
in September 2004, public schools should not charge temporary schooling fees to 
migrant children who meet the standards.  The final section also discusses the general 
duties of key departments.  However, the approach towards migrant schools remains 
unchanged.  The document’s fifth section emphasizes once again the need to ensure that 
substandard migrant schools are closed.  It states that district and county governments 
should, in accordance with local conditions, set deadlines for migrant schools to reach 
the standards set for private (minban) schools, adding that the goal is for all migrant 
schools to reach these standards within three years. 
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Table 4.5 Key Beijing Municipal Policies on Migrant Children’s Education  
Year Document Key Content 
2001 “Suggestions of the Beijing 
Municipal People’s Government on 
Implementing ‘Decision of the State 
Council on the Reform and 
Development of Basic Education’” 
Beijingshi renmin zhengfu guanche 
guowuyuan guanyu jichu jiaoyu gaige 
yu fazhan jueding de yijian 
 Receiving governments are primarily 
responsible for the education of children of 
the floating population [Section 2, Article 8] 
 To ensure that children of the floating 
population who are legally residing in Beijing 
receive compulsory education, various 
channels should be used (including placing 
them in public schools as temporary students 
and using extra school buildings and teachers 
to open special schools) [Section 2, Article 8]  
2002 “Provisional Measures [of the Beijing 
Municipal Education Commission] 
for the Implementation of 
Compulsory Education for Children 
and Youth of the Floating Population 
in Beijing”  
Beijingshi dui liudong renkou zhong 
shiling ertong shaonian shishi yiwu 
jiaoyu de zanxing banfa 
 All levels of government and relevant 
departments should create the conditions and 
adopt various measures to safeguard the right 
of children of the floating population to 
receive compulsory education [Article 1] 
 Children of the floating population who have 
guardians in their place of household 
registration should return there to receive 
compulsory education; those who do not have 
guardians in their place of household 
registration and whose parents have lived in 
Beijing for over half a year and have a 
temporary residence permit (zanzhuzheng) can 
apply to attend a public school in Beijing on a 
temporary basis [Article 1] 
 Parents should apply for proof of household 
registration and present the required 
documents (e.g., parents’ identification, 
temporary residence permits, and work 
permits) at the local street office, which will 
issue a Beijing temporary schooling approval 
permit (zai Jing jiedu pizhunshu) if 
requirements are met; using the letter and 
proof of student status from their former 
school, children can contact nearby public 
schools, which will decide whether or not to 
accept them [Article 6] 
 In districts with large floating populations, 
groups/individuals are allowed to create 
special schools for migrant children, as long 
as they meet the required standards; 
district/county educational administrative 
departments and educational supervision 
departments should increase their 
management and supervision of these schools, 
conduct regular inspections, and promptly 
shut down substandard schools (in these cases, 
the government should ensure that students 
are able to continue schooling) [Articles 10-
11] 
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2004 “Suggestions [of the Beijing 
Municipal Education Commission 
and Nine Other Departments] on 
Implementing the General Office of 
the State Council’s Working 
Documents on Providing Better 
Compulsory Education to the 
Children of Migrant Workers in 
Cities” 
Guanyu guanche guowuyuan 
bangongting jinyibu zuohao jincheng 
wugong jiuye nongmin zinü yiwu jiaoyu 
gongzuo wenjian de yijian 
 Work done on migrant children’s education is 
related to the healthy growth and overall 
development of these children and is 
significant in Beijing’s efforts to promote 
socio-economic development and safeguard 
social stability [Section 1] 
 The work should be based on the principle of 
“government responsibility, joint 
administration, the central role of public 
schools, and regulation according to law” 
[Section 2] 
 Migrant and local children should be treated 
equally (yishi tongren) in terms of the 
charging of fees [Section 3, Article 2] 
 The clearing and rectification of unlicensed 
migrant schools should be continued [Section 
5, Article 3] 
2005 “Notice of the Beijing Municipal 
Education Commission on the Work 
of Strengthening the Management of 
Self-Run Migrant Schools” 
Beijingshi jiaoyu weiyuanhui guanyu 
jiaqiang liudong renkou ziban xuexiao 
guanli gongzuo de tongzhi 
 There are 269 migrant schools in Beijing, with 
about 99,000 students  
 To strengthen the management of these 
schools as quickly as possible, district/county 
education commissions should adopt the 
following work strategy: 1) assist some 
schools, 2) examine and approve some 
schools, and 3) eliminate some schools (fuchi 
yipi, shenpi yipi, taotai yipi) [Section 2] 
2006 “Notice of the General Office of the 
Beijing Municipal People’s 
Government on the Work of 
Strengthening the Safety of Non-
Approved Self-Run Migrant 
Schools” 
Beijingshi renmin zhengfu bangongting 
guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang weijing pizhun 
liudong renyuan ziban xuexiao anquan 
gongzuo de tongzhi 
 There are 239 remaining unlicensed migrant 
schools in Beijing, with over 95,000 students 
 The majority of the city’s migrant schools 
pose safety and security risks 
 To improve the school environment for 
children of the floating population and ensure 
the safety of teachers and students, local 
governments at all levels should increase their 
safety work by “clearing up and rectifying” 
(qingli zhengdun) unlicensed migrant schools 
[Section 1] 
 To clear up and rectify unlicensed migrant 
schools as quickly as possible, district/county 
governments should adopt the following work 
strategy: 1) distribute some students to public 
schools, 2) regulate some migrant schools, 
and 3) close migrant schools that do not meet 
the standards by the given deadline (fenliu 
yipi, guifan yipi, qudi yipi) [Section 2]  
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2008 “Suggestions of the General Office of 
the Beijing Municipal People’s 
Government on Implementing the 
Spirit of the State Council’s Working 
Documents on Waiving Tuition and 
Miscellaneous Fees for Compulsory 
School-Aged Children in Cities”  
Beijingshi renmin zhengfu bangongting 
guanyu guanche guowuyuan zuohao 
mianchu chengshi yiwu jiaoyu jieduan 
xuesheng xuezafei gongzuo wenjian 
jingshen de yijian 
 To date, temporary schooling and 
miscellaneous fees have been waived for 
migrant children in public schools who meet 
the requirements [Section 2] 
 In waiving the tuition and miscellaneous fees 
for students in licensed self-run schools who 
possess the required documents and materials, 
the municipal government’s finance 
department will cover the costs during the first 
year, but the municipal and district/county 
governments will each be responsible for 50 
percent in subsequent years [Section 2, 
Articles 1 and 3]  
 
2008 “Beijing Measures for Implementing 
the Compulsory Education Law 
(2008 Amendment)” 
Beijingshi shishi Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo yiwu jiaoyufa banfa (2008 
xiuding) 
 Municipal and district/county governments 
should ensure migrant children’s access to 
compulsory education according to law 
[Article 13]  
2008 “Suggestions of the Beijing 
Municipal Education Commission 
and Beijing Municipal Finance 
Bureau to Provide Better 
Compulsory Education to the 
Children of Migrant Workers in 
Beijing” 
Beijingshi jiaoyu weiyuanhui Beijingshi 
caizhengju guanyu jinyibu zuohao 
laijing wugong renyuan suiqian zinü 
zai Jing jieshou yiwu jiaoyu gongzuo de 
yijian 
 Migrant children’s education should be 
incorporated into overall urban planning, 
urban population management, and plans for 
socio-economic development; district/county 
governments should raise the quality of 
service and management [Section 3, Article 1] 
 Based on the principle of territorial 
management, the primary role of the 
district/county governments should be 
strengthened; district/county governments 
should strengthen the safety management of 
unlicensed migrant schools (e.g., in areas like 
infrastructure and health and sanitation) and 
the regulation of how migrant schools are run 
[Section 3, Article 2] 
 The municipal government will adopt a role of 
coordination and guidance and allocate special 
funds for districts/counties with large numbers 
of migrant children to encourage public 
schools to enroll migrant children [Section 3, 
Article 3] 
2008 “Notice of the Beijing Municipal 
Education Commission on 
Implementing Matters Concerning 
the Suggestions to Provide Better 
Compulsory Education to the 
Children of Migrant Workers in 
Beijing” 
Beijingshi jiaoyu weiyuanhui guanyu 
luoshi jinyibu zuohao laijing wugong 
renyuan suiqian zinü zai Jing jieshou 
yiwu jiaoyu gongzuo yijian youguan 
shixiang de tongzhi 
 Based on current estimates of the number of 
self-run schools, district/county education 
commissions should “strengthen control” 
(jiada guankong lidu) [Section 3, Article 2] 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2009-2010). 
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 This attitude towards migrant schools was made more explicit in July 2006 with 
the promulgation of the “Notice of the General Office of the Beijing Municipal People’s 
Government on the Work of Strengthening the Safety of Non-Approved Self-Run 
Migrant Schools,” one of the city’s most controversial moves.  The document states that 
most unlicensed migrant schools offer poor quality education and pose security risks in 
areas like infrastructure, fire safety, and health and sanitation.  It therefore proposes a 
three-part strategy: distributing some children to public schools (fenliu) and regulating a 
portion of the migrant schools (guifan), while shutting down the others (qudi).  In terms 
of the third, district and county governments should set deadlines for improvement and 
shut down substandard schools by the end of September 2006.  What followed was seen 
by many migrant school principals, NGOs, and others involved as an attempt to close as 
many migrant schools as possible prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics and generated 
widespread opposition, including criticism from principals (who appealed to influential 
figures and the media for support).  As a result, even though a few district governments 
had already adopted measures to close schools in response, the municipal government 
eventually cancelled the decision.  Still, the notice and the motives behind it are 
revealing in terms of the attitude towards migrant schools.   
 The municipal government has also been increasing the amount of responsibility 
given to district governments.  The “Suggestions of the General Office of the Beijing 
Municipal People’s Government on Implementing the Spirit of the State Council’s 
Working Documents on Waiving Tuition and Miscellaneous Fees for Compulsory 
School-Aged Children in Cities” (2008) is one example.  In addition to stating that 
tuition and miscellaneous fees (xuezafei) will be waived for students in licensed self-run 
schools who possess the required documents and materials, it gives 50 percent of the 
financial responsibility in covering these costs during subsequent years to the districts 
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and counties (the other half being covered by the municipal government).  In the same 
year, the “Suggestions of the Beijing Municipal Education Commission and Beijing 
Municipal Finance Bureau to Provide Better Compulsory Education to the Children of 
Migrant Workers in Beijing” was issued, calling for district and county governments to 
continue strengthening their primary role in the area in accordance with the “principle of 
territorial management” (shudi guanli yuanze).  Such measures signify efforts by the 
municipal government to reduce its share of the responsibility, shedding light on the 
extent to which migrant children’s education is seen as a policy priority.   
There have been some positive developments.  At the end of 2008, the municipal 
government stated that it would provide a subsidy to students in licensed migrant 
schools of 80 RMB (about 12 USD) per student per term at the primary school level and 
130 RMB (about 19 USD) per student per term at the middle school level.  In 2009, it 
stated that it would provide new desks, chairs, podiums, and lights to licensed migrant 
schools (known as sanxin yiliang).  However, while these measures provide some 
support to licensed migrant schools and their students, they are relatively trivial in light 
of recent efforts in Shanghai.  Perhaps of more significance is the decision in 2010 to 
include migrant children in the computerized lottery system for enrollment in public 
middle schools (see Zhong and Yue 2010).  At the time of fieldwork, though, it 
remained unclear how the system would operate and whether or not students of licensed 
and unlicensed migrant schools would benefit equally.  Implementation may also vary 
between the districts.  Still, the decision itself is an important step in moving towards 
more equal educational opportunities for migrant children in Beijing. 
 Despite such developments, the municipal government continues to adopt a 
more reserved attitude towards migrant schools.  Of particular interest is the general 
absence of support for migrant schools in its policies.  The Law on Promoting Private 
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Education, adopted in December 2002 and effective as of September 2003, states that 
private (minban) schools and public schools share the same legal status.  Yet, despite 
calls for an increase in both support (fuchi) for and management (guanli) of migrant 
schools in central policies, Beijing municipal policies have largely omitted the former, 
primarily calling for management, or in some cases management and supervision 
(guanli he jiandu), of the schools.7  That is, even though the policies reiterate many of 
the key sentiments expressed by the central government (including migrant children’s 
right to education and the need to treat migrant and local children equally), the 
municipality has generally excluded discussion of support or assistance for migrant 
schools from its policies.  What’s more, its pursuit of urbanization has meant that 
frequent rounds of demolition still threaten the survival of these schools (as will be 
discussed in Chapter 6).   
As a result, researchers, NGO staff, and principals in the sample discussed 
Beijing’s approach as being more “conservative” (baoshou), “strict” (yange), and less 
supportive, especially compared to Shanghai (see Table 4.6).  As L. Wang (2008, 692) 
explains: 
[The Beijing] municipal government takes a very cautious attitude towards educational 
provision for migrants, as there is anxiety that easing the situation will accelerate the growth 
of migrants and will increase pressure to make it easier to obtain urban social rights.  The 
policy-makers are particularly concerned with the image of the capital and generally 
consider migrants as a disproportionate source of social and civic problems.   
 
                                                     
7
 One exception can be found in the “Notice of the Beijing Municipal Education Commission on the 
Work of Strengthening the Management of Self-Run Migrant Schools” (2005), which calls for a three-
part strategy that includes assisting some schools (fuchi yipi).  However, the strategy proposed less than a 
year later in the “Notice of the General Office of the Beijing Municipal People’s Government on the 
Work of Strengthening the Safety of Non-Approved Self-Run Migrant Schools” (2006) omits any 
mention of support and calls for distributing some migrant children to public schools, regulating some 
migrant schools, and closing others.  The shift from a focus on managing migrant schools in the 2005 
document towards a focus on closing unlicensed ones in the 2006 document is also noteworthy. 
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Table 4.6 Beijing’s Conservative Approach: Views of Interviewees 
Lack of Support 
for Migrant 
Schools 
 As one principal asserted: “[Migrant] children in Shanghai can 
just carry their backpacks and go to school.  They don’t have to 
pay.…  Beijing hasn’t supplied the funds, so how are our schools 
supposed to be maintained?  Children have all come to school 
carrying their backpacks, so what are we supposed to use to pay 
teachers’ salaries?  What are we supposed to use to pay rent?  
Shanghai has allocated funding, so [migrant] schools there have 
money to pay the rent and pay their teachers, and students can 
study for free.…  The Shanghai government has assumed its 
responsibility” (HL1P1).  
Reasons for Its 
Conservative 
Approach 
 As one interviewee stated, Beijing’s conservative approach is 
driven by the fear that “as soon as [the restrictions] are loosened, 
the city will become overcrowded,” adding that “Beijing is 
particularly afraid of the emergence of elements of instability” 
(YOL4S1).  
 According to one interviewee: “The good thing is that Beijing 
has a relatively large amount of financial resources.  That is, if it 
wanted to do it, it should be able to do it.  It’s not a simple issue 
of not having enough money.…  But, on the other hand, Beijing 
faces some of its own restrictions.  It’s the location of the CPC 
Central Committee and the State Council.…  [So] it’s very 
difficult for it to be innovative.  It cannot act very boldly like 
other parts of the country that are farther away.  Those areas can 
experiment.  When Beijing does these things, it has to be more 
cautious.…  This is its constraint.  It cannot do anything about it” 
(YOF1S1). 
 As one researcher maintained: “[In terms of the reasoning behind 
Beijing’s approach], my [conjecture] is that it has to do with 
Beijing’s total population.…  Its current population has already 
surpassed Beijing’s plans.  Beijing’s population last year or the 
year before already reached the urban planning population total 
for 2020.  So Beijing has major population pressures … so it 
wants to control the population.  To control the population, it 
certainly cannot control the local Beijing population, can it?  It 
must control the outside population [wailai renkou].  So these 
things will definitely impact policy implementation.…  Shanghai 
and Beijing are not the same.  Shanghai is an economic center, 
while Beijing is a political center.  Economic centers need labor.  
Beijing is a political center and doesn’t necessarily [feel as great 
of a] need [for] these kind of people, these laborers” (A1). 
 
 In other words, Beijing’s response to central policies on migrant children’s 
education has been shaped to a large extent by social and political concerns regarding 
population growth and social instability.  Its identity as the political center of China has 
greatly exacerbated these concerns.  The result has been a policy environment in which 
barriers to the achievement of central-level policy ideals have emerged, with serious 
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implications for the survival and development of migrant schools as a source of 
education for migrant children in the city.   
 
Towards a More Comprehensive Understanding of the  
Effects of Decentralization on Migrant Children’s Education in Beijing 
In China, the dilemmas faced by the government in setting and implementing 
migration and educational policies often illustrate a basic tension between social and 
economic aspirations; that is, while migrant workers have made major contributions to 
urban development and economic growth, officials have frequently been driven by 
concerns about the socio-political ramifications of large-scale rural-urban migration (see 
Hannum 1999, 193; Guang 2001, 490-491).  These concerns have contributed to the 
reality that policies intended to address the problems of migrant workers and their 
children are not necessarily translated into positive outcomes at the local level, 
illustrating the complexity of decentralized decision-making.  Though the recent 
experiences of a few cities, Shanghai in particular, provide some evidence that 
decentralization through the policy of “two priorities” can have a positive impact on 
migrant children’s education, the case of Beijing serves as an example of a municipality 
in which such concerns have heavily influenced the policy approach adopted.  This 
chapter shows that, despite increasingly positive central policies on migrant children’s 
education over the past decade, Beijing has adopted a conservative approach, a key 
aspect of which has been a general lack of support for migrant schools in its policies.   
In the realm of migrant children’s education, the emergence of such gaps 
between central-level policy ideals and the local reality could have serious 
consequences for rural-urban inequality and future trends in social stratification (see 
Chapter 2).  As Wu (2001, 86) asserts: “With the increasing influx of migrant families, 
the frightening prospect is that a generation of uneducated, unemployed children may 
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become a new urban underclass.”  Under such circumstances, it is crucial to evaluate 
whether or not central policies are leading to positive outcomes locally and why, 
including how far the issue goes beyond the hukou system.  Yet ultimately missing from 
the discourse is an analysis of the process by which the policies are being implemented, 
as well as the extent to which differential policy implementation extends to the district 
level.  The latter is particularly relevant in the case of Beijing given efforts by the 
municipal government to increase the responsibilities of district and county 
governments in the area.   
This analysis raises important questions that require further investigation.  In 
light of the policy history evaluated above, what approaches are district governments in 
Beijing adopting and why?  What are the consequences of the municipal and district 
policy approaches for the situations of migrant schools and their students?  Given the 
gaps in knowledge regarding policy processes in China (especially urban China), what 
does such an analysis contribute to the understanding of decentralization and differential 
policy implementation and their potential long-term effects on trends in social 
stratification?  These questions will be the focus of the remainder of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DECENTRALIZATION AND  
MIGRANT CHILDREN’S EDUCATION IN BEIJING:  
THE IMPORTANCE OF DISTRICT POLICY APPROACHES  
 
 
 
“The views of the municipal and district leaders determine the fate of migrant workers’ 
children.  This is the fundamental issue” (HU1P1). 
 
 
 
Despite its potential benefits, decentralization is a highly complex phenomenon.  
It can create space for the emergence of different views and policy approaches that are 
shaped by the particular local context (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998, 4-9).  As Dunne, 
Akyeampong, and Humphreys (2007, 7) argue: 
Decentralisation has in the last two to three decades become almost synonymous with 
reforms in governance and accountability in many developing countries (Litvack et al., 
1998).…  But the gap between decentralisation policy and practice is usually wide in many 
developing country systems (e.g. in Malawi – Davies et al., 2003).  The complexities and 
weaknesses within environments in which it is introduced produces outcomes that are not 
predicted by decentralisation policy. 
Policy implementation can therefore be an extremely complex, political process 
(Thomas and Grindle 1990; Crosby 1996; Sutton 1999, 22; Little 2008, 14-17).  Not 
only can it involve multiple levels of local government (as well as a range of actors 
within each level), but it can also be heavily influenced by local social, economic, 
political, and governance factors, with major consequences for the populations being 
targeted.   
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, central policies have given municipal 
governments a degree of autonomy in adopting their own policy approaches.  Policy 
document analysis shows that the Beijing municipal government has largely omitted 
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support for migrant schools from its policies, creating a gap between central-level 
policy ideals and the local reality.  Given the growing recognition in the policy 
processes literature of the complex effects of decentralization, as well as the tendency to 
focus on municipal-level situations when discussing migrant children’s education in 
China, this chapter evaluates the potential importance of district-level policy responses 
for migrant schools and their students in Beijing and the role of local context in shaping 
these responses.  That is, what attitudes and approaches have the selected district 
governments adopted towards migrant children’s education and particularly migrant 
schools and why?  What do these approaches reveal about the policy implementation 
process?  Examining these questions will shed much needed light on the linkages 
between decentralization, local context, and policy implementation outlined in Figure 
2.1, including the consequences of decentralization, the extent to which differential 
policy implementation extends to the district level, and the role of local social, 
economic, political, and governance factors.  Ultimately, a stronger understanding of 
these district-level dynamics will allow for a more comprehensive analysis of the 
situations of migrant schools. 
The following exploration is based on interviews with district education 
commission officials, policy documents and materials acquired, and information from 
migrant school principals, researchers, and local organizations.  The chapter starts by 
illustrating the increasing roles and responsibilities of the district governments – and 
district education commissions in particular – in the policy area and the subsequent 
importance of examining district-level policy approaches.  This is followed by an 
analysis of the situations in three of Beijing’s inner suburban districts: Shijingshan, 
Fengtai, and Haidian.  Evidence shows that, despite being constrained by municipal-
level standards, district policy approaches do vary.  Shijingshan has adopted an 
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approach centered on the close regulation of its migrant schools, primarily in terms of 
safety and security.  Fengtai has focused on minimizing the number of migrant schools 
and retaining full control.  And Haidian has adopted a strategy of limited management 
towards migrant schools, in which it wants to play a smaller role while maintaining a 
level of control.  Though decision-making in the area continues to be a closed process, 
evidence from fieldwork is used to draw connections between the local context and the 
policy approach adopted in each district.  The chapter shows that several district-level 
factors – mainly the size of the district and its migrant population, the number of 
migrant schools, the district’s financial situation, other policy interests and priorities, 
and external pressures – have had a substantial impact on the attitudes and approaches 
of these district governments.  In each district, which factors have been more influential 
vary, demonstrating that implementation does not operate in a systematic way.  
 
The Role of District Governments in Migrant Children’s Education 
When asked to discuss the main problems surrounding educational provision for 
migrant children in Beijing, most researchers and migrant school principals interviewed 
expressed that policy implementation at the local levels is a serious problem (see Table 
5.1).  The fact that district governments must follow standards set by the municipal 
government might lead to the conclusion that the latter determines the situations of 
migrant schools.  However, evidence shows that district governments are also given 
flexibility in their approaches, and they ultimately manage the situations in their 
localities.  For example, though the Beijing municipal government may set the general 
guidelines for licensing migrant schools, district governments can interpret and 
implement the regulations.  Districts are often responsible for deciding when to close or 
demolish migrant schools as well.  In other words, district governments have a critical 
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impact on two key aspects of migrant schools’ existence: their legal status and chances 
of survival.  Moreover, according to a government-based researcher, much of the 
financial burden in the area is placed on the district governments, with only some 
support from the Beijing municipal government.  They are also the main level of 
government that migrant schools interact with.  Thus, district-level approaches can have 
major consequences for migrant schools and their students.   
Table 5.1  The Problem of Implementation: Views of Academics, Researchers, 
and Migrant School Principals in the Sample 
 According to one academic, the central policies cannot get any better in theory, but, 
in practice, the power to decide has been given to individuals (A4). 
 As one researcher asserted: “In China, a lot of factors are very individual factors.  For 
example, this district chief or this bureau chief, what kinds of personal views they 
have, there is no way to determine” (A1). 
 As one researcher stated, the central policies merely put forth the principles, while 
the real policies are at the local levels (GR1). 
 As one academic argued, the Beijing municipal government simply tells the district 
governments what to do, and the district governments are the ones that actually 
manage their schools (A5). 
 According to one principal: “[Implementation] is an area of conflict.  Sometimes the 
central and local governments vary in how they think.  Local governments have local 
finances, and the central government has central finances.…  Local governments can 
decide on their own how to spend the money that’s in their hands.  Sometimes the 
central government is not able to do anything about it” (HL1P1).  
 As one principal described: “Our school will soon be demolished, and we still don’t 
know what will happen.  We don’t know what will happen to these children and 
whether or not the education commission has a plan.  The policies are, in principle, 
good.  The idea of treating these children as though they are all under the same sun 
[tongzai yige yangguang xia] and ensuring that migrant children are able to benefit 
from a high quality education and learning environment, just as local children are, is 
a good idea.  But why hasn’t there been action, right?  There hasn’t been action” 
(HU2P1). 
 
This section identifies the district government actors involved in migrant 
children’s education and their respective responsibilities, shedding light on the 
complexity attached to the policy area and motivating a deeper analysis of the district-
level policy approaches.  Since the introduction of the policy of “two priorities,” 
migrant children’s education has become a part of each district government’s work on 
96 
compulsory education.  Within each district, the education commission has the main 
responsibility in terms of implementation.  Based on documents collected, a key role of 
the district education commission in migrant children’s education is to distribute the 
duties of accepting migrant children to all public primary and middle schools.  It is also 
responsible for strengthening the management of and guidance for migrant schools (e.g., 
monitoring and regulating school conditions and how the schools are run, as well as 
providing substandard schools with deadlines for improvement).1  Within each district 
education commission, responsibilities are spread across numerous sub-departments.  
As Table 5.2 shows, these responsibilities exhibit a strong focus on the management and 
supervision of migrant schools (including safety and health regulation), reflecting the 
municipal-level perception of migrant children’s education as a policy area closely 
linked to issues of public security and social stability. 
A range of other district-level departments have also become involved (see 
Table 5.3).  For example, the health bureaus and public security sub-bureaus (or 
sometimes local police stations) play a key role in conducting regular inspections; aside 
from the district education commission, migrant schools generally have the most 
interaction with these two units.  The participation of such actors provides further 
evidence that migrant children’s education is not simply a matter of education and is 
seen as a complex policy area that involves a variety of issues like public security, 
sanitation, food safety, and housing and rent.  As one education expert summarized:  
Besides those doing work related to education, [the policy area involves individuals that 
work in] public security, city management, housing management, health and sanitation, and 
trade and commerce.  These people do not work in education, but it is their participation that 
makes this education possible. (YOF1S1) 
                                                     
1
 See, for example, the “Haidian District’s Measures for the Implementation of Providing 
Compulsory Education to School-Aged Children and Youth of the Floating Population,” issued by the 
Haidian district government in 2002, and the “Suggestions on Implementing the Provision of Compulsory 
Education to School-Aged Children and Youth of the Floating Population,” issued by Fengtai’s education 
commission, agriculture commission, civil affairs bureau, public security sub-bureau, and education 
supervision office in 2003. 
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Ultimately, the education commission retains the primary responsibility of coordinating 
these various departments in regulating migrant schools and plays a leading role in the 
implementation process. 
Table 5.2 Roles of Key Departments within the District Education 
Commissions 
Unit Main Responsibility in the Area 
School Management with 
Social Resources Section 
(Shehui liliang banxue 
guanli ke) 
Generally responsible for work related to private (minban) schools 
and compulsory education for migrant children 
Primary Education 
Section, Middle School 
Education Section  
(Xiaojiao ke, Zhongjiao 
ke) 
Responsible for providing guidance and services for licensed and 
unlicensed schools, coordinating the allocation and enrollment of 
migrant children into schools, and keeping track of the numbers of 
students  
Private Education 
Section 
(Minban jiaoyu ke) 
Responsible for doing the preliminary work when private schools 
apply for a license, as well as providing guidance and management 
for licensed and unlicensed schools and coordinating relevant 
departments and sections  
Health and Sanitation 
Section  
(Baowei ke) 
Responsible for conducting health and sanitation inspections at 
licensed and unlicensed schools  
Health Center  
(Tiwei zhongxin) 
Responsible for doing work related to health and epidemic 
prevention at private schools, including conducting inspections  
Housing Management 
Office  
(Fangguan suo) 
Responsible for inspecting the safety of school buildings  
Equipment Department  
(Zhuangbei chu) Responsible for improving the conditions of private schools  
Personnel Section  
(Renshi ke) 
Responsible for doing work related to teacher training at private 
schools  
Finance Section  
(Caiwu ke) 
Responsible for doing fund allocation and budgetary work, as well as 
reducing the temporary schooling fees and tuition and miscellaneous 
fees charged by licensed schools  
Auditing Section  
(Shenji ke) 
Responsible for supervising, managing, and auditing the allocation 
and use of special funds, as well as reducing the temporary schooling 
fees and tuition and miscellaneous fees charged by licensed schools  
Legislation Section  
(Fagui ke) 
Responsible for guiding the various departments in managing the 
schools, as well as guiding the implementation of relevant laws and 
regulations  
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2009-2010) and district-level documents collected.   
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Table 5.3 Roles of Other Key Departments at the District and Sub-District 
Levels 
Unit Main Responsibility in the Area 
District Public Security 
Sub-Bureau 
(Qu gongan fenju) 
Responsible for carrying out safety inspections and strengthening the 
security management of schools accepting migrant children, 
protecting the safety and stability of the school environment, and 
cooperating with other departments in carrying out safety regulation 
and shutting down unlicensed schools 
District Health Bureau 
(Qu weisheng ju) 
Responsible for carrying out health inspections at schools, including 
work related to health and epidemic prevention and food safety  
District Housing and 
Urban and Rural 
Construction 
Commission 
(Qu zhufang he 
chengxiang jianshe 
weiyuanhui) 
Responsible for regulating and inspecting the safety of school 
buildings  
District Fire Brigade 
(Qu xiaofang zhidui) 
Responsible for inspecting, supervising, and managing fire safety in 
schools 
District Finance Bureau 
(Qu caizheng ju) 
Responsible for allocating and monitoring the use of special funds 
for migrant children’s education 
District Development and 
Reform Commission 
(Qu fazhan he gaige 
weiyuanhui) 
Responsible for managing and supervising schools in terms of 
charging and refunding fees  
District City 
Administration and 
Supervision Team 
(Qu chengshi guanli 
jiancha dadui) 
Responsible for assisting the various departments in conducting 
relevant inspections  
District Floating 
Population Management 
Office 
(Qu liudong renkou 
guanli bangongshi) 
Responsible for providing relevant services and guidance and 
playing a coordinating role 
District Civil Affairs 
Bureau 
(Qu minzheng ju) 
Responsible for organizing and coordinating implementation  
District Social Work 
Commission 
(Shegong weiyuanhui) 
Responsible for urging all relevant commissions, offices, street and 
village/township-level units to implement policies and decisions 
District Commission of 
Rural Affairs 
(Qu nongcun gongzuo 
weiyuanhui) 
Responsible for guiding, coordinating, and encouraging relevant 
work at the village and township level  
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District Education 
Supervision Office 
(Qu jiaoyu dudao shi) 
Responsible for including all relevant work done by the departments 
and schools into its work scope and carrying out regular supervision  
All related 
village/township 
governments (xiangzhen 
zhengfu) and street 
offices (jiedao banshichu) 
Responsible for supervising, managing, and inspecting migrant 
children’s education and reporting their situations to the district 
education commission, as well as issuing Beijing temporary 
schooling approval permits to migrant children who meet the 
conditions 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2009-2010) and district-level documents collected. 
 
Thus, district governments – and district education commissions in particular – 
have acquired critical roles and responsibilities in migrant children’s education, creating 
the potential for variation between policy approaches and making a closer exploration of 
the district-level dynamics crucial.  The rest of this chapter examines the policy 
approaches adopted in Shijingshan, Fengtai, and Haidian, primarily from the 
perspective of the district education commissions.  It shows that decentralization has 
generated space for differential policy implementation at the district level, and different 
local factors have shaped the policy response in each district. 
 
The Cases of Shijingshan, Fengtai, and Haidian 
The above discussion raises critical questions surrounding the extent to which 
variations have emerged between district policy approaches, particularly in terms of the 
level of attention and support given to migrant schools and the approaches towards 
licensing and demolition and closures.  A common perception among many academics 
in the sample was that, since local policies and standards are set at the municipal level, 
any variation between districts would be small and inconsequential.  Yet, based on 
interviews with other researchers, migrant school principals, and staff at NGOs, there is 
increasing acknowledgement of differences between district governments’ approaches.  
Among those with some knowledge about the districts, it was often stated that 
Chaoyang, and to a lesser extent Changping and Tongzhou, have stronger reputations in 
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terms of their support for migrant schools and their students, and Fengtai has the worst.  
Districts including Shijingshan, Haidian, and Daxing fall in-between.  While such 
general reputations exist, there has been a lack of detailed exploration of the attitudes 
and approaches adopted.  The question then arises: what is driving these different 
reputations?   
As Table 5.4 shows, the four inner suburban districts vary not only in area, but 
also in terms of population size, economic indicators like GDP and average incomes, 
and the size of their public school systems.  Shijingshan is the smallest of the four in 
terms of area, total population, and GDP.  Fengtai, the second smallest in area and total 
population, has the lowest GDP per capita of the four districts.  Haidian, which is only 
slightly smaller than Chaoyang in area and total population, has the highest GDP and 
local financial expenditure in the entire city (see also Chapter 3).  Given the more 
positive reputation of Chaoyang, the largest of the four in area and the largest of 
Beijing’s districts and counties in total population, it is useful to briefly discuss its 
situation before moving on.  Though usually associated with being home to most of the 
city’s embassies, foreign businesses, and international agencies, Chaoyang is also home 
to Beijing’s largest migrant population and, based on data from 2009, nearly 95,000 
compulsory school-aged migrant children (Ni and Zhao 2010).  According to a long-
time principal in the district, its earliest migrant schools were established around 1996-
1997, and it had over 100 at its peak.  At the time of fieldwork, it had 14 licensed 
migrant schools and an estimated 60-70 unlicensed ones (see Table 5.5).   
101 
Table 5.4 Basic Information on Beijing’s Inner Suburban Districts 
 Shijingshan Fengtai Haidian Chaoyang BEIJING 
Size (km²) 84.32 305.80 430.73 455.08 16,410.54 
POPULATION* 
Total Population (2000 Census) 489,439 1,369,480 2,240,124 2,289,756 13,569,194 
Total Population (2010 Census) 616,000 2,112,000 3,281,000 3,545,000 19,612,368 
Permanent Resident Population 
(changzhu renkou) 546,000 1,693,000 2,814,000 3,001,000 16,330,000 
Registered Population  
(huji renkou) 354,000 1,017,000 2,039,000 1,784,000 12,133,000 
% of Permanent Resident 
Population 64.84 60.07 72.46 59.45 74.30 
Outside Population  
(wailai renkou) 167,000 447,000 848,000 963,000 4,197,000 
% of Permanent Resident 
Population 30.59 26.40 30.14 32.09 25.70 
Temporary Resident Population  
(zanzhu renkou) 174,000 858,000 1,037,000 1,353,000 5,549,000 
ECONOMIC SITUATION** 
GDP  
RMB 
(billions) 22.64 46.32 182.88 169.74 935.33 
USD 
(billions) 2.98 6.09 24.03 22.31 122.91 
Local Financial 
Revenue  
RMB 
(billions) 1.38 3.03 11.57 14.15 188.20 
USD 
(millions) 180.85 398.56 1,520.09 1,860.02 24,731.15 
Local Financial 
Expenditure  
RMB 
(billions) 2.41 6.20 14.94 13.06 206.77 
USD 
(millions) 316.31 815.00 1,963.29 1,716.52 27,170.22 
Average Annual 
Wage of Staff 
and Workers in 
Urban Units 
RMB/year 40,841 35,484 51,841 53,768 46,507 
USD/year 5,367 4,663 6,812 7,065 6,111 
Per Capita 
Annual 
Disposable 
Income of Urban 
Households 
RMB/year 20,745 20,574 25,312 22,377 21,989 
USD/year 2,726 2,704 3,326 2,940 2,889 
EDUCATIONAL SITUATION 
Number of Primary Schools 32 94 109 149 1,235 
Number of General Secondary 
Schools 22 49 83 78 689 
Source: Beijing Municipal Statistics Bureau and National Bureau of Statistics Beijing Survey Team (2008).  
Figures for the total population from the 2000 and 2010 censuses came from National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (2000); National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011); The Sixth National Census Leading Group Office 
of Beijing Municipality, Beijing Municipal Statistics Bureau, and National Bureau of Statistics Beijing Survey 
Team (2011). 
* The permanent resident population is usually defined as including the registered population (those with 
registered permanent residence in the locality) and the outside population (those who have lived in the locality 
for over half a year but lack local permanent residence status).  The temporary resident population refers to 
those who have stayed in the locality for over three days but lack local permanent residence status.  The sources 
of these figures can vary; in this table, figures for the registered and temporary resident populations were 
determined by Beijing’s public security bureau, while figures for the permanent resident and outside 
populations were based on a 2007 sample survey on population change.  The percentages calculated here based 
on these figures should therefore be seen as rough estimates. 
** The USD amounts were calculated using the average RMB/USD exchange rate of 7.61 in 2007. 
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Table 5.5 Estimated Numbers of Migrant Schools in Beijing’s Districts and 
Counties  
District/County 
Outside Population 
(wailai renkou) 
(10,000 persons) 
Total Number of 
Migrant Schools 
(Estimated) 
Number of Licensed 
Migrant Schools 
City Proper:  
Dongcheng 10.1 0 0 
Xicheng 11.0 0 0 
Chongwen 5.5 0 0 
Xuanwu 10.9 1 1 
Inner Suburbs:  
Chaoyang 96.3 >80 14 
Fengtai 44.7 9 3 
Shijingshan 16.7 9 3 
Haidian 84.8 21 2 
Outer Suburbs:  
Mentougou 3.2 0 0 
Fangshan 13.0 <10 3 
Tongzhou 27.8 40-50 11 
Shunyi 17.3 10-20 0 
Changping 30.5 50-60 16 
Daxing 33.7 50-60 12 
Huairou 4.5 2 0 
Pinggu 3.2 0 0 
Miyun 4.0 0 0 
Yanqing  2.5 1 1 
Total (Beijing): 419.7 >300 66 
Source: Figures for the outside population came from Beijing Municipal Statistics Bureau and National 
Bureau of Statistics Beijing Survey Team (2008).  Figures for the numbers of migrant schools were 
mainly provided by a prominent principal during fieldwork, and estimates for the total number of schools 
in each district should be seen as rough.  Moreover, the numbers may have since declined due to 
demolition and closures. 
 
Chaoyang is frequently discussed as being more supportive of migrant schools.  
Based on conversations with principals, migrant schools have been incorporated into the 
district’s educational work and planning to a greater extent than in many other districts.  
For example, principals of licensed and unlicensed migrant schools may regularly attend 
meetings held by the education commission together, whereas it is common for other 
districts to only include the principals of unlicensed migrant schools in a small number 
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of safety-related meetings.2  It has also allowed the largest number of migrant schools to 
exist over the years and has the second highest number of licensed ones.  
Aside from Chaoyang, two of the outer suburban districts, Changping and 
Tongzhou, have acquired relatively positive reputations.  Changping has not only 
licensed the largest number of migrant schools, but it has also “never once forcefully 
clamped down [on migrant schools]” (HL1P1).  According to principals, Tongzhou has 
been more open-minded in its approach towards the schools as well; for example, it was 
the first district in Beijing to license migrant schools and licensed five in 2001 alone.  
As of late 2011, both were still allowing the establishment of new migrant schools (e.g., 
post-demolition).  As one principal highlighted: “[In Changping and Tongzhou], you 
can still open some new [migrant] schools.  If you go to other districts you can’t.  [They] 
won’t let you” (YL1P1).  Though the experiences of these two districts may differ from 
those in the inner suburban areas in terms of migration patterns and the attitudes 
towards migrants, such examples provide additional evidence of positive steps taken 
towards migrant schools at the district level. 
In light of the above, the rest of the chapter examines the situations in 
Shijingshan, Fengtai, and Haidian districts, with a focus on the approaches adopted 
towards migrant schools and the factors driving them.  While the depth of analysis is 
ultimately limited by the closed nature of internal policy deliberations and decision-
making (Howell 2003, 198), the discussion uses information from interviews and 
evidence from policy documents and materials to explore the three trajectories followed.   
 
                                                     
2
 Since licensed migrant schools are considered to be private (minban) schools, they usually attend 
the district government’s meetings on a range of topics, while unlicensed ones often only attend a few 
safety meetings each year.  Ultimately, each district government decides which schools attend which 
meetings. 
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Shijingshan District 
 As shown in Table 5.4, Shijingshan is the smallest of the four inner suburban 
districts.  At only 84.32 square kilometers, it is less than one-fifth the size of Chaoyang.  
By 2007, the district’s permanent resident population was 546,000, while its outside 
population was 167,000.  Based on figures in the education commission’s “Shijingshan 
District’s Situation Report on the Regulation of Self-Run Migrant Schools” (2009) 
(hereafter, “Shijingshan Report (2009)”),3 there were over 16,000 school-aged migrant 
children in the district by late 2009, the lowest among the inner suburban districts (see 
Table 5.6).  At its peak, it had 18 migrant schools with about 14,000 students in 2000.  
By late 2009, it had nine migrant schools.   
Table 5.6 Official Estimates on the Numbers of Migrant Children and Migrant 
Schools in the Selected Districts  
 Shijingshan Fengtai Haidian 
Estimated Number of Compulsory School-Aged 
Migrant Children > 16,000 > 55,000  > 62,000 
Total Number of Migrant Schools  9 9 21 
Number of Licensed Migrant Schools 3 3 2 
Number of Unlicensed Migrant Schools 6 6 19 
Number of Children in Licensed Migrant Schools ≈ 4,000  > 3,600 > 1,500 
Number of Children in Unlicensed Migrant 
Schools > 2,000 > 4,800 > 9,400  
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2009-2010) and district-level documents collected.  These estimates should 
be seen as extremely rough.  As will be discussed in Chapter 6, there may be a number of migrant schools 
and migrant children that are not included in these figures.  What’s more, estimates for the migrant 
children’s population may refer to “children of the floating population” rather than “migrant workers’ 
children.”   
 
Shijingshan’s district government started to pay attention to the provision of 
education for migrant children around 2000 and has since made some notable 
achievements.  As discussed in the “Shijingshan Report” (2009), for example, it 
converted a vocational high school into a migrant school in 2000, becoming Beijing’s 
first public school for the children of migrants.  It also chose two public primary schools 
                                                     
3
 As these materials were obtained during fieldwork, I shall not burden the reader with the Chinese 
(pinyin) titles. 
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and two public middle schools to primarily accept children of the floating population.  
According to the report, over 10,000 children of the floating population were attending 
its public schools by 2009.  Moreover, the district government has received recognition 
from higher-level leadership.  In 2003, for instance, Shijingshan was chosen to represent 
Beijing at a UNESCO forum on migrant children’s education.  In addition, on Teachers’ 
Day in 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao visited one of the district’s public schools set aside 
for migrant children.  Not only did he commend the district for its progress in the area, 
but he also wrote on a blackboard the now famous words: “Under the same blue sky, 
grow up and progress together” (tongzai lantian xia, gongtong chengzhang jinbu).  
 
Shijingshan’s focus on close regulation and safety management.  According to 
the official interviewed, the district education commission has adopted a three-pronged 
strategy in the area: to distribute some migrant children to public schools (fenliu) and to 
regulate a portion of its migrant schools (guifan), while shutting down the others 
(qudi).4  Since 2000, it has evaluated the performance of its migrant schools with a 
focus on safety, health and sanitation, and teacher certification, though the official 
emphasized that safety regulation is a particular concern.   
An example of the focus on safety can be seen in the decision to prohibit 
migrant schools in the district from using school buses (a decision that only one other 
district, Chaoyang, has made).5  As described by the official, in 2009, after observing 
school bus activity among its migrant schools, the education commission decided to 
prohibit the use of these buses in order to ensure the safety of the students, prevent 
                                                     
4
 These were goals described in the “Notice of the General Office of the Beijing Municipal People’s 
Government on the Work of Strengthening the Safety of Non-Approved Self-Run Migrant Schools” 
(2006) (see Chapter 4).  
5
 The seven schools visited in Shijingshan each had two to six buses prior to this decision.  As will be 
discussed in Chapter 6, the conditions of the buses used by migrant schools tend to be poor. 
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migrant schools from enrolling students from nearby districts, and ensure that students 
attend schools close to their homes.   
 The district’s emphasis on safety-related issues can also be seen in its 2006 
decision to close several unlicensed migrant schools.  In the period leading up to the 
2008 Olympics, the “Notice of the General Office of the Beijing Municipal People’s 
Government on the Work of Strengthening the Safety of Non-Approved Self-Run 
Migrant Schools” (2006) called for the “clearing up and rectification” (qingli zhengdun) 
of unapproved migrant schools.  As mentioned in Chapter 4, the notice generated 
widespread opposition, and the decision was eventually cancelled.  Still, conversations 
with principals revealed that, by that time, Shijingshan – one of the few districts to 
adopt measures in response – had already closed about eight schools it considered to be 
unsafe.  
 What, then, has this approach meant for the district’s migrant schools?  The 
education commission claims to be supportive of public schools that accept migrant 
children.  As discussed in the “Shijingshan Report” (2009), it has assisted these schools 
in areas like funding and the treatment of teachers.  In addition, given the high mobility 
of migrant children, it has adopted a public school management system based on the 
notion of registration, enrollment, and transfer at any time.  However, the focus of its 
approach towards migrant schools has predominantly been on safety and health 
regulation.  In other words, migrant schools receive considerably less support than the 
district’s public schools, both financially and otherwise.  During fieldwork, I visited 
four of the five remaining unlicensed migrant schools in Shijingshan and was told each 
time that their relationship with the district government revolves primarily around 
health and safety inspections, as well as safety meetings at least once or twice per 
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school term.  Principals described that, while the education commission does a lot of 
regulation, it has not given them much assistance (see Table 5.7).  
Table 5.7  Shijingshan’s Approach: Views of Migrant School Principals in the 
Sample 
Approach Examples 
Close 
management, but 
general lack of 
support 
 “Some districts are really supportive of migrant schools.  Some 
districts discriminate against them or don’t manage them.  
Shijingshan is average” (SU3P1).  
 “I think Shijingshan says a lot and manages a lot but, in terms of 
real help, it hasn’t been implemented.…  For example, around 
the time of the Olympics, they basically required us to attend 
meetings every day.  If today was a meeting with the education 
commission, then tomorrow it was with the safety departments, 
and then the day after it was with the health departments.…  
Every department contacted us to attend meetings.  But in the 
end none of the problems were resolved.…  Maybe from their 
point of view [all of the regulation] is for our own good, for our 
own safety.  We can understand that” (SU2P1).  
 “There is no support [from the government].  They have never 
given us a penny.  The treatment is just not the same [as that 
given to public schools]” (SU4P1). 
 
The impact of local factors.  Ultimately, the size of the district and its migrant 
population has played a central role in shaping Shijingshan’s approach.  Its outside 
population is only about three-eighths the size of Fengtai’s and about one-fifth the size 
of Haidian’s, while the estimated number of migrant children is about three-tenths the 
size of Fengtai’s and about one-fourth the size of Haidian’s.  According to the official, 
Shijingshan’s situation is unique in that, with fewer than ten migrant schools, the 
education commission can closely monitor and regulate the schools – as called for in 
Beijing municipal policies – more easily than other districts.  For instance, as spelled 
out in the “Shijingshan District Education Commission’s Trial Suggestions for 
Strengthening the Management of School Conduct among Private Educational 
Institutions” (2003), Shijingshan introduced a points system to regulate the daily 
behavior of its private schools.  Under this system, each school would begin with 30 
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points, and points would subsequently be added or deducted based on behavior.6  Such a 
system required that the district education commission and other relevant departments 
keep extremely close watch over the schools, and its introduction was possible largely 
because of the district’s small size.  As the official maintained, Shijingshan’s education 
commission is able to be very familiar with its migrant schools, whereas it is common 
for section chiefs in Haidian, a district with a much larger number of schools, to have 
never met with the principals of migrant schools.   
The official further highlighted the link between the district’s size and its ability 
to closely monitor migrant schools by pointing to its response to the sudden closing of 
an unlicensed migrant school in 2009.  As described in the “Shijingshan Report” (2009), 
due to the decision to prohibit the use of school buses, this particular school’s student 
body declined from over 600 students at its peak to around 170.  As a result, the 
principal began to face difficulties paying rent and other expenses.  In addition, the 
principal’s spouse had fallen ill and had to return to their home province for medical 
treatment.  Under these circumstances, the principal made the decision to close the 
school, leaving the students without a school to attend.  The incident attracted attention 
from the local media and society.  Aware of the situation, the district education 
commission immediately adopted measures to maintain stability.  First, it placed over 
80 students into four nearby public schools, while the remaining students were placed 
into a nearby migrant school.  Second, it made sure that the principal refunded all the 
fees parents had paid for that term.  And third, officials went to the school to assess the 
scene and resolve any remaining issues.  The day after the school’s closure, they met 
with the principals of the four public schools and introduced principles to guide them in 
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 Points could be awarded if, for instance, a large sum of money was invested into improving the 
school’s quality.  Points could be deducted due to improper behaviors.  If the overall deduction of points 
exceeded a certain number, the principal would be required to go to the education commission for training 
and would be given a deadline for improvement.   
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their enrollment of the children.7  Thus, due to the district’s small size and its ability to 
closely observe its migrant schools, the education commission was able to adopt a rapid 
response.   
 In sum, evidence shows that, largely in line with the Beijing municipal policies, 
Shijingshan’s approach towards migrant schools has been one centered on regulation, 
primarily in relation to safety and public security.  According to the official, the main 
factor shaping its approach has been the small size of the district and its migrant 
population and the small number of migrant schools, making close regulation more 
manageable.  Shijingshan has received recognition from higher-level officials, and its 
reputation among researchers and principals interviewed remains relatively 
uncontroversial.  However, unlike some of the efforts made by Chaoyang, Changping, 
and Tongzhou discussed earlier, it has not strayed far from municipal-level attitudes in 
terms of the level of support given to migrant schools.  
 
Fengtai District 
 Fengtai is one of Beijing’s key rural-urban transition areas and industrial 
districts.  At 305.80 square kilometers, it is about two-thirds the size of Chaoyang.  By 
2007, the district’s permanent resident population was 1,693,000, and its outside 
population was 447,000 (see Table 5.4).  As stated in the education commission’s 
“Situation Report on Resolving Compulsory Education for Migrant Children” (hereafter, 
“Fengtai Report (2004)”) and “Fengtai District’s Work Report on Education for 
Children of the Floating Population” (hereafter, “Fengtai Report (2007)”), its floating 
population in 2004 was close to 400,000, including over 34,000 children, and grew to 
nearly 816,000 by 2007, including over 48,000 children.  In addition, based on figures 
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 These principles included accepting all of the migrant children without entrance examinations and 
waiving tuition and miscellaneous fees.  In addition, to reduce the financial burden on migrant parents, 
the education commission would cover the costs of new teaching materials for the children.   
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in the education commission’s “Fengtai District’s Work Plan on Guaranteeing 
Compulsory Education for Migrant Children” (2009), it had over 55,000 compulsory 
school-aged migrant children by 2009.  That is, even though Fengtai is only about 70 
percent the size of Haidian in area, the estimated number of school-aged migrant 
children is nearly 90 percent of that in Haidian.  Still, Fengtai had only three licensed 
and six unlicensed migrant schools as of late 2009. 
 Fengtai was chosen as one of six pilot sites for the State Education 
Commission’s “Trial Measures for the Schooling of Children and Youth among the 
Floating Population in Cities and Towns” (1996).  The other sites selected were Hebei 
district in Tianjin, Xuhui district in Shanghai, Luohu district in Shenzhen, Yiwu city in 
Zhejiang province, and Langfang city in Hebei province.  As explained by a 
government-based researcher, Fengtai was chosen mainly due to the large size of its 
floating population and migrant workforce.  However, understanding of what measures 
it adopted at the time and what the outcomes were remains extremely limited, and both 
officials interviewed expressed a lack of knowledge about the district’s early role in the 
area.  While it was difficult to acquire information about Fengtai during this period, 
another government-based researcher did recall the establishment of a special public 
school for migrant children in the district at the time.  The school, though, was closed 
within a year or so, most likely due to issues concerning expensive fees like the 
temporary schooling fee and discrimination by teachers. 
 According to the officials, the district government began paying attention to 
migrant children’s education around 2001, after coming across some migrant schools 
while doing public security work.8  They discovered that these schools – often referred 
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 According to a principal whose school was located in Fengtai during the late 1990s but later moved 
to another district, Fengtai’s district government knew about the existence of migrant schools at the time, 
but there was very little regulation or interaction with them. 
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to as “simple schools” (jianyi xuexiao) – posed serious public safety and security risks.  
Several areas of concern were highlighted in the “Fengtai Report” (2004).  One was the 
poor quality of education and teaching.  Another involved the use of illegal school buses; 
they found that schools were using 17-seater buses, most of which were old and in poor 
condition, to carry close to 50 students at a time.  Moreover, schools were expanding in 
a disorderly manner; at one school, for instance, the size of the student body grew from 
600 to over 1,200 within a year.  Most of the schools’ cafeterias were also not certified, 
and schools were not taking proper precautions in terms of disease prevention.  Such 
findings and subsequent fears about public security and stability would play a central 
role in shaping the district government’s approach. 
 
Fengtai’s pursuit of “total control” and the elimination of migrant schools.  
The primary goal of the district government’s work in the area has, in principle, been to 
ensure that migrant children receive compulsory education.  However, the approach 
adopted has been extreme compared to other districts.  Based on the “Fengtai Report” 
(2004), the education commission’s core strategy revolved around two key ideas.  One 
was a focus on the central role of public schools and the use of multiple channels to 
ensure this.  The other, and the one that ultimately set the district apart, involved a 
combination of the two concepts of shu and du (shu du jiehe).  In order to ensure the 
right of children of the floating population to life, education, and health, the Fengtai 
district government formulated the work principle of shu and du; the notion of shu 
(literally to clear away an obstruction) refers to the goal of allocating these children to 
public schools rather than migrant schools, while du (literally to block or stop) refers to 
shutting down migrant schools with security risks.   
This line of thinking – evident in the use of terms like “strengthening 
management” (jiaqiang guanli) and “total control” (zongliang kongzhi) in district-level 
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documents – materialized into an effort to close all of the district’s migrant schools 
within a short amount of time.  As stated in the “Fengtai Report” (2007), the conditions 
and behavior of these schools were in violation of the Compulsory Education Law 
(1986) and the Law on Promoting Private Education (2002).  A process of rectification 
and clearing up (zhengdun qingli) was therefore initiated to ensure that substandard 
migrant schools were not allowed to exist.9   
The result of this approach – and what has driven the district government’s poor 
reputation – was that Fengtai was essentially left with no migrant schools for a period of 
time, leading many principals and researchers to refer to it as a yidaoqie (literally “to cut 
all at one stroke”) approach.  Under the premise of protecting the right of children of the 
floating population legally residing in the district to life, education, and health, the 
education commission wrote in one of its reports that 89 unlicensed migrant schools 
were shut down between 2001 and 2007.   
The primary reason for which this became so controversial was its impact on the 
students of these schools (see Table 5.8).  These children basically had four options: 
they could look for schools in other districts, move with their migrant school to another 
district, enroll in a public school in Fengtai, or return to their hometowns.  The “Fengtai 
Report” (2004) and the “Fengtai Report” (2007) stated that public schools had admitted 
the majority of the compulsory school-aged children in the district’s floating population.  
But, according to principals, most children affected had to either attend migrant schools 
in other districts like Daxing or return to their hometowns for further schooling.  Indeed, 
principals of the licensed migrant schools visited in Fengtai maintained that, unlike 
Shijingshan and Haidian, there are no public schools in the district that primarily accept 
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 See also, for example, the “Suggestions [of the Fengtai District Education Commission and Four 
Other Departments] on Implementing the Provision of Compulsory Education to School-Aged Children 
and Youth of the Floating Population” (2003). 
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migrant children.  As a result, while some students were able to continue their schooling 
in Fengtai, others had go to other districts or return to their hometowns.  That is, only a 
small proportion were placed into public schools.  Though the officials admitted that no 
reliable figures exist, one district-level document obtained cited the estimate that, by the 
mid-2000s, about 10,000 migrant children whose parents worked in Fengtai were 
attending schools in other districts.   
Table 5.8  Fengtai’s Approach: Views of Migrant School Principals in the 
Sample 
Approach Examples 
A pursuit of 
“total control” 
and the 
elimination of 
migrant schools 
 As one principal argued: “Fengtai is the worst of the districts.  
Within a three year period, it strove to exterminate all migrant 
schools, not leaving a single one.  As a result, large numbers of 
children were left on the streets and had to go to other districts 
like Haidian, Chaoyang, and Daxing to find schools” (HU1P1). 
 One principal stated that, due to government intervention, 
Fengtai had become an “empty district” (kong qu) by the mid-
2000s.  Under such circumstances, he saw an opportunity and a 
need to open his own migrant school in the district (FU1P1). 
 As one principal explained, one of the reasons that Daxing 
district has such a large migrant population is because a lot of 
migrant workers moved to Daxing from other districts, including 
Fengtai, after their communities and schools were demolished 
and brought their children with them to look for new schools 
(XU1P1).  
 
Since the mid-2000s, migrant schools have begun to appear in the district again, 
albeit on a much smaller scale.  At the time of fieldwork, the district had nine migrant 
schools.  In addition to being required to attend one to three safety meetings held by the 
education commission every school term, unlicensed schools are subject to regular 
inspections.  They also continue to be in danger of being closed, with consequences for 
their stability; one unlicensed school in the sample, for instance, had already moved 
three times since its establishment in 2005.  While Fengtai’s licensed schools receive 
some governmental support (e.g., in terms of equipment and facilities), principals of the 
unlicensed schools stated that they remain largely unsupported.  As described by the 
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principal of the school just mentioned, they have not yet been “pushed aside” (paiji) by 
the district government, but they have not received much support or assistance either 
(FU1P1).   
Thus, even though Fengtai has allowed the reemergence of a small number of 
schools, the objective to keep their number at a minimum remains.  For example, 
recommendations made in district-level documents obtained called for strengthening the 
management of unlicensed migrant schools and called on the Beijing People’s Congress, 
the municipal government, the media, and society to help the district government by 
supporting the work of clearing up the unlicensed schools.  In addition, given the 
difficulties faced in shutting these schools down, village and township governments and 
street offices should prevent the renting of buildings to the individuals who run them.   
 
The impact of local factors.  Given the district government’s controversial 
approach, it is necessary to explore the reasons underlying its attitude towards migrant 
children and migrant schools.  Though the documents discussed above emphasize that 
the strategy adopted was largely driven by the goal of protecting the rights of children 
of the floating population, a closer analysis of the documents and views expressed by 
the officials suggest a more complex picture.  Compared to other districts, the officials 
asserted that the scale of the problem is larger in Fengtai; not only does it have one of 
the largest migrant populations, but migrant workers’ children make up 98 percent of 
the children in its floating population.  The officials also pointed to the low status of 
migrant workers in the district, maintaining that there are too many “low-level parents” 
(dicengci de jiazhang), as opposed to those, for example, in Haidian (which is generally 
seen as a more “civilized” district).  All of this has led them to view migrant children’s 
education as an extremely difficult area that requires “controlling.” 
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Moreover, as highlighted earlier, district governments have the primary financial 
responsibility in the provision of education for migrant children.  This has been a 
particular problem for Fengtai, one of Beijing’s poorer districts.  Not only does it have 
the lowest GDP per capita among the four inner suburban districts, but, as shown in 
Table 5.4, its local financial revenue is only about one-quarter of that in Haidian.  In 
other words, Fengtai lacked the financial capacity to manage such a large number of 
informal schools, and this directly impacted its early decision to close all of them.  In 
the “Fengtai Report” (2007), an extremely difficult economic situation was first in a list 
of key problems faced by the district government in the area.  It was further expressed 
that the financial pressure on Fengtai has substantially increased since the municipal 
government’s decision to eliminate the temporary schooling fee for migrant children in 
public schools.  In addition, the report’s first recommendation was that, since Fengtai’s 
economy is underdeveloped and the district is facing a great deal of financial pressure in 
the area, the Beijing municipal government should allocate special funds to support 
public schools in educating children of the floating population.  As one academic in the 
sample asserted, whereas Chaoyang has the money and can afford to adopt a more 
supportive approach, Fengtai is simply too poor.   
These two factors have contributed to a heightened sense of concern about the 
increased flow of migrants into Beijing and particularly Fengtai.  The officials 
emphasized that the central and municipal policies on migrant children’s education are 
becoming more relaxed, which has increased the number of migrant workers in the city.  
As a result, the increase in the number of migrant children trying to attend school in 
Beijing has become a major concern.  According to the officials, this has not only been 
a problem for the district education commission, but it has also required an excessive 
use of the city’s educational resources, while the resources of sending governments 
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have not been fully utilized.  In other words, Fengtai adopted the strategy it did because 
of fears about public security issues and social instability, as well as the belief that 
eliminating migrant schools and relying solely on public schools would be the right 
thing to do.  The large size of Fengtai’s migrant population – along with the fact that it 
has a smaller amount of financial resources to draw from than wealthier districts like 
Chaoyang – played a critical role in motivating these concerns and its pursuit of “total 
control.”  
In sum, Fengtai has adopted a strict policy based on minimizing the number of 
migrant schools.  During the early to mid-2000s, this involved efforts to eliminate the 
schools altogether.  As expressed in the “Fengtai Report” (2007), the outcomes of 
closing unlicensed migrant schools have not been ideal, but the district government is 
ultimately unable to resolve the roots of the problems.  Since the reemergence of a small 
number of migrant schools in the mid- to late 2000s, the district education commission’s 
aim has been to keep the number of these schools at a minimum and ensure that they are 
subject to regular inspections.  Thus, Fengtai’s reputation remains controversial; the 
impact of its approach in the early 2000s is still apparent, and the number of migrant 
schools in the district is now comparable to that in Shijingshan, even though Fengtai is 
more than three and a half times larger in area and has a compulsory school-aged 
migrant children population estimated to be almost three and a half times the size of 
Shijingshan’s.   
 
Haidian District 
At 430.73 square kilometers, Haidian is the second largest inner suburban 
district and is only about 24 square kilometers smaller than Chaoyang.  By 2007, it had 
a permanent resident population of 2,814,000 and an outside population of 848,000 (see 
Table 5.4).  According to figures provided by the official interviewed, it had over 
117 
62,000 compulsory school-aged migrant children by late 2009 (almost quadruple that in 
Shijingshan).  Beijing’s earliest migrant schools were in Haidian; as pointed out by a 
long-time principal in the district, the city’s first three migrant schools emerged in 
Haidian within a one-year period between 1993 and 1994, and, according to the official, 
the district had roughly 61 migrant schools by 2001.  It therefore has an important place 
in the history of migrant schools in Beijing.  As the principal of one of the first migrant 
schools remarked: “If the earliest migrant schools in Beijing had been in Fengtai, then 
the over 300 migrant schools that subsequently emerged would not exist today.  Haidian 
did not shut down our school, whereas Fengtai did not leave a single one” (HL1P1).   
 Given the media coverage on its migrant schools during the mid-1990s, Haidian 
became aware about the schools early on.10  As stated by the official, the education 
commission started paying attention to migrant children’s education in 1996 and even 
conducted some early research on the subject.  Yet it did not adopt any measures in 
response at the time, as its priority was to provide education to children with Beijing 
hukou.  Indeed, it only began to pay more attention to migrant children’s education in 
the early 2000s, at a time when the municipal government and many other district 
governments were beginning to adopt responses.  Since then, its primary goal has been 
to increase the number of migrant children in public schools.   
Like Shijingshan, Haidian has also seen some positive developments.  The 
official emphasized two particular achievements.  First, in 2008, students from one of 
the district’s licensed migrant schools were invited to perform in the CCTV New Year’s 
Gala, China’s most widely watched television program of the year.  Second, in 2009, 
President Hu Jintao and other key government figures, including Zhou Ji (Minister of 
                                                     
10
 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the discovery of migrant schools in Beijing is usually attributed to a 
local researcher, who then brought the issue to the attention of the media and the government.  These first 
schools to be discovered were located in Haidian. 
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Education, 2003-2009), made a special visit to a Haidian public school at which most of 
the students were migrant children.  Similar to Shijingshan, the district has a small 
number of public schools attended primarily by migrant children.  At the school just 
mentioned, migrant children made up 90 percent of the student body by the late 2000s.  
It was also named Beijing’s “model school for moral education” (deyu gongzuo shifan 
xuexiao) (“Examining Popular Sentiment” 2006).11   
In addition, given Haidian’s high concentration of academic and research 
institutions, a distinctive aspect of the district government’s early approach was the 
creation in 2004 of a research center entirely dedicated to compulsory education for 
migrant children.  Under the support of the central and municipal government, research 
results would be applied to education and teaching practice in the district (“Examining 
Popular Sentiment” 2006). 
 
Haidian’s strategy of limited management.  Despite such efforts, Haidian has 
been more hesitant than Shijingshan and Chaoyang in its approach towards migrant 
children’s education.  The official listed several difficulties encountered by the 
education commission, especially in terms of placing migrant children into public 
schools.  First, public schools are primarily created for the permanent resident 
population and often cannot accommodate the needs of migrant workers; for instance, 
migrant parents usually go to work early in the morning and may need to drop off their 
children as early as 5 a.m., creating serious safety risks.  Second, if public schools 
continue admitting migrant children, more and more local children (and their parents) 
may want to change schools, causing transportation problems for the district.  Third, all 
of the district’s public schools are basically full.   
                                                     
11
 This was discussed in an unauthored document entitled “Examining Popular Sentiment, Following 
the Hearts of the People, Understanding the Hopes of the People – The Course of Haidian District’s Work 
in the Clearing Up and Rectification of Non-Approved Self-Run Migrant Schools (News Background 
Material)” (2006).   
119 
It was further expressed that the high mobility of the migrant population has 
made it difficult for the district education commission to formulate a work plan.  The 
official explained that if the number of migrant children in the district were to increase 
during one period, the education commission might respond by increasing the number 
of public school teachers.  But if the number of migrant children then declined, there 
would be a surplus of teachers.  Moreover, since migrant children come from different 
regions across China, there is considerable variation in their educational levels, 
performance, and needs, and public school teachers may not be able to handle such a 
large range of students.   
Such factors have made the education commission less willing to invest a 
significant amount of its resources and energy into migrant children’s education, with 
major consequences for its approach.  For example, as one researcher revealed, the 
research center on migrant children’s education created in 2004 was initially meant to 
demonstrate that Haidian, as the country’s leading district in education, recognized the 
importance of the policy area; it was hoped that the center would further boost its 
reputation.  This, however, did not happen.  Though the education commission had 
taken time to appoint a public school principal as the center’s director and to recruit 
local academics and researchers to contribute to research efforts, the center faded away 
after a few meetings and events and has essentially become an empty structure.  
Furthermore, while officials from Fengtai and to a lesser extent Shijingshan mentioned 
shortages of funding as an issue, the Haidian official expressed a degree of hesitation 
about investing the district’s resources into what they see as a difficult, unstable policy 
area, despite the fact that its financial revenue is nearly four times that of Fengtai and 
over eight times that of Shijingshan (see Table 5.4).   
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 How, then, has this affected Haidian’s migrant schools?  Given the concerns 
about continuing to place migrant children into public schools, has more emphasis been 
placed on migrant schools instead?  The official did express that the district government 
sees its migrant workers and their children as “Haidian’s new citizens” (Haidianqu de 
xinqumin) and acknowledged that many migrant children are born or raised in Beijing 
and do not feel a connection to their hometowns.  Yet, when it came to discussing 
migrant schools, it was emphasized that many of them are run for profit-seeking 
purposes.  Thus, while the education commission has been relatively supportive of the 
two licensed migrant schools (e.g., in terms of assisting with supplies and facilities), 
principals of unlicensed migrant schools in the sample stated that it has not given them 
much support.   
Particularly in the early to mid-2000s, migrant schools did not receive much 
attention from the district government.  According to principals in the district, Haidian’s 
current approach towards unlicensed migrant schools remains one of limited 
management (see Table 5.9).  For example, as previously mentioned, unlicensed 
migrant schools in Shijingshan and Fengtai must attend district-level safety meetings at 
least once or twice per school term.  In contrast, principals of unlicensed schools visited 
in Haidian stated that they are asked to attend such meetings as little as once a year.  
One principal even said that his school, which was established in 1994, had never been 
notified by the education commission to attend meetings and that the only interaction 
they had with district education commission officials was when they called about once a 
year to ask general questions about the school.  As this principal described, the 
education commission keeps track of the school’s situation, but “it has never once asked 
what the school needs” (HU4P1).   
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Table 5.9 Haidian’s Approach: Views of Migrant School Principals in the 
Sample 
Approach Examples 
Limited 
management and 
support 
 At one of the district’s earliest migrant schools, the principal 
maintained: “The attitude that Haidian has adopted towards its 
migrant schools has been one in which there haven’t been too 
many restrictions but there also hasn’t been too much support.…  
It is unlike Chaoyang, [where migrant schools have been] 
brought into the district government’s planning, given reasonable 
support, and integrated in a fair way.  It is also unlike Fengtai, 
where the aggressive approach did not leave a single school.” 
(HU1P1). 
 At one school that was located in Haidian in the early 2000s, the 
principal recalled: “During the four years that our school was in 
Haidian, there was basically no regulation [from the district 
government] and no one asked questions.…  For example, in 
terms of school buses, in Haidian, and perhaps this is because 
Haidian is relatively large, … we had school buses during those 
four years but did not run into the police a single time.  But as 
soon as we moved to Shijingshan, the local police came to our 
doors to inspect the buses” (SU2P1). 
 At one school that had spent time in Fengtai, Haidian, and 
Shijingshan, the principal asserted: “In terms of Haidian’s 
approach towards migrant schools, you could say that it couldn’t 
handle the situation, you could also say that it didn’t have time to 
deal with us, or you could even say that it didn’t want to provoke 
any trouble, but those two years [in Haidian] were our most 
uneventful and quietest years, with the least amount of 
intervention [from the government]” (SU1P1). 
 
The district education commission has also been hesitant to license migrant 
schools.  Even though it has more than triple the number of unlicensed schools than 
Shijingshan and Fengtai (both of which have licensed three), Haidian only has two 
licensed migrant schools.  Moreover, one of these two schools has three branches, but 
only one branch has been licensed when, according to the principal, there are no 
significant differences between them.  When asked why this was the case, the principal 
asserted that “only the education commission knows,” adding that Haidian is simply 
“not willing to license too many [migrant schools]” (HL1P1). 
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The impact of local factors.  Haidian’s approach has largely been driven by two 
interrelated factors: attention from external actors and a focus on local schools and 
institutes of higher education.  Given the district’s strong reputation in education, as 
well as the fact that migrant schools have had the longest presence in Haidian, the 
district government’s work on migrant children’s education has attracted much attention 
from actors like the media, which is one of the reasons why Haidian has not been as 
extreme as Fengtai in shutting down migrant schools.  As the official described, many 
migrant school principals are driven by self-interests, and their schools are substandard, 
but it is ultimately difficult for the district government to close the schools due to 
external pressure.   
This was most apparent in 2006 when – in the context of policies such as 
“Notice of the Beijing Municipal Education Commission on the Work of Strengthening 
the Management of Self-Run Migrant Schools” (2005) and “Notice of the General 
Office of the Beijing Municipal People’s Government on the Work of Strengthening the 
Safety of Non-Approved Self-Run Migrant Schools” (2006) – Haidian made efforts to 
close a large number of unlicensed schools.  During 2006, several departments in 
Haidian’s district government, including the education commission and comprehensive 
management office, organized ten joint inspection units and conducted inspections of 39 
unlicensed migrant schools.  The results of the inspections showed serious safety risks 
in areas like the use of electricity and food safety.  Thirty-seven of the schools were 
issued deadlines for improvement and later issued orders to close (see “Examining 
Popular Sentiment” 2006; Han 2007).  According to principals, however, the education 
commission encountered several problems while trying to distribute the children to 
public schools; for example, it could not find enough space for the students, and many 
public schools were located too far from migrant communities.  This attracted a great 
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deal of societal attention, including criticism from the principals themselves and other 
actors like the media.  In the end, the education commission retracted the order to close 
the schools, allowing many to continue operation.   
This decision signifies a fundamental difference between the approaches 
adopted in Haidian and Fengtai.  It is interesting, though, that despite this difference, 
there remain similarities between their attitudes.  Indeed, when asked about Haidian’s 
approach compared to other districts, the Haidian official expressed that Fengtai’s 
district government has performed well in the area, as the district basically has no 
migrant schools left.  Ultimately, while its approach has not been nearly as controversial 
as Fengtai’s, the reality is that the Haidian education commission’s focus is on local 
schools and higher education and science and technology, where its reputation is 
strongest.  This focus, combined with the fact that the district has a much larger number 
of schools to manage than neighboring districts like Shijingshan, has taken much of its 
attention away from migrant children and made it less willing to invest its resources into 
migrant children’s education and migrant schools.  The fading away of its research 
center on migrant children’s education is a case in point.  
In sum, evidence shows that Haidian has adopted an approach in which it has 
not been particularly aggressive towards migrant schools, but it has also not been 
particularly supportive, especially of the unlicensed ones.  Though the official did 
express feeling sympathetic towards migrant schools and their students, the district 
education commission has been hesitant in its approach.  While attention and pressure 
from external actors like the media have been important in driving its progress and 
achievements in the area, its ultimate focus on local schools and issues concerning 
higher education has affected its willingness to invest time and resources into what it 
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sees as an unstable area.  The district has therefore acquired somewhat of a mixed 
reputation in this area.   
 
Recognizing the Importance of District-Level Approaches 
In the case of migrant children’s education, the overarching problem of 
differential policy implementation at the municipal level has been made even more 
complicated due to district-level variations that have developed, especially since the 
introduction of the policy of “two priorities.”  As shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, district 
governments – and district education commissions in particular – have acquired a 
critical role and important responsibilities in migrant children’s education.  This 
decentralization, along with the fundamental complexity of the policy area itself 
(evidenced by the range of responsibilities and departments involved), has created the 
potential for differing policy approaches at the district level.  Using evidence from 
fieldwork, this chapter identifies three trajectories that illustrate significant differences 
between district-level approaches towards migrant children’s education and specifically 
migrant schools, the most extreme case being Fengtai.   
Although the officials interviewed each expressed a hope for all migrant 
children to attain an education, the complex nature of educational provision for migrant 
children has meant that some district governments are less able or equipped, or 
sometimes less willing, than others to address the policy area.  District-level factors – 
mainly the size of the district and its migrant population, the number of migrant schools, 
the district’s financial situation, other policy interests and priorities, and external 
pressures – have led to differences between the district governments in terms of what 
they view as the main issue or problem, the degree of importance or urgency attached to 
that problem, and the approaches adopted in response.  Evidence from interviews and 
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policy documents shows that which local factors have played a larger role in shaping the 
different attitudes and approaches vary.  In Shijingshan, the small size of the district and 
its migrant population and the small number of migrant schools have allowed the 
district government to adopt an approach centered on the close management of the 
schools (largely in line with the municipal policies).  In Fengtai, the large size of the 
migrant population and a tight financial situation have been especially influential in 
shaping the district government’s efforts to minimize the number of migrant schools.  In 
Haidian, external pressures (e.g., from the media) due to its strong reputation in the 
educational arena, combined with a prioritization of issues concerning local schools and 
higher education, have contributed to an approach of limited management in which the 
district government has neither been too aggressive nor too supportive of migrant 
schools. 
The municipal and district-level attitudes and approaches can also interact and 
overlap in important ways, further illustrating the complexity of the implementation 
process.  Here, the case of Fengtai is particularly relevant.  As pointed out by a principal 
in the sample, the current deputy director of Beijing’s education commission (since 
2005) held several key posts in Fengtai’s district government, including director of the 
education commission and deputy district chief, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
at the height of the district government’s efforts to close all of its migrant schools.  The 
fact that an influential figure in Fengtai during that period is now a high-ranking official 
in Beijing’s education commission provides major insight into the concerns at the 
municipal level about the implications of migrant children’s education for social 
stability and the general lack of support for migrant schools and their students in 
municipal policies. 
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This chapter therefore sheds substantial light on the complex effects of 
decentralization, the importance of district-level dynamics, and the differing ways in 
which local factors can shape policy implementation.  In doing so, it demonstrates that 
the linkages between decentralization, local context, and policy implementation 
proposed in Figure 2.1 are close but complicated.  These findings are significant; not 
only do they show that the implementation process does not operate in a systematic way, 
but, as will be illustrated in the next two chapters, they also have serious implications 
for the situations of migrant schools and their students, including the amount of 
assistance they receive from civil society.   
In view of the limited amount of support given to migrant schools at the Beijing 
municipal level and the variation between district-level approaches, it becomes 
necessary to examine questions regarding the consequences of both for the situations of 
migrant schools and their students.  What are the key problems these schools face, and 
how have the policy approaches adopted at both levels affected them?  What 
implications does this have for the quality of migrant schools compared to public 
schools and the situations of their principals, teachers, and students?  And, perhaps most 
importantly, given the continued policy focus on the primary role of public schools in 
this area, are such questions increasingly irrelevant?  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE SURVIVAL AND DEVELOPMENT OF  
MIGRANT SCHOOLS IN BEIJING:  
IMPACTS OF THE MUNICIPAL AND DISTRICT POLICY APPROACHES 
 
 
 
“When I got to the school, I stared blankly at the sight in front of me – a low enclosing 
wall, a few unbearably disorderly classrooms, an extremely small sports area.  Could 
this really be a school?  Feeling astonished, puzzled, and helpless, I took my first step 
into a migrant school.” 
--A migrant school teacher in Beijing1 
 
 
 
Although decentralization can potentially increase the efficiency of service 
delivery, “in itself it is, in the end, merely a mechanism” (Davies, Harber, and Dzimadzi 
2003, 139), and it can ultimately have serious implications for issues of social 
development and inequality (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998, 1).  The previous two 
chapters established that the decentralization of responsibility to local governments and 
public schools through the policy of “two priorities” has not only created space for the 
Beijing municipal government to adopt a conservative approach towards migrant 
children’s education, including a general lack of support for migrant schools, but it has 
also allowed district governments to adopt different policy approaches based on local 
factors.  Given that the educational opportunities available to migrant children can have 
major consequences for trends in social stratification, a critical part of this study 
involves analyzing the effects of decentralization and differential policy implementation 
on the situations of migrant schools and their students (see Figure 2.1).   
                                                     
1
 This quote was translated from a 2009 issue of the migrant school teachers’ association’s magazine.   
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This chapter examines the impact of the municipal and district policy 
approaches on the survival and development of migrant schools in Beijing, shedding 
light on the extent to which central-level policy ideals are being realized and why.  Two 
sets of questions are evaluated.  First, how have the municipal and district policy 
attitudes and approaches affected the situations of migrant schools in Beijing?  What 
impact has this had on the principals, teachers, and students, as well as the quality of the 
schools compared to public schools?  Second, given the policy of “two priorities” and 
its focus on the role of public schools, are migrant schools increasingly unimportant in 
the provision of education for migrant children in Beijing and why?   
The first section of this chapter argues that, due to the general lack of support for 
migrant schools in Beijing municipal policies, licensed and unlicensed migrant schools 
in the city face many of the same fundamental problems as they did during the 1990s.  
However, evidence from fieldwork shows that the extent to which they experience these 
problems has also been influenced by the district-level dynamics discussed in Chapter 5, 
illustrating the important impacts of municipal and district-level policy implementation 
on their situations.  Despite the continued existence of these problems, as well as the 
policy focus on the role of public schools and increased efforts to close or demolish 
migrant schools, the rest of the chapter shows that migrant schools remain a necessary 
source of education for many migrant children in Beijing, making an understanding of 
the effects of decentralization on these schools and, ultimately, trends in social 
stratification all the more critical. 
 
The Continued Problems of Migrant Schools and the  
Consequences for Principals, Teachers, and Migrant Families 
Migrant schools in Beijing remain, on the whole, poor in quality and still lag 
behind public schools (Duan and Liang 2005, 16; L. Wang 2008, 702).  This section 
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illustrates that, despite calls for the increased support of migrant schools in central 
policies, these schools face some of the same problems as they faced in the 1990s.  
Based on fieldwork, the four main problem areas that continue to define the situations 
of migrant schools in Beijing are a general lack of resources and poor physical 
conditions, a low quality of teaching, instability, and difficulties acquiring licenses (see 
Table 6.1).  The discussion below evaluates how the overall lack of assistance from the 
municipal government and differing district-level approaches have affected migrant 
schools in these four interrelated areas, contributing a more nuanced understanding of 
their current situations.  
Table 6.1 Key Problems of Migrant Schools in Beijing over Time 
Key Problems of 
Migrant Schools  
(based on 
fieldwork) 
Lu (2007) Han (2001) 
General Lack of 
Resources & 
Poor Physical 
Conditions 
 School conditions were extremely 
simple and crude (jianlou) 
 Schools frequently lacked basic 
equipment and teaching materials  
 Most school buildings were simple 
and crude, and supplies and 
equipment were very limited  
Low Quality of 
Teaching 
 Many teachers lacked basic 
training and experience 
 Teacher turnover rates were high; 
many teachers would leave for 
higher-paying jobs, as the average 
salary of migrant school teachers 
was only 400-500 RMB per month  
 The quality of teaching was far 
behind that in proper (zhenggui) 
schools 
 Most teachers were uncertified  
 Teacher mobility was high due to 
factors including the low pay, 
heavy workloads, and difficult 
living conditions  
Instability 
 One or two districts/counties (e.g., 
Fengtai) adopted measures to 
completely clamp down on migrant 
schools, with serious consequences 
for their stability 
 Since migrant schools were often 
in danger of being shut down or 
demolished, principals were 
reluctant to make long-term 
investments in their schools  
Difficulties 
Acquiring 
Licenses 
 No migrant schools were licensed 
 Due to reasons like the lack of 
comprehensive policies and a lack 
of organizations to provide social 
services for the floating 
population, migrant schools were 
essentially “underground” schools 
 No migrant schools were licensed 
 The government saw migrant 
schools as “underground” schools, 
and knowledge about them was 
limited  
Source: Han (2001, pp. 2, 5-6, 10-13); Lu (2007, pp. 225-226, 228-229, 233, 238).  Lu’s discussion of 
migrant schools is based on research conducted in 1999-2000.  Han’s research was conducted in late 2000.  
 
130 
A General Lack of Resources and Poor Physical Conditions 
Migrant schools are self-funded and, without government assistance, lack the 
physical and financial resources to provide a learning environment on par with that in 
public schools.  During the 1990s, the physical conditions of migrant schools were very 
poor.  As Han (2001, 6) describes:  
Most school buildings were simple, crude, and shabby single-story houses or rooms 
(constructed using asbestos tiles or wooden planks) or were rebuilt from old warehouses to 
create temporary classrooms.  Most of the students’ desks and chairs were bought as 
second-hand goods at low prices from public schools, and the heights of the desks and 
chairs were uneven.  At some schools that were in their early stages, due to a lack of 
sufficient funds, they would place wooden boards on top of bricks and use them as desks 
and chairs, with serious consequences for the students’ physical and mental development ….  
Because most of the schools were run using personal investments, in order to cut down the 
costs of rent, classrooms would be crowded with students’ seats ….   
… Because the rooms were crowded and there was no ventilation, students were 
particularly vulnerable to infecting each other with cheek line inflammation and 
influenza.…  In terms of water and sanitation facilities, most schools did not provide 
students with drinking water.  
While conditions have since improved, there was agreement among interviewees that 
the overall physical conditions of migrant schools in Beijing still lag far behind public 
schools (see Table 6.2).2  The few government efforts to improve the conditions of 
migrant schools have ultimately had little impact.3 
                                                     
2
 Based on schools in the sample and findings from previous research (e.g., Duan and Liang 2005; L. 
Wang 2008), there is no clear indication that the physical conditions of migrant schools in Beijing vary 
between districts.  Any variation – in terms of, for example, facilities, size, and infrastructure – is often 
between individual schools rather than schools across districts.  Ultimately, however, it is difficult to 
measure given their high mobility.   
3
 The municipal government’s “Hand-in-Hand” (shou la shou) program is a case in point.  According 
to principals and teachers, the program, which pairs up migrant schools with local public schools, is 
primarily focused on passing second-hand supplies and equipment no longer required by public schools to 
migrant schools.  However, of the 22 schools in the sample, principals at 12 (including eight unlicensed 
ones) expressed that they have had little to no contact with public schools, and some had not even heard 
of the program.  Among the remaining ten (including five licensed schools), interaction with public 
schools was limited and irregular, and the general view was that the program is essentially too little, too 
late. 
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Table 6.2 The Poor Physical Conditions of Migrant Schools in Beijing: Views 
of Principals in the Sample 
Examples 
 As one principal stated: “We cannot be compared to public schools.  Our facilities are 
just one-tenth or one-twentieth, even one-hundredth of theirs [in quality].  It cannot 
be compared” (HL1P1). 
 One unlicensed school in the sample not only did not have any computers or 
telephones, but it also did not have a library, sports area, or heating.  As the principal 
described: “One of the biggest problems we face is that our school is not in a stable 
situation.…  In terms of equipment, we don’t have anything.  We don’t have 
computers.  We used to have a computer class, but our second-hand computers broke 
down, so then we stopped.…  We don’t even have a telephone.…  It would be great 
if we had our own telephone and could contact students’ parents at any time.…  
There is a telephone outside, but it can only receive calls.…  If our teachers need to 
contact students’ parents, they have to use their own cell phones” (HU2P1). 
 Most schools visited did not have enough computers, and computers were usually 
second-hand and outdated.  According to one principal, if they were to sell their 
computers, they would get less than 200 RMB for each one (FL2P1). 
 Due to financial constraints, school buses used are generally poor in condition and 
are often used to carry more students than there are seats.  One principal, for instance, 
stated: “I cannot tell you [how many children are in each bus].  If we followed the 
[government] standards, then we’d be picking up and dropping off children all day, 
and there would be no class” (HU2P1).  As a parent from another school described: 
“Basically, one child sits down and holds on to another child.  It is very crowded and 
unsafe” (FU2F2). 
 
An additional outcome of the lack of resources is the limited capacity of migrant 
schools to offer middle school education.  According to principals, most migrant 
schools in Beijing, particularly unlicensed ones, are primary schools and do not offer 
the full three years of middle school education given the difficulties of maintaining 
additional grade levels (e.g., having to hire additional teachers and find classroom 
space).4  Schools that try offering middle school may give up after a few years, as was 
the case with two of the 17 schools visited in Haidian, Shijingshan, and Fengtai.  
District approaches can also affect the number of schools that offer middle school 
education, as well as the proportion of cases in which the middle school level is licensed 
                                                     
4
 Given the mobile nature of the schools, the exact proportion of migrant schools in Beijing that offer 
both primary and middle school education is unclear.  Within the sample, nine schools offered primary 
and middle school education (up to the ninth grade), one offered classes up to the seventh grade, and one 
offered classes up to the eighth grade.  Based on fieldwork, there is one migrant school in Beijing that 
offers only middle school education.   
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(for licensed migrant schools offering both, it is frequently only the primary school 
levels that are licensed).  In Shijingshan, all three licensed migrant schools (and one of 
the four unlicensed schools visited) offered middle school; at all three licensed schools, 
both levels were licensed.  In Haidian, however, only one licensed school and one of the 
unlicensed schools I came across were able to offer middle school education; at the 
former, only the primary school level was licensed, meaning that there are no licensed 
migrant middle schools in the district.  Interestingly, the two schools mentioned above 
that gave up offering middle school classes were both in Haidian.  Of the Fengtai 
schools visited, only one was able to offer the full three years of middle school, though 
it was given a license.5   
 
The impact on principals, teachers, and families.  The lack of resources has 
created challenges for migrant school principals and, subsequently, the teachers and 
students.  Using limited resources, principals must ensure that they have sufficient funds 
to pay rent and other fees to maintain their schools.6  One result is that they often cannot 
afford to raise their teachers’ salaries.  The average salary of migrant school teachers in 
Beijing is around 800-1,000 RMB per month (roughly 120-150 USD) (Zhang 2010), 
compared to 400-500 RMB in the late 1990s (Lu 2007, 229).  While migrant workers’ 
salaries have increased over time, the average salary of migrant school teachers in 
Beijing remains low; according to Zhang (2010), it is often only about one-fourth of the 
average salary of public school teachers, which is about 4,000 RMB.  Within the sample 
of schools, teachers’ salaries ranged from 750 to 1,300 RMB per month, which was 
                                                     
5
 Migrant schools in the sample at which both levels were licensed could support more students at the 
middle school level than schools at which only the primary school level was licensed.  The four licensed 
schools visited in Shijingshan and Fengtai that offered middle school each had at least 200 middle school 
students, whereas the licensed school in Haidian only had about 150. 
6
 Almost all migrant schools in Beijing are rented or built on rented land (Beijing Migrant School 
Principals’ Association 2009).  Within the sample, the costs of rent ranged from 30,000 to 600,000 RMB.   
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lower than the salaries of most migrant parents interviewed.7  As shown in Table 6.3, 
there was little variation between the average salaries of primary school teachers at 
licensed and unlicensed migrant schools, indicating that teachers at licensed and 
unlicensed migrant schools in Beijing frequently face similar circumstances and 
treatment.8  However, there was some slight variation across districts; the average salary 
of teachers at the primary school level was highest in Haidian (around 975 RMB), 
followed by Shijingshan (about 950 RMB), and then Fengtai (about 900 RMB), the 
potential consequences of which will be discussed later.   
Table 6.3 Teachers’ Salaries at Migrant Schools in the Sample 
District 
Migrant Schools Teachers’ Salaries (RMB/month) 
Year 
Created 
Legal Status Primary School Middle School 
Haidian 
1994 Licensed (unlicensed branch) 1,000-1,200 NA 
1999 Licensed 800-1,300 800-1,300 
1994 Unlicensed ≈1,000 NA 
1994 Unlicensed 800->1,000 NA 
1995 Unlicensed >900 >900 
1996 Unlicensed ≈900 NA 
Shijingshan 
1997 Licensed ≈850 ≈950 
1998 Licensed 800-1,000 800-1,000 
1998 Licensed ≈1,000 >1,000 
1999 Unlicensed ≈1,000 ≈1,000 
2000 Unlicensed ≥850 NA 
2000 Unlicensed 900-1,200 NA 
2000 Unlicensed ≈1,000 NA 
Fengtai 
2000 Licensed 1,000-1,050 1,000-1,050 
2005 Licensed 750-800 NA 
1999 Unlicensed 1,000 1,000 
2005 Unlicensed 800 NA 
Chaoyang 1998 Licensed ≥1,000 ≥1,000 2007 Licensed 1,400 NA 
Changping 2000 Licensed >1,000 >1,000 2003 Unlicensed 800-1,000 800-1,000 
Daxing 1996 Unlicensed 1,000 NA 
 
                                                     
7
 In addition, unlike public school teachers, migrant school teachers are not subsidized during winter 
and summer holidays, a total of about three months every year.  To support themselves and their families, 
many take up additional, low-paying jobs during these holidays (e.g., working as nannies, tutors, cleaners, 
construction workers, and street vendors) (Zhang 2010). 
8
 There is, however, often a range of salaries within schools, depending, for example, on level of 
experience. 
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In addition, whereas public school teachers are provided insurance, migrant 
school teachers are generally not.9  As one teacher stated:  
There are no migrant schools in Beijing that give their teachers insurance.  A few schools 
might simply provide accident insurance.  The personal safety of these teachers is not even 
fully protected.  Medical insurance, work-related injury insurance, and unemployment 
insurance are currently treated as nothing more than unreasonable requests! (Zhang 2010)  
Only about five schools in the sample provided some insurance for their teachers.  In 
two of those cases, the schools (in Haidian and Shijingshan) were licensed, and 
insurance was subsidized by an NGO.10  Ultimately, most principals cannot afford to 
increase teachers’ salaries or provide insurance, making the job less attractive.11  As will 
be shown later, the resulting high teacher mobility has had major consequences for the 
quality of teaching offered.   
Another result of the lack of resources is that principals charge their students 
tuition and other fees.  As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, the Compulsory Education 
Law (1986) stipulated that primary and middle school education in China would be 
provided free of tuition.  However, as one principal emphasized: “In China, there are 
two groups that still pay for it: students in private aristocratic [guizu] schools and 
migrant workers’ children in cities.  One of these groups is poor, … [and] one is 
wealthy” (HL1P1).  Within the sample, tuition ranged from 400 to 700 RMB per term 
(about 60-100 USD) for primary school students and 500 to a little over 1,000 RMB per 
term (about 70-150 USD) for middle school students (see Table 6.4).12  Overall, the 
average tuition fees were slightly higher at licensed migrant schools, but the difference 
                                                     
9
 Public school teachers are usually provided pension, medical, unemployment, work-related injury, 
and maternity insurance. 
10
 As will be discussed in Chapter 7, this also reflects the tendency of civil society actors to work in 
particular districts. 
11
 At schools that are short on teachers, principals (and sometimes their spouses) may also teach 
classes and take on additional responsibilities like driving the school bus.   
12
 Due to factors like increasing costs of rent, many migrant school principals have also been 
increasing their tuition fees.   
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was relatively marginal, and the fees at certain unlicensed schools were even higher 
than at some of the licensed ones, providing further evidence that there is often no 
substantial difference between licensed and unlicensed schools in the city.   
Table 6.4  Tuition Fees at Migrant Schools in the Sample 
District Legal Status 
Tuition (RMB/school term) 
Primary School Middle School 
Haidian 
Licensed (unlicensed branch) 600 NA 
Licensed 500 500 
Unlicensed 400 NA 
Unlicensed 400 NA 
Unlicensed 700 900 
Unlicensed 550 NA 
Shijingshan 
Licensed 600 1,000 
Licensed 400 800 
Licensed 600 1,000 
Unlicensed 520 700 
Unlicensed 550 NA 
Unlicensed 550 NA 
Unlicensed 400 NA 
Fengtai 
Licensed 620 1,070 
Licensed 600 NA 
Unlicensed 500 800 
Unlicensed 600 NA 
Chaoyang Licensed 600 1,000 Licensed 470 NA 
Changping Licensed 570 1,000 Unlicensed 500 800 
Daxing Unlicensed 600 NA 
 
Besides tuition, migrant schools may also charge a range of additional fees.  
Based on the sample, these can include book fees of 80-150 RMB per term; lunch fees 
of 80-130 RMB per month; heating fees, which can cost about 100 RMB per winter; 
water fees, which can cost around 30 RMB per term; school bus fees of 150-200 RMB 
per term; summer and winter uniform fees, around 25-80 RMB per set; summer 
homework fees of about 20 RMB; and fees for school outings, which can cost 50-100 
RMB per trip.  As a result, parents may be required to pay a total of over 1,000 RMB 
per term in school-related fees.   
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As will be discussed later in the chapter, the fees described above are lower than 
what is frequently required for migrant children to attend public schools.  Still, migrant 
school fees can be an issue for migrant families.  According to a government-based 
researcher, the average monthly income of migrant families around the late 1990s was 
1,000-1,300 RMB.13  Though most migrant workers are now able to make at least 1,000 
RMB per month per person (about 150 USD), the monthly household income among 
these families remains low.14  For example, over 40 percent of the families in the 
sample who had children in migrant schools and were willing to disclose their 
household incomes made less than 3,000 RMB per month (see Table 6.5).15  As shown 
in Appendix B, the average income among parents tended to be higher in Haidian, 
followed by Shijingshan, and finally Fengtai, consistent with the economic situations of 
the districts (see Chapter 5).16  Yet there was no observable correlation between parents’ 
educational background, household income, and the type of migrant school their 
children were attending, reflecting the reality that migrant workers often simply send 
their children to schools closest to where they live.17   
                                                     
13
 In comparison, based on China Household Income Project (CHIP) survey data, the average 
household per capita disposable income in 1995 was 4,429 RMB in urban areas and 1,564 RMB in rural 
areas (calculated without including subsidies for housing and imputed rent) (Sicular et al. 2010, 91, table 
4.1).   
14
 Based on CHIP survey data, the average household per capita disposable income in urban areas 
had already reached 8,038 RMB by 2002 (Sicular et al. 2010, 91, table 4.1). 
15
 Though some families make several thousand RMB per month doing work in areas like business or 
sales, most do lower-paying jobs like selling fruits and vegetables, cleaning, working in factories, doing 
small business, making clothes, washing dishes, working on construction sites, moving bricks, and 
collecting garbage to name a few, and their work is frequently described as “dirty, tiring, arduous, and 
dangerous” (HL1P1).  Almost all the families visited lived in one-room homes that were just large enough 
to fit one or two beds.  While most could afford a small television, the majority did not have appliances 
like refrigerators or adequate space for their children to do homework.   
16
 To date, no studies have compared characteristics of migrant workers like income and educational 
background across districts, due largely to their high mobility.  Knowledge of the extent to which such 
differences exist remains extremely limited. 
17
 This is also an indication of the diverse nature of migrant communities (see Ma and Xiang 1998, 
548).   
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Table 6.5  Incomes of Families in the Sample with Children in Migrant Schools 
Household Income (RMB/month) Number of Families  
<1,000 1 
1,000-1,999 2 
2,000-2,999 13 
3,000-3,999 8 
4,000-4,999 5 
5,000-5,999 2 
>6,000 3 
Would not say 3 
 
Furthermore, while there are no accurate statistics, principals stated that at least 
50-60 percent of migrant families in Beijing have more than one child, increasing the 
costs of school-related fees.  Within the sample of 40 families, only 12 had one child, 
while 15 had two children, nine had three children, three had four children, and one had 
five children.  Of the 28 families with more than one child, there were 18 in which all of 
the children were in Beijing with their parents (see Appendix B).  In addition, with only 
four exceptions, all of the families with children in either primary or middle school had 
them attending school in Beijing rather than in their home provinces.  Though some 
migrant schools give discounts to families with more than one child enrolled, this is not 
always the case.  Indeed, the father in one of the families in the sample that had four 
children attending the same migrant school stated that they were paying full tuition for 
all of them (SU1F3).  Thus, school fees, even those charged by migrant schools, can be 
an issue. 
What’s more, some migrant families face difficult circumstances that result in 
even tighter financial situations.  The following are examples of such cases within the 
sample:  
In one family, a single mother, who worked 13 hours per day as a dishwasher, was raising 
two school-aged children on a monthly salary of 900 RMB (HU2F3).  
In one family with two children to support (including one who was still in school), the 
father was injured while working on a construction site, and the mother had to quit her own 
job to take care of him (SU1F1).  
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In one family with two school-aged children, the parents made a total of about 2,700 RMB 
per month, though the father’s income came from doing odd jobs (sangong) and was 
therefore unstable.  Their daughter had a medical condition that required over 2,000 RMB 
per month to treat (HU2F2).  
In one family with four school-aged children, the eldest daughter had a rare health condition 
since the age of four.  After going to several hospitals in their home province and Beijing, 
the parents found that the only hospital able to treat her condition was in Beijing, and the 
average cost of each hospital visit has often been over 10,000 RMB.  In addition, the 
daughter, who was about to finish middle school, would have to return to their home 
province if she wanted to attend high school.  Doing so, however, would mean that she 
would not be able to get further medical treatment.  The family also had to send an 
additional 10,000-20,000 RMB in remittances each year to the father’s father, who was in 
poor health (FU2F2).  
Such examples illustrate that school fees can be a source of concern, and, out of the 37 
families in the sample with children in migrant schools, 22 (from across the three 
districts) stated that tuition was one of the key problems they faced in terms of 
education.   
Besides tuition, the limited capacity of migrant schools to offer middle school 
education has important consequences for migrant children’s post-primary school 
options, a top concern among families in the sample.  For middle school, migrant 
children in Beijing generally have three options.  The first is to attend a migrant school 
offering middle school classes.18  Since most migrant schools in Beijing are unable to 
offer both primary and middle school education due to physical and financial constraints, 
only a limited proportion of children have this option.  As mentioned before, this can 
also vary between districts.  The second option is to enroll in a public middle school in 
Beijing, but, as will be discussed later, this usually requires an entrance exam and a 
                                                     
18
 Migrant children who stay in Beijing for middle school usually have two options if they wish to 
continue their education after graduation.  One is to attend vocational school in Beijing before entering 
the workforce.  Of the schools in the sample, this was a common path chosen.  At one school, for instance, 
over two-thirds of their middle school graduates attend vocational schools in Beijing (HL2P1).  At 
another school, about 80 percent of the students pursue this route (SL3P1).  The second option is to go 
back to their home provinces for high school.  According to principals and teachers, in cases where 
children are not getting good grades, parents often choose not to send them home, particularly if there is 
nobody to take care of them.  It is generally the better performing students who go back for high school.  
Yet an increasing number of migrant children are born and/or raised in Beijing and are unaccustomed to 
life in rural areas.  This issue of post-primary and post-middle school education (commonly referred to as 
shengxue wenti) is a top concern among migrant parents. 
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range of fees and documentation, making enrollment difficult.  The third option is to 
return to their hometowns.  In the past, most migrant children would go home for 
middle school because of expensive public school fees.  Based on conversations with 
parents and researchers, however, a larger proportion of parents now hope to keep their 
children in Beijing for at least part of middle school before sending them home.19  The 
obstacles migrant schools in different districts face in offering middle school education 
can therefore affect migrant children’s educational opportunities. 
 
A Low Quality of Teaching 
According to an officer of Beijing’s migrant school teachers’ association, there 
were about 7,000 migrant school teachers in the city by 2010.  Most of these teachers 
are young, female rural migrants.  These individuals choose to become migrant school 
teachers for various reasons.  Some are recent graduates unable to find other work.  
Others come across the occupation by chance or are introduced to it by friends or 
relatives.  Still others choose it because they enjoy teaching.   
Two key factors have contributed to the low quality of teaching in migrant 
schools: high teacher mobility, which can affect licensed and unlicensed schools, and 
the continued hiring of uncertified teachers by migrant schools, particularly unlicensed 
ones.  First, high rates of teacher turnover are primarily driven by three factors: low 
salaries (discussed earlier), job instability due to the high mobility of migrant schools 
(which will be discussed later), and the difficult nature of their jobs.  In terms of the 
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 For most migrant children, by the time they complete primary school, there are only three years left 
before they must return to their home provinces if they wish to attend high school.  As a result, many 
parents with children in migrant schools – especially those who are unable to enroll their children in 
public middle schools – choose to send their children home for at least the last year or two of middle 
school so they can get used to the living and school environment.  Going back, however, raises additional 
problems.  Difficulties adjusting and differences in curricula may result in children having to repeat a 
grade upon their return.  Certain subjects may also be taught at different stages.  As one parent pointed 
out, her daughter, who was born in Beijing but would be “returning” to the family’s home province for 
the sixth grade, had been studying English at her migrant school since the first grade, when schools in her 
hometown only start teaching English in the fifth grade (SL2F6). 
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third, these teachers have heavier workloads than their public school counterparts.  
While public school classes are limited to 40 students in Beijing,20 the average class size 
in Beijing’s migrant schools frequently exceeds 40, with sometimes over 50-60 students 
per class (Zhang 2010); within the sample, five schools had average class sizes of at 
least 50 students.21  Moreover, while public school teachers traditionally teach a more 
stable, settled part of the population, migrant school teachers face high levels of student 
mobility.22  Of the 12 schools that kept rough records on student mobility, about half 
said that at least 30 percent of their students were considered mobile.  This is 
exemplified by the following examples:  
At one licensed primary school with over 1,100 students, the principal expressed that, each 
semester, over 300 students leave the school and another 300-some enroll (FL2P1).   
 
At one unlicensed primary school, only three or four of the 34 students in the sixth grade 
class had been attending the school since the first grade (SU2P1).   
 
At another unlicensed school, a third grader had already changed schools four times because 
of the demolition of migrant villages and school closures (SU1F4).   
Besides high student mobility, migrant school teachers face a range of other 
issues.  Unlike local urban parents, migrant workers, especially those who are more 
poorly educated, may not know how to teach their children at home, and some may 
even be violent or abusive.  This affects the everyday responsibilities of migrant school 
teachers.  During an interview at a licensed migrant school, for instance, the teacher had 
to leave the room several times due a missing student, who had been beaten by his 
father and had not returned home for two days.  The teacher had to then track down and 
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 In 2009, for instance, the average class size was 31 among public primary schools and 33 among 
public middle schools in Beijing (Wang 2011). 
21
 In addition, the average number of class hours per week among Beijing’s migrant school teachers 
is about 24, which is 1.5 times greater than that among public primary school teachers (Wang 2011). 
22
 As one long-time principal maintained, there are generally three reasons for high student mobility.  
First, migrant schools often relocate, and students may not be able to follow their school to its new 
location.  Second, migrant communities and migrant schools are frequently in danger of being demolished, 
in which case migrant children must find other schools to attend.  The third reason is related to the mobile 
lifestyles of migrant workers.   
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meet with the student’s father (XL1T1).  According to other principals and teachers and 
student volunteers interviewed, such occurrences are not uncommon.   
As a result, principals and parents repeatedly expressed that the teachers, 
especially younger ones, often treat their time at migrant schools as temporary and leave 
when they find better jobs or because they cannot support their families on such low 
salaries.23  For example: 
At one school, the principal was only able to recall one semester since 1999 when no 
teachers had left the school (SU1P1).   
At another school, the principal stated that about half of the 14 teachers were mobile, with 
teachers leaving each semester (PU1P1). 
Principals may find themselves scrambling to find teachers throughout the year.  The 
principal of one school – where as many as half of the 46 teachers were considered to be 
mobile – contacted me at the start of a school year saying: “Our school is currently in urgent 
need of teachers.  Could we please trouble you to help recommend some?” (FU2P1). 
In discussing the high level of teacher turnover at his son’s school, one parent stated that 
one of the teachers had recently quit and chosen to sell vegetables instead (HL1F4).   
Even students are frequently aware of the reasons underlying the high turnover rate.  
One fifth grader at a licensed migrant school, for instance, stated that her teachers 
change all the time, explaining that their salaries are too low and the teachers are fed up.  
She supported this conclusion with an example, saying that she recently saw two of her 
teachers talking at school, one of whom was holding about 1,700 RMB (roughly 250 
USD).  After commenting on how much money it was, she was shocked when the 
teacher replied: “No, this is both of our salaries!” (SL2F6).  
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 There are, of course, exceptions.  One teacher from Hebei, a woman in her early thirties, had 
started teaching at a licensed migrant school in the sample six years earlier.  Though she subsequently got 
a Beijing hukou and a teaching certificate, which qualified her to be a public school teacher, she chose 
instead to stay at the school, saying that she felt a sense of loyalty to the school, the children, and the 
cause (HL2T3).  Another teacher, a middle-aged woman from Inner Mongolia, had been teaching at 
migrant schools in Beijing since 1998.  At her first migrant school, she received a total of 800 RMB for 
her first four months of teaching.  With her current monthly salary of a little over 1,000 RMB, she pointed 
out that she could earn more working as a cleaner (baojie).  Still, she continues to teach because the 
children need to have good teachers (SU1T1).   
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Second, the quality of teachers migrant schools are able to attract remains low, 
and – not unlike the situation during the late 1990s (see Han 2001, 12; Lu 2007, 228-
229) – the educational background of migrant school teachers and the proportion of 
teachers with teaching certificates still lag behind public schools (Song, Loyalka, and 
Wei 2009).  Within the sample of schools, teachers were often graduates of vocational 
secondary schools (zhongzhuan) or junior colleges (dazhuan).  Unlike public school 
teachers, many migrant school teachers lack teaching experience and certification.  
While licensed migrant schools are required to fulfill government standards for teaching 
certification, unlicensed ones frequently have a high proportion of uncertified teachers; 
at over one-third of the 22 schools in the sample, all of which were unlicensed, 
principals expressed that at least half their teachers were uncertified (see Table 6.6).  
Interestingly, unlike Haidian and Fengtai, there was only one school in Shijingshan 
where the majority of teachers were uncertified, likely a reflection of the district’s close 
attention to teacher certification in regulating migrant schools (see Chapter 5). 
Table 6.6 Proportion of Teachers with Certification at Migrant Schools in the 
Sample 
District Legal Status 
Percentage of Teachers 
with Teaching Certificates 
Haidian 
Licensed (unlicensed branch) 67% 
Licensed 80% 
Unlicensed 40% 
Unlicensed 50% 
Unlicensed Almost 100% 
Unlicensed 12% 
Shijingshan 
Licensed 100% 
Licensed Almost 100% 
Licensed 100% 
Unlicensed >90% 
Unlicensed Minority  
Unlicensed Majority 
Unlicensed 80% 
Fengtai 
Licensed Majority 
Licensed 100% 
Unlicensed 30% 
Unlicensed <50% 
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Since they can only afford to offer low salaries, some principals, mainly those at 
unlicensed schools, do not require their teachers to have certificates at all.  At one such 
school in the sample, the principal admitted that only two of their 17 teachers were 
certified (HU2P1).  Further exacerbating the problem is the fact that, unlike public 
schools, where teachers are given regular training, migrant school principals generally 
lack the resources to provide training (Zhang 2010).  Along with the high levels of 
teacher turnover, this has had negative consequences for the quality of teaching in 
migrant schools (see Figure 6.1).   
Figure 6.1  Factors Contributing to the Low Quality of Teaching at Migrant 
Schools 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2009-2010). 
 
As a result, migrant schools in Beijing continue to offer low quality teaching 
(see Table 6.7).  While their lack of financial resources has prohibited them from hiring 
better quality teachers, low teacher salaries and the unstable and difficult nature of the 
job have resulted in high teacher turnover, with major consequences for the quality of 
teaching at licensed and unlicensed schools.  Indeed, the quality of teaching and 
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facilities at migrant schools in Beijing still lags behind urban public schools and, 
according to Lai et al. (2012, 15-16), even rural schools.   
Table 6.7 The Low Quality of Teaching at Migrant Schools: Views of 
Principals in the Sample 
Examples 
 “[Since] the tuition we charge is low, the salaries we pay our teachers are low.…  So 
the school lacks the appeal [to attract better quality teachers].…  There is turnover 
every year.” (HL1P1). 
 “In the earlier years, my goal in running the school was to make sure that the children 
had a school to go to.  Now, my goal in running the school is to make sure that the 
children are getting a good education” (YL1P1).  
 “If you were to randomly choose a public school, its conditions would be better than 
our school.  So the result is that, if on a civilization exam public school students were 
able to get an average of 80-90 points, our students might only get 50-60 points.  
Because the opportunities are not equal, the outcomes are not equal” (YL2P1). 
 
The impact on families.  Even for migrant families where tuition was not 
mentioned as a substantial problem, the quality of teaching at migrant schools remains a 
widespread concern.  Though many are aware that the gap between public and migrant 
schools is due to the physical and financial limitations of migrant schools, the majority 
of the parents in the sample expressed worries about the quality of education offered by 
migrant schools, particularly when it came to the qualifications of teachers and high 
levels of teacher turnover (see Table 6.8).   
Table 6.8 The Quality of Education and Teaching at Migrant Schools: Views 
of Migrant Parents in the Sample 
Examples 
 “This [migrant] school faces restrictions [in providing quality education].  The gap 
between this school and public schools is large” (HL1F7).   
 “The difference between [the quality of teaching in] this school and public schools is 
too great.  I don’t know where some of these teachers came from” (SL2F2). 
 “The quality of teaching is too poor.…  Some teachers have even said [to our 
daughter]: ‘Your grades are so good, you shouldn’t be going to school here’” 
(FU2F2). 
 “The teachers are always changing [because] the school doesn’t give them enough 
money” (SL2F6). 
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Instability 
One of the issues that most defines the situations of migrant schools in Beijing is 
their instability.  Unlike public schools, migrant schools have often been in danger of 
being shut down or demolished and have frequently had to change locations (Han 2001, 
5; Kwong 2004, 1085-1086).  Among the 17 schools visited in Haidian, Shijingshan, 
and Fengtai, only two had never moved (see Table 6.9).  One school in particular had 
moved five times across three districts (SU1P1).  Relocating has become a way of life 
for most of these schools, particularly those that are unlicensed.  When I asked an 
interviewee at one school that had moved 11 times within a decade about the moves, she 
simply replied: “We’re used to it” (HL1P3).  The fear of being shut down or demolished, 
however, has made some principals hesitant to invest in improving their schools (Han 
2001, 5).  Instability has, therefore, also contributed to the poor physical conditions of 
the schools. 
Table 6.9 Number of Relocations among Migrant Schools in the Sample 
District Legal Status Year Founded Number of Relocations 
Haidian 
Licensed (unlicensed branch) 1994 11 
Licensed 1999 4 
Unlicensed 1994 4 
Unlicensed 1994 2 
Unlicensed 1995 1 
Unlicensed 1996 2 
Shijingshan 
Licensed 1997 4 
Licensed 1998 2 
Licensed 1998 2 
Unlicensed 1999 5 
Unlicensed 2000 1 
Unlicensed 2000 1 
Unlicensed 2000 0 
Fengtai 
Licensed 2000 1 
Licensed 2005 0 
Unlicensed 1999 2 
Unlicensed 2005 3 
 
In most cases, this instability is due to either the risk of being closed for failing 
to meet government standards or demolition.  The former, though common to 
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unlicensed migrant schools across the city, can be higher in some districts than others.  
The best example is the case of Fengtai, where the district’s more assertive approach in 
closing migrant schools in the early to mid-2000s made the situations of the schools and 
their students particularly unstable.  As discussed in Chapter 5, most students affected 
by the closures had to attend migrant schools in other districts or return to their home 
provinces.  Interestingly, among the migrant schools in Fengtai during this period, there 
was little movement within the district, and schools that did relocate usually moved to 
other districts instead.   
The latter, demolition, is certainly not a new occurrence and has been a core 
element of Beijing’s path towards urbanization, even in the 1990s.  According to 
principals, the city may have had as many as 500 migrant schools at its height, but the 
number has been declining.  Over time, migrant communities have been pushed farther 
and farther away from the city’s center, such that, as of 2010, there were essentially no 
migrant enclaves left within the city’s Fourth Ring Road.24  Razing prior to the 2008 
Olympics received a lot of media coverage, which put pressure on the municipal 
government to temporarily slow down its quest for urbanization.  Recent rounds of 
demolition, however, have been threatening the survival of migrant enclaves and 
migrant schools – licensed and unlicensed – to a greater extent than before, such that 
even some of the relatively well-established, well-supported schools may no longer 
exist in a few more years.  Within the sample, 13 of the 22 schools were in danger of 
being demolished as of mid-2010.  While some principals stated that they would try to 
relocate, or at least wait and see what happens, nearly half indicated that the impending 
demolition might signify the end of their schools.  Not only would it be too difficult to 
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 As Heikkila (2007, 74) maintains: “[For reasons] including a perception of social disorder and 
crime, these urban villages are viewed as problematic by local government authorities and by many urban 
residents [in cities like Beijing].  Recent government reforms seek to convert these places to designated 
urban areas.” 
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find another place to rent, but many communicated that they were simply too exhausted 
after years of struggling to keep their schools running (see Table 6.10).  Indeed, though 
there were over 300 migrant schools in Beijing at the time of fieldwork, follow-up 
conversations with a few principals revealed that the estimated number had dropped to 
200-some by late 2011.  This lack of stability has significantly affected how these 
schools are run; as one principal stated: “We’ve already told our teachers that, for every 
day this school is still in existence, we must continue to be responsible for these 
children” (HU2P1).   
Table 6.10 The Demolition of Migrant Schools: Views and Plans of Principals in 
the Sample  
Reason 
Provided Examples 
Too 
Exhausted 
 One principal, whose school was established in 1994, said that, 
after their community – with a migrant population of about 60,000 
– is demolished, there is a chance that they will not continue as 
they are very tired and “cannot manage it” (banbuqi) (HU3P1). 
 For one of the city’s earliest migrant schools, one of its branches 
was about to be demolished at the time of fieldwork, while the 
other two would likely be demolished within a few years.  The 
principal revealed that they would most likely not move the school 
to another location because there is nowhere to go and they are 
“truly exhausted” (shizai pibei).  He stated: “This is the extent of 
our efforts” (HL1P1). 
 As one principal – who had recently invested his own money to 
build a new school after his previous one had been demolished – 
summarized: “Moving [a school] all the time, who could take it?” 
(YL1P1). 
Difficulties 
Concerning 
Rent 
 As one principal expressed: “[With our type of school], even if you 
move to a new location, no one is willing to rent buildings to 
you.…  Even if someone is willing to rent to you, … it would cost 
at least 400,000 RMB per year [around 59,000 USD].…  Without 
external [financial] support, this school absolutely cannot relocate.  
If it’s demolished, it’s demolished” (SU2P1). 
 
These closures and demolitions are often decided by the districts, and 
differences have emerged in terms of the extent to which district governments demolish 
or shut down schools and how they handle the distribution of the students to other 
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schools.  Though knowledge of student allocation following demolitions or closures and 
the politics behind it remains extremely limited, it is possible to shed light on some of 
the variations by examining recent cases (see Table 6.11).   
Table 6.11 Examples of District-Level Approaches towards Closing and 
Demolishing Migrant Schools Based on Fieldwork 
Period District Measures Adopted Distribution of Students 
Late 
2010 to 
Mid-
2011 
Shijingshan 
 Demolished a migrant 
community in which there were 
around 30,000 migrants and 
three migrant schools 
(involving about 1,300 students 
and over 50 teachers) 
 Adopted measures to ensure 
that students were distributed to 
public schools, including those 
it had primarily set aside for 
migrant children 
 Almost all students were 
allocated to a few nearby public 
schools for free; a proportion of 
the migrant school teachers 
were transferred to the public 
schools with their students 
 A small proportion went to 
other migrant schools or back 
to their hometowns 
August 
2011 
Haidian 
 Demolished or closed four 
migrant schools  
 Provided some assistance in 
allocating students to public 
schools 
 About half of the students went 
to public schools 
 About half went to other 
migrant schools or back to their 
hometowns 
Chaoyang 
 Shut down nine migrant 
schools  
 Created about four private 
(minban) schools, at which 
retired public school teachers 
were chosen to be principals, 
while the teachers were 
primarily transferred from the 
migrant schools themselves 
 At least half of the students 
went to the four private 
(minban) schools; fees charged 
were roughly equivalent to 
those previously charged by the 
migrant schools 
 Some went to migrant schools 
or back to their hometowns  
 Very few went to public 
schools 
Daxing 
 Made plans to close over ten 
migrant schools for not having 
real estate licenses  
 Resulting pressure from the 
media played a role in delaying 
action to close the schools 
 NA 
 
For example, even though it has tended to focus its management of migrant 
schools on safety regulation, Shijingshan has reportedly done better than other districts 
in distributing migrant children to public schools after demolition.  After the demolition 
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of a migrant enclave in which there were three unlicensed schools in 2011, a follow-up 
conversation with the principal of one of these schools revealed that the district 
education commission allocated almost all of the students involved to nearby public 
schools.  Moreover, based on information from principals and researchers, migrant 
children affected by demolitions and closures in districts like Chaoyang and Haidian, 
where the gap between the best and worst public schools is relatively large, may 
frequently be allocated to poorer quality public schools (jichu boruo xuexiao).  In 
contrast, the gap between public schools in Shijingshan is smaller, and, as a result, 
migrant children affected by closures or demolitions may be distributed to schools that 
are not considerably worse than those primarily attended by local students.   
Despite Chaoyang’s more positive reputation in the policy area (see Chapter 5), 
migrant schools in the district have not been unaffected by plans for urban expansion, 
and the district government has reportedly not done as well in allocating migrant 
children after recent closures and demolitions.  For example, Chaoyang was one of the 
several districts that demolished over 30 migrant schools in 2010 (see Ni and Zhao 
2010).  Based on information provided by an NGO in the sample, while some children 
were able to follow their schools to new locations or find new schools to attend, many 
had to return to their hometowns or were unable to find new schools at all.  In the case 
of the Chaoyang branch of a school in the sample that was demolished that year, most 
students had to find other migrant schools to attend in Chaoyang and Daxing.  
According to the principal, the small proportion of children who were able to enroll in 
public schools did so without government assistance, and, in most cases, these public 
schools were of poorer quality and charged tuition and miscellaneous fees of around 
3,000-4,000 RMB per year (HL1P1).25   
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 According to the principal, such schools accept migrant children due to their own shortages of 
students. 
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 The demolition and closures of migrant schools in Haidian, Chaoyang, and 
Daxing in 2011 are another case in point.  Much of the media reported on the closing of 
24 migrant schools by the three districts,26 but follow-up conversations with principals 
suggested a more complicated picture involving different objectives and approaches.  In 
Haidian, four migrant schools were demolished or closed, primarily due to the fact that 
they were built on government land or were considered unsafe.  Although the education 
commission distributed about half of the students to public schools, the rest had to either 
go to other migrant schools or return to their hometowns.  In Chaoyang, nine unlicensed 
schools were closed during this round.  Instead of allocating the students involved to 
public schools, the education commission distributed at least half of them to about four 
private (minban) schools (which it had converted from public schools for this purpose).  
While retired public school teachers were appointed as the principals of these new 
schools, the teachers were transferred from the migrant schools themselves; that is, the 
principals and locations changed, but the quality of teaching and the fees charged 
basically remained the same.  Of the remaining children, most went to other migrant 
schools or back to their hometowns.  In Daxing, the district government made plans to 
close over ten migrant schools on the basis that they did not possess real estate licenses 
(fangchanzheng), technically an issue to be taken up with the landlords rather than the 
schools.  Resulting pressure from the media, however, played a role in delaying action 
to close these schools.  In other words, 13 schools were closed or demolished during 
this particular round, and each district had different motives and strategies, with 
different consequences for the students.  Though knowledge of the politics behind such 
demolitions remains limited, the above discussion indicates that different district 
approaches can have direct implications for the survival of migrant schools and the 
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 See, for example, Chin (2011) and Zhang (2011). 
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continued schooling of their students, illustrating the importance of understanding 
district-level dynamics within the context of municipal-level standards. 
 
The impact on families.  Following from the three stages proposed by Han 
(2003) (discussed in Chapter 3), we are now witnessing a fourth stage in the 
development of migrant schools in Beijing, one in which these schools are, once again, 
struggling to survive.  This has major consequences for the students.  As one principal 
asked: “What will happen to these migrant children if they do not get an education?” 
(HL1P1).  Indeed, parents interviewed expressed a great deal of concern about the 
uncertain future of their children’s education in light of pending demolition or closures, 
especially since no one had given them advice or discussed their options with them.27   
The instability of migrant schools has serious, longer-term implications for the 
development and growth of these children.  Given their already mobile lifestyle, as well 
as the fact that they attend schools that may be unlicensed, it is vital that these children 
have a strong support system from their schools and families.  But this is not always the 
case.  They may often not get adequate time and attention from their parents, and it is 
difficult for them to get a sense of stability from their schools and teachers given the 
reasons explored above.  According to China Labour Bulletin (2008), “migrant children 
in cities consequently develop psychological [and behavioral] problems disturbingly 
similar to those left behind.”  The outcomes are made even more complex due to 
differing district-level approaches towards closing or demolishing the schools. 
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 While landlords are often given subsidies when migrant enclaves are demolished, migrant families 
are generally not given any assistance.  In addition, based on a notice one principal in the sample received 
from the Haidian education commission in mid-2006, students attending migrant schools that are closed 
must go to their local street office to present various documents and apply for a temporary student 
certificate before contacting the public school assigned to them.  In many cases, however, the situation 
may not be clear-cut, and parents are often unaware of their options and must find new schools for their 
children to attend on their own. 
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Difficulties Acquiring Licenses 
Though it has been over a decade since district governments in Beijing started to 
license migrant schools, it continues to be difficult for these schools to get licensed, and 
they remain vulnerable to government closures.  In order to get government approval, 
migrant schools in Beijing must fulfill a range of conditions, and all facilities and 
equipment must reach a certain standard.  Evidence shows, however, that there is a 
general lack of transparency in the licensing process, leaving many principals and 
researchers unclear about the actual standards being used.  As a result, principals of 
unlicensed schools put great emphasis on the difficulties of getting licensed; many had 
applied several times unsuccessfully, while others did not even bother (see Table 6.12).  
More than one source (mainly a few well-connected principals) also stated that the 
municipal government had already announced internally the decision to suspend the 
licensing of migrant schools.  This is in stark contrast to Shanghai, which reportedly 
licensed over 60 migrant schools per year in recent years, and Wuhan, where one 
district alone licensed over 30 migrant schools (Beijing Migrant School Principals’ 
Association 2009).   
Table 6.12 The Difficulties Acquiring Licenses: Views of Principals in the 
Sample 
Examples 
 One principal stated: “We don’t have anything.  We know we cannot apply because 
we don’t meet the standards.  Applying would be pointless” (HU2P1). 
 One principal shared that he had applied twice before the local education commission 
told him stop, as his school did not meet the standards (FU1P1). 
 According to one principal, in mid-2006, officials from numerous district 
government departments visited the district’s 18 migrant schools and told them that 
they needed to improve (zhenggai).  After a series of meetings, the education 
commission closed eight of them but did not disclose why those particular schools 
were shut down and the others were not.  The principal stated that the requirements 
for a license are similarly unclear, so “there is no use in applying” (SU2P1). 
 As one principal asserted: “Even private preschools [for migrant children] that meet 
the standards aren’t licensed” (HU1P1). 
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Whether or not a migrant school is licensed is often left for the district 
governments to decide.  As previously discussed, Haidian’s approach of limited 
management has made it hesitant to license migrant schools; the district only has two 
licensed ones, while Shijingshan and Fengtai – both of which have less than half the 
number of migrant schools than Haidian – have each licensed three.  Still, all three 
districts have a much lower number of licensed migrant schools when compared to 
Chaoyang, which has licensed 14 of its over 80 migrant schools, and Changping, which 
has licensed 16 of its roughly 50-60 migrant schools.  This is despite the fact that 
Chaoyang’s outside population of 963,000 is only slightly larger than Haidian’s (which 
is 848,000), and Changping’s outside population of 305,000 is even smaller than 
Fengtai’s (which is 447,000) (see Chapter 5).  Thus, assuming there is no significant 
variation between the physical conditions of migrant schools by district, district 
governments play a direct role in determining the difficulties faced by migrant schools 
in acquiring licenses (see Figure 6.2). 
Figure 6.2 Factors Influencing the Difficulties Faced by Migrant Schools in 
Acquiring Licenses  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2009-2010). 
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An additional issue is that government approval does not necessarily mean 
migrant schools are immune to the problems discussed above.  As mentioned in Chapter 
4, licensed migrant schools do receive some governmental support; the municipal 
government provides assistance in the form of supplies and equipment, and students 
receive a small subsidy each term.  Yet, based on the sample, even these schools face 
difficulties, and government support remains limited (see Table 6.13).   
Table 6.13  The Problems Faced by Licensed Migrant Schools: Views of 
Principals and Teachers in the Sample 
Examples 
 One teacher, who had taught at licensed and unlicensed schools, stated: “Currently, 
I’ll put it this way, in terms of ‘licensed’ and ‘unlicensed’ [migrant schools], there 
isn’t a clear concept.  It’s only formal language.  Usually, schools that have relatively 
better relations with government actors or schools that are in slightly better condition 
can get licensed.…  But it’s just formal language.  There is not much difference” 
(XL1T1). 
 In a report on his school’s situation, one principal wrote: “As a migrant school, the 
primary difficulty we face is the shortage of funds.  Our school fees are: on average, 
350 RMB per student per term.  In cases where students’ families face difficulties, 
the fees are reduced.  Fees collected are used to pay rent, utilities, transportation 
expenses for students, teachers’ salaries, the purchase of basic teaching instruments 
and equipment, [fees for] necessary school construction, etc., all in order to maintain 
the normal operation of the school.  Under such circumstances, even if the school 
wants to further improve the conditions and the treatment of teachers, we often run 
into difficulties because of insufficient funds” (HL2P1). 
 According to one principal, the equipment and supplies they have received from the 
district education commission after being licensed are frequently old items passed 
down from public schools (SL1P1). 
 
Ultimately, though licensed schools may still face a range of problems, licensing 
remains an important step in at least formalizing the existence of migrant schools and 
guaranteeing them a level of governmental support.  Whether or not a migrant school is 
licensed also has direct implications for its stability; while licensed schools are not 
immune to demolition, they will at least not be shut down for failing to meet official 
standards.   
 
155 
The impact on families and teachers.  The fact that serious barriers to licensing 
remain has not only made it more difficult for principals to improve their schools, but it 
has also had consequences for the teachers and students.  For students, the lack of a 
license affects the stability of their schooling.  Children attending unlicensed migrant 
schools that are shut down usually have to go to their local street office to present a 
range of documents and apply for a temporary student certificate before contacting 
nearby public schools; in other words, enrollment is not guaranteed.  For teachers, 
whether or not the school is licensed affects their job stability, as teachers at unlicensed 
schools are more likely to lose their jobs due to closures.  This then has additional 
consequences for teacher turnover rates and subsequently the quality of teaching. 
 
The Continued Importance of Migrant Schools in Beijing 
Since the early 1990s, the problem of migrant children’s education in Beijing 
has been shifting from one of access to one of quality, but recent rounds of demolition 
and efforts to close unlicensed migrant schools indicate that access continues to be a 
problem.  As one principal pointed out, the Law on Promoting Private Education (2002) 
stipulates that private (minban) schools (including their teachers and students) should 
enjoy equal treatment as public schools, but this is still far from the reality in Beijing.  
One can argue, as some interviewees did, that the situation of migrant schools has 
already seen great improvement since the early 1990s; not only are they no longer seen 
as “underground” schools, but they are also more standardized and better supported.  
While this may be true to an extent, the above discussion illustrates that, licensed or not, 
migrant schools in Beijing remain “outside of the system” (zai tixi wai) (GR2).  What’s 
more, demolition and increased efforts to close unlicensed migrant schools are making 
the issue much more urgent.   
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It is commonly argued that public schools are the better option for migrant 
children.  For one, according to the Compulsory Education Law, public school 
education at the primary and middle school levels is technically free of tuition.  
Attending public schools would also presumably allow for migrant children to become 
more socially integrated.  In addition, based on the above discussion and the findings of 
studies including Song, Loyalka, and Wei (2009) and Lai et al. (2012), the overall 
quality of education and teaching offered by migrant schools in Beijing remains 
considerably poorer than that offered by public schools.  Yet, while placing migrant 
children into public schools is a necessary long-term goal, such a focus in the immediate 
future would only lead the Beijing municipal and district governments to neglect the 
continued role of migrant schools.   
This section highlights several reasons why the municipal and district 
governments should not assume that focusing on migrant schools is of secondary 
importance.  Evidence is used to show that, despite the poor quality of migrant schools 
and the policy focus on public schools, migrant schools continue to serve a critical 
function for migrant communities in Beijing and provide a service for many migrant 
children for which there is currently no adequate alternative.   
 
Problems with Existing Estimates 
The actual proportion of migrant children in public schools remains unclear and 
highly debatable, making it unwise to assume that the role of migrant schools is 
declining, at least in the near future.  First of all, there is considerable variation between 
existing estimates.  Recent government figures suggest that most migrant children in 
Beijing are in public schools.  According to the “Notice of the General Office of the 
Beijing Municipal People’s Government on the Work of Strengthening the Safety of 
Non-Approved Self-Run Migrant Schools” (2006), for instance, over 62 percent of the 
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city’s school-aged children of the floating population were already in public schools by 
the mid-2000s.  Other estimates, however, suggest a different picture.  Li (2009, 65) 
maintains that in large cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, less than two-
thirds and sometimes less than half of the migrant children are able to attend local 
public schools.  According to Beijing Migrant School Principals’ Association (2009), 
half of the over 400,000 migrant children in Beijing still attend migrant schools.  L. 
Wang (2008, 693) writes that an estimated 47 percent of Beijing’s migrant children 
attend public schools, and Lai et al. (2012, 3) cite that 70 percent are in migrant schools. 
 Second, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, measuring the number of migrant 
children in public schools is fundamentally difficult.  According to a researcher in the 
field, it is likely that around 65 percent of the children in Beijing’s floating population 
are attending public schools.  But, as discussed in Chapter 3, the children of rural-urban 
migrant workers are, in principle, only a subset of this population.  While these terms 
are frequently used interchangeably by officials and academics alike, there are no 
accurate estimates of the percentage of migrant workers’ children attending public 
schools in Beijing.   
 Third, existing estimates may not include all migrant children.  Official statistics, 
as well as many estimates made by researchers, may be based on figures that exclude a 
number of migrant schools, though how many is unclear.  Indeed, it is not uncommon 
for migrant schools that were shut down to secretly reopen their doors.  For example, as 
one principal disclosed, a number of the unlicensed schools that were shut down in 
Haidian have reopened as “preschools,” when in fact they are still primary schools.  In 
Shijingshan, one school I stumbled across had over 2,000 students at its peak.  Soon 
after it was shut down in 2006, it reopened its doors without publicizing its identity as a 
school for migrant children.  The size of its student body had decreased to about 200-
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300 students, but the fact that it had resumed operation is significant.  It is likely that 
such schools are not included in official reports and figures. 
  
The Continued Demand for Migrant Schools in Beijing 
Evidence also shows that there remains a demand for migrant schools in Beijing.  
Among the principals and teachers interviewed, there were mixed views on the 
advantages of migrant schools versus public schools for migrant children (see Table 
6.14).  Interviews with migrant parents, however, showed that, even though most hope 
for their children to attend public schools, there is still a need for migrant schools.  
While seemingly contradictory, this demand is primarily due to three reasons: barriers 
to public school education, the lack of discrimination in migrant schools, and the 
services offered by migrant schools.28   
Table 6.14 Benefits of Public and Migrant Schools for Migrant Children 
Discussed by Migrant School Principals and Teachers in the Sample 
Type of School Key Advantages 
Public Schools 
 Higher quality of education and teaching  
 Better physical conditions and facilities 
 More standardized management 
Migrant Schools 
 More convenient (e.g., in terms of location) 
 Flexible enrollment procedures 
 Low fees  
 Lack of discrimination  
 Similar teaching materials to those used in sending areas 
 
Barriers to public school education.  Despite concerns about the quality of 
migrant schools, public schools continue to be an elusive option for many migrant 
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 See Kwong (2006, 172) and Chen and Liang (2007, 125-126) for additional discussion of this 
demand. 
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families.29  Entrance into public schools remains difficult, as migrant families are 
regularly required to pay a range of fees and present various documents.  In the late 
1990s, public schools charged children of the outside population temporary schooling 
fees and sponsorship fees, ranging from a few thousand to tens of thousands of RMB 
(Lu 2007, 218).  With policies calling for the equal treatment of migrant children in the 
acceptance of fees, these schools are no longer permitted to charge migrant children 
temporary schooling fees.  Yet public schools in Beijing regularly charge migrant 
children various other fees, and how much they charge can be up to their discretion.   
According to parents in the sample, sponsorship fees, for example, can often 
cost at least 10,000-20,000 RMB (about 1,500-3,000 USD).  For migrant children 
wishing to enter a public primary school after the first grade or a public middle school 
after the seventh grade, public schools may charge a special fee known as chabanfei, 
literally a fee to be inserted into a class or grade level; though the amount varies across 
schools, it can cost migrant parents several thousand RMB.  Upon enrollment, there are 
usually additional fees (e.g., for food, books, and school events) that can sometimes add 
up to over 2,000 RMB per term.  Entrance into top public schools can cost considerably 
more.  Based on conversations with a few migrant parents with children in such schools, 
the entrance fee for migrant children can be as high as 60,000 RMB for top primary 
schools and 180,000 RMB for top middle schools, which most migrant families cannot 
afford.  Fees charged by public schools therefore continue to constitute a major obstacle 
for migrant children.   
Public schools also require that migrant children present a range of documents 
before enrollment.  The number of certificates required in Beijing is most frequently 
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 As discussed in Chapter 5, there are a small number of public schools in Beijing at which the 
majority of students are migrant children.  Based on fieldwork, these schools may sometimes only charge 
a few hundred RMB per term, but they are usually of poorer quality and have limited space. 
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cited as five, typically referring to the temporary residence permit, household 
registration booklet, work permit, proof of residency, and certificate verifying a lack of 
guardianship in the place of origin (Rural Education Action Project 2009).  According 
to a government-based researcher, though, some schools require as many as seven or 
eight.  Migrant workers often do not have all of these certificates, making enrollment 
difficult.   
Ultimately, while the municipal and district governments may make the 
regulations, public schools themselves usually make the final decisions when it comes 
to entrance requirements.  Overall, there was agreement among parents and other 
interviewees that the entrance policies of most public schools in Beijing are not 
particularly welcoming to migrant children.  Parents expressed that it was too difficult 
to get into public schools, especially those of better quality, as they did not have all the 
documents required and/or the fees were too expensive (see Table 6.15).   
Table 6.15 The Continued Barriers to Enrolling in Public Schools: Difficulties 
Encountered by Migrant Parents in the Sample 
Examples 
 Of the parents in the sample who went to local public schools to enquire about 
entrance requirements, the fee that was most frequently asked for was the 
sponsorship fee, ranging from 6,000 to 100,000 RMB, though the most common 
amount cited was usually 10,000-20,000 RMB.  Even poorer quality public schools 
may require a sponsorship fee of 15,000 RMB. 
 As one parent concluded: “Instead of charging temporary schooling fees, they charge 
sponsorship fees.  All they did was change the name” (HL1F6). 
 One parent stated that a local public primary school required them to pay all six years 
of school-related fees upfront, amounting to about 12,000 RMB (HL1F5). 
 One parent recalled that he had gone to a public school near the Fifth Ring Road only 
to be turned away before he was able to get any information about entrance 
requirements (SL2F4). 
 
There are some migrant families that have children in both migrant and public 
schools, as was the case with three families in the sample.  This is a phenomenon that 
has likely only surfaced in recent years.  Interestingly, the reasons that prohibited these 
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families from enrolling all of their children in public schools have to do precisely with 
the requirements just discussed.  In the first case, the older child was a seventh grader at 
a migrant school, while the younger child was a third grader at a public school.  The 
reason for this was that the children had come to Beijing two years earlier, and the 
public school would not allow the older child to enroll as a fifth grader (HL2F3).  In the 
second case, a chabanfei of 4,000-5,000 RMB was too expensive for the family, so the 
oldest child had to enroll in a migrant school (SU2F2).  And in the third case, the 
parents were only able to get the elder of their two daughters into a public school after 
using some connections to get all of the required documents (SU2F3).   
Thus, while most migrant parents hope that their children can get a higher-
quality education in public schools, entrance requirements continue to constitute a major 
barrier.  What’s more, as argued by one researcher, the lack of transparency in terms of 
the fees public schools charge migrant children has made the schools a less attractive 
option.  In addition, officials and public schools themselves regularly claim that most 
public schools in Beijing are already full and that placing all migrant children into these 
schools is therefore an unrealistic short-term goal (see Chapter 5).  As one migrant 
school principal summarized: “Children only come to our school because public schools 
cannot accept all of them” (FL2P1).   
Furthermore, as the number of migrant schools declines due to demolition and 
closures, it is unlikely that all of the children involved will be placed into public schools 
due to the barriers discussed.  If unable to find another migrant school to attend, a 
significant number of these children may be left without schools to attend in Beijing and 
may have to return to their “hometowns” for schooling.  While many may return to their 
home provinces for the latter part of middle school or for high school anyway, 
demolition and closures may be forcing them to do so at an earlier age, with serious 
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implications for their childhood development.  Indeed, in many such cases, even if they 
return to their home province, at least one of their parents may decide to continue 
working in Beijing to support the family.  In other words, the surviving migrant schools 
play an additional role by providing these children with the opportunity to stay with 
their parents in the city for a longer period of time in a context in which barriers to 
public school education persist.   
 
The lack of discrimination in migrant schools.  The phrase yishi tongren (equal 
treatment) has made frequent appearances in recent central and Beijing municipal 
policies discussing the treatment of migrant children (see Chapter 4).  Still, 
discrimination by teachers and students in public schools can be a problem, and local 
parents may often be opposed to their children attending school with migrant children 
(L. Wang 2008, 693).  Depending on the proportion of students that are migrants, 
migrant children may also sometimes be placed into separate classrooms (Z. Wang 2009, 
300-301).30  As a result, it is common for migrant children attending public schools to 
lack self-confidence.  For example, one retired public school teacher from Beijing, who 
was teaching at a migrant school at the time of fieldwork, recalled observing a 
noticeable “sense of inferiority” (zibei) among the one or two migrant children in each 
of his classes at the public school (SU4T1).  The lack of discrimination is therefore an 
attractive trait of migrant schools.  As one principal asserted:  
At this kind of school, the teachers are migrant workers, and the students are the children of 
migrant workers.  There is absolutely no sense of discrimination among the students, 
teachers, and administrators, and no one looks down on anyone else.  We are all equal.  So 
in this kind of environment, our students can study and live very happily. (YL1P1)  
 
                                                     
30
 According to a researcher in the sample, this is usually done for reasons of convenience (e.g., if the 
school has a separate branch closer to a migrant community or if different teaching materials need to be 
used).   
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Services offered by migrant schools.  Migrant schools offer services catering to 
the needs of migrant families.  Similar to the situation in the 1990s (Han 2001, 6), one 
of the primary reasons families in the sample chose their child’s school was that it was 
close to their home and more convenient (as opposed to public schools, which tend to be 
farther away).  In addition, migrant schools have flexible enrollment procedures and 
accept students throughout the school year.  They are also open for longer hours; many 
allow parents to drop off their children as early as 5 a.m. and pick them up as late as 6 
p.m. in order to accommodate migrant workers’ long work days.  Many give discounts 
to families with more than one child enrolled.  At one unlicensed school in Fengtai, for 
instance, about 40 percent of the students were regularly given discounts (FU2P1).  At 
some schools, families facing particularly difficult financial situations may not be 
charged tuition at all.  Moreover, the similar curricula often used by migrant schools and 
schools in their home provinces may help facilitate the transition of these children when 
they return home (for middle school or high school).31  Thus, migrant schools not only 
“address both psychological and economic barriers to education in the state system” 
(Chen and Liang 2007, 125), but they also provide services that are not offered 
anywhere else in Beijing’s schooling system.  As one parent put it: “These schools only 
exist because there is a need for them” (HL1F4).   
Each of these three factors has contributed to a continued demand for migrant 
schools in Beijing.  When asked what aspects of their children’s education were most 
important to them, parents in the sample placed great emphasis on the quality of 
education and teaching.  At the same time, most were aware of the gap between migrant 
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 As pointed out by Rural Education Action Project (2009): “According to the Ministry of Education, 
all students must take their high school entrance exam in the county to which their original hukou belongs.  
The high school exam, however, is based on the curriculum that is in use in the local school system.…  
[S]ince many rural counties have a school system that use[s] the standard ‘national curriculum,’ many 
migrant schools teach material from the national curriculum to better prepare students to take the high 
school examination back in their county.”  
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and public schools in this area.  The fact that these parents enroll their children in 
migrant schools anyway is a reflection of both the barriers faced in attending public 
schools and the convenience, flexibility, and sense of community that migrant schools 
provide.  The reemergence of migrant schools in Fengtai in the mid- to late 2000s and 
the reopening of several migrant schools as “preschools” after being closed in Haidian 
are useful examples of this continued demand.  Thus, putting aside any perceptions of 
migrant school principals as profit-seeking individuals (see Chapter 3),32 it is crucial not 
to downplay the role and contribution of migrant schools over time.  As one principal 
expressed: 
We are silently doing a service for the country, for the nation.…  I made all of the 
investments [into this school] myself, but by training these children I am doing something 
for the country, for society, and for the families.  Isn’t that all good? …  At least I am not 
training these children to become thieves and robbers – that is not possible.  At least I am 
teaching them. (YL1P1)  
 
Government Recognition of the Continued Importance of Migrant Schools  
Even at the government level there is an awareness of the continued market and 
need for migrant schools in Beijing.  The district officials interviewed emphasized that 
their public schools are basically full and also expressed that migrant schools are often 
more convenient for migrant families due, for example, to their locations and flexible 
enrollment procedures.  The Haidian official, for instance, provided several reasons why 
the schools still exist: first, many migrant children do not have the documentation 
required to attend public schools; second, a strong sense of community and native-place 
ties bind migrants together; third, many migrant school principals may misinform their 
students, saying that enrolling in public schools is complex and requires the payment of 
high fees; fourth, migrant schools provide services that cater to the needs of the migrant 
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 Zhang (2010), for example, makes the case that a school with 500 students and 15 teachers can 
make one million RMB per year from students’ fees (2,000 RMB per student per year).  Subtracting 
expenses for teacher salaries (100,000 RMB per year) and rent (200,000 RMB per year), the school would 
still be left with 700,000 RMB.  
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population; and, finally, public schools are generally full and too far from migrant 
communities.   
 
The Important Effects of Decentralization on Migrant Schools and Their Students 
The discussion in this and previous chapters illustrates that the decentralization 
of responsibility to receiving governments and public schools through the policy of 
“two priorities” has had major consequences for migrant schools in Beijing, with 
implications for the quality and stability of the education migrant children are receiving 
and subsequently trends in social stratification.  The lack of support for migrant schools 
in Beijing municipal policies has directly affected the stability and legal status of the 
schools, as well as their poor conditions and low quality of teaching.  Evidence shows 
that licensed and unlicensed schools in the city continue to face many of the same basic 
problems, illustrating that this lack of policy support has had serious consequences for 
migrant schools as a whole.  At the same time, district-level approaches have also 
affected the situations of these schools, resulting in differences between the stability of 
the schools and the difficulties they face in getting licensed.  Understanding the impacts 
of both the municipal and district approaches is therefore a critical step towards 
identifying more targeted measures to improve the situations of migrant schools and 
their students, an especially important task given that these schools remain a crucial 
source of education for migrant children in Beijing. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, studies often point to the key role of the hukou 
system in accounting for the educational problems of migrant children in China.  
However, central-level policy changes, as well as some recent developments in Beijing 
like the decision to include migrant children in the lottery system for enrolling in public 
middle schools, indicate that it is possible to weaken or at least challenge the impact of 
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institutional barriers on the exclusion of migrant children and the situations of migrant 
schools, even in cities with large migrant populations.  The recent experience of 
Shanghai is a useful example (see Chapter 4).  The municipal and district-level 
situations explored in the previous two chapters and the consequences for migrant 
schools discussed above provide further evidence of the basic significance of examining 
the local politics surrounding policy implementation.  The findings show that the 
situations of migrant schools and their students are shaped by social and political 
concerns at the municipal level and a range of district-level factors.  In other words, the 
impact of the hukou system on the educational exclusion of these children is not 
straightforward.  Ultimately, in order to more fully understand the intricacies of 
educational provision for migrant children and their implications for trends in social 
stratification, the hukou system, while fundamentally important, must be considered in 
conjunction with local factors and dynamics.   
Thus, the above discussion provides a valuable case that illustrates the need to 
analyze the implementation process to better understand the local consequences and 
sheds light on the effects of decentralized decision-making on migrant schools and their 
students in Beijing.  The findings confirm that, despite the potential benefits, the 
outcomes of decentralization can be highly complex.  As King and Cordeiro Guerra 
(2005, 179) argue in discussing decentralization and reform in the realm of education: 
“[T]he reform process is never smooth.  It is likely to be punctuated by bursts of 
progress and frequent setbacks, which may lead to rising frustration and growing 
mistrust among stakeholders who see themselves as losers under the reform process.” 
In view of the limited policy support given to migrant schools at the municipal 
level and variations between district approaches, as well as the continued existence of 
the problems discussed above, critical questions arise regarding whether or not actors 
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outside the government are able to have an impact.  For example, what role do civil 
society actors play in this picture?  What can a stronger understanding of their 
involvement contribute to knowledge of Beijing’s policy environment in this area?  
Turning to the final remaining piece of the framework set out in Figure 2.1, the next 
chapter demonstrates that an exploration of the municipal and district-level approaches 
and their impact on the situations of migrant schools is not complete without also 
considering the role of civil society.  Examining the nature of civil society involvement 
will shed further light on how policy implementation in the area operates in Beijing, 
including which actors are involved and why, and the ultimate consequences for 
migrant schools and their students. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
THE SURVIVAL AND DEVELOPMENT OF  
MIGRANT SCHOOLS IN BEIJING:  
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
 
 
“[Civil society] is becoming more and more involved … [but] its impact is not great.  
The arm is no match for the thigh [gebo ningbuguo datui]” (HL1P1). 
 
 
 
Not only does decentralization increase the involvement of different levels of 
government, but it can also create space for civil society in the delivery of services like 
education (see Chapter 2).1  In China, civil society has become increasingly involved in 
welfare service provision for marginalized groups including laborers and children since 
the early 1990s (Howell 2007, 18-20).  The case of migrant children’s education in 
Beijing is, at first glance, no exception.  As mentioned in Chapter 3, a local researcher 
was the first to “discover” the existence of migrant schools in Beijing in 1996, and the 
local media subsequently played a key role in bringing migrant children’s education to 
the attention of the government and society.  Since then, an increasing number of civil 
                                                     
1
 According to Malena and Heinrich (2007, 338): “Despite its varied interpretations, civil society can 
be broadly understood as the space in society where collective citizen action takes place.  This notion, 
however, of a societal space animated by a complex set of actors, activities, interests, and values has in 
fact proved extremely difficult to operationalise.”  According to Kaldor (2003, 11-20), there are four 
major categories of civil society actors: 1) social movements, “organizations, groups of people, and 
individuals, who act together to bring about transformation in society”; 2) non-governmental 
organizations, which are “voluntary, in contrast to compulsory organizations like the state or some 
traditional, religious organizations, and they do not make profits, like corporations”; 3) social 
organizations, “organizations representing particular sectors of society defined in social terms” that 
include “professional organizations (societies of lawyers, doctors, employers, trades unions or farmers) 
[and] community groups of women or youth”; and 4) national or religious movements, “organizations 
based on particular sections of society, defined in terms of culture, kin or religion.” 
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society actors have become active in mobilizing on behalf of migrant children and their 
education in the capital city. 
In light of the overall lack of support for migrant schools from the Beijing 
municipal government and the emergence of different district-level policy approaches, 
important questions arise concerning civil society involvement in this policy area.  What 
role do civil society actors play, and are they able to influence the situations of migrant 
schools and their students?  If so, what are the main channels through which they are 
able to have an impact, or, if not, what factors are inhibiting them?  What are the 
implications for the understanding of migrant children’s education in Beijing?  
Examining these questions will shed further light on the dynamics shaping the situations 
of migrant schools and their students at the municipal and district levels.   
This chapter focuses on the main sets of actors outside the government that have 
become involved in migrant children’s education in Beijing and operate with the goal of 
improving the educational situations of migrant children in some way: academics and 
researchers, the media, university student organizations, NGOs, migrant school 
principals’ and teachers’ associations, and migrant parent activists.  It explores the 
involvement of these actors, including their interaction with both the government and 
migrant schools (see Figure 7.1).  Evidence shows that their overall capacity to impact 
migrant children’s education in Beijing has been limited, mainly in terms of their 
influence on government and policy, the situations of migrant schools and their students, 
and the sharing of knowledge and information.  Their limited impact has been shaped 
by a general lack of support for civil society from the municipal government in an area 
that is, in its view, closely linked to population growth and social instability, as well as 
low levels of collaboration between key actors involved.  Analysis also shows that 
district-level situations and policy approaches have had an additional impact on where 
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in the city these actors tend to work, with consequences for the amount of external 
attention and support migrant schools in different districts receive.   
Figure 7.1 General Areas of Interaction between Government, Civil Society, 
and Migrant Schools in Beijing  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2009-2010).   
 
Civil Society and Social Welfare Provision in China 
Since the 1980s, decentralization has created room for civil society involvement 
in the delivery of services in China (Davis 1989; Teets 2008, 7-8).  As Howell (2007, 
17-18) describes: 
The introduction of economic reforms in China has brought about fundamental changes in 
the structure of society, including the pluralization and diversification of social interests, 
 
Central 
Government 
Municipal 
Government 
District 
Government 
Academics/
Researchers 
NGOs 
Media 
University 
Student 
Organizations 
Businesses 
Government-Based 
Researchers 
Key: 
    Limited interaction 
    Interaction 
    Close interaction 
Migrant Parent 
Activists 
 
Migrant Schools 
Migrant School 
Principals’ 
Association 
Migrant School 
Teachers’ 
Association 
171 
increased social differentiation and stratification, the breakdown of rigid rural-urban barriers 
and new forms of associational life.  Aware of the need for new institutional mechanisms to 
“bridge” the Party/state and society, the Chinese Communist Party from the1980s onwards 
encouraged the development of new forms of association such as  professional associations, 
trades associations, learned societies, cultural and sports clubs.  Furthermore, in the context 
of a more general re-organization and streamlining of the state in the direction of “small 
government, large society” (xiao zhengfu, da shehui), the Party/state urged these new 
intermediary bodies to take on former state functions, such as the daily regulation of 
specific trades and the provision of social welfare. 
In particular, the 1990s saw a rise in the number of civil society associations focused on 
the provision of services for marginalized groups including workers, women, children, 
the poor, and people with disabilities (Howell 2007, 19).  The increase in the number of 
such organizations was rooted in political and economic developments2:  
The deepening of state enterprise reform could not be achieved unless alternative systems of 
social protection were set in place.  The development of a services sector would also 
provide an additional source of employment, which could absorb the laid-off and 
unemployed.  Furthermore, as market reforms deepened in the 1990s, the negative 
dimensions of economic restructuring intensified, reflected in new forms of urban poverty, 
unemployment and increased income disparities.  For the political elite, maintaining social 
stability in a context of minimal political reform was paramount.  Hence, the creation of a 
new architecture of intermediary organizations to deal with welfare issues was one way of 
alleviating poverty and reducing discontent. (Howell 2007, 20) 
The nature of the relationship between government and civil society in social 
welfare provision in China varies.  In some areas, government control over these actors 
has loosened.  Shang (2002, 204), for instance, points to a shift from “welfare statism” 
to “welfare pluralism” in the case of care for orphaned or abandoned children, 
indicating that civil society has become more influential in the policy process.  In most 
cases, however, the relationship is complex, and government actors adopt differing 
                                                     
2
 According to Shang (2002, 206), the increase in the number of such actors was due in large part to 
the government’s limited capacity to provide social welfare: “During economic reform, the Chinese 
economy developed at high speed.  However, because conventional welfare beneficiaries lack political 
voice and there are few independent forces in Chinese society to form a voice for them (Shang 1998), the 
[Ministry of Civil Affairs] found that it was at a great disadvantage in attracting more state appropriation.  
The urban social welfare and social relief systems faced policy neglect (Wong 1998; Shang 2001).  The 
government’s budget for social welfare (services) and social relief was reduced from 0.58 percent of gross 
domestic product in 1979 to 0.19 in 1997 (State Statistical Bureau 1998, pp. 20, 280).  State investment 
fell behind what is needed to maintain welfare provision at existing levels today, and civil affairs 
departments are unable to meet the demand.”   
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strategies towards civil society depending on the context.  As Cheng, Ngok, and Zhuang 
(2010, 1104) contend:  
[M]any uncertainties exist in the informal politics between the Chinese authorities and civic 
groups.  Official agencies have strong interest orientations of their own, and it is difficult for 
them to have a consensus on the issue of civic groups.  The respective positions of various 
levels of government are not only unclear, but also shifting.  In general, they have to 
respond to increasing demand for various types of social services.  But their considerations 
of social stability and definitions of their respective baselines are complicated and may even 
be contradictory, with mixed elements coexisting: detachment, neglect, tolerance, support, 
and sanction.   
Indeed, a range of government approaches have emerged.  Officials may tolerate 
those actors that restrict their size and act in line with policy goals.  In other cases, they 
may adopt strategies to retain control, either formally (e.g., by increasing management 
through policy) or informally (e.g., by trying to limit the development of such actors).  
They may also adopt a strategy of “absorption” as a regulatory mechanism, which could 
involve presenting awards or titles of a political nature, building relationships between 
the actors and local government departments, and appointing actors to political positions 
(cited by Cheng, Ngok, and Zhuang 2010, pp. 1095-1096, 1098-1102).   
Ultimately, the role of civil society in welfare provision in China is complicated 
and varies across both contexts and policy areas (Chamberlain 1993, 212; Cheng, Ngok, 
and Zhuang 2010, 1104).  Issues involving gender, for example, are generally 
considered to be less sensitive than those involving labor; as a result, “just as attempts to 
organize around labour point to the boundaries of Party-state tolerance for civil society, 
organizing around gender can indicate how wide the space for organizing can be 
pushed” (Howell 2003, 207).  Cheng, Ngok, and Zhuang (2010, 1089-1090) argue the 
following for the case of many labor NGOs in China:  
In the eyes of local governments, it appears rational and advantageous to provide these labor 
NGOs with a certain degree of political support to promote social harmony and justice; ….  
However, these labor NGOs do not have legal status and supporting them openly carries 
political risk.  This is why local governments tend to ignore them and maintain a wait-and-
see attitude.  In other words, local governments avoid political risk, adopting a neutral and 
defensible position while trying to take advantage of the NGOs’ help. 
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The extent to which civil society actors are able to build relationships with 
government actors has become a major factor shaping their role in social welfare 
provision.  Those actors that do not interact with the government may struggle to 
survive or flourish, while those that have closer relationships with government actors 
may be less likely to face such difficulties, though they may eventually be absorbed into 
the government’s sphere of control (Cheng, Ngok, and Zhuang 2010, 1095).  All of this 
has consequences for the services and amount of support available to the groups these 
actors serve, making closer examinations of their involvement in different policy areas 
crucial. 
Despite growing interest in the role of civil society in areas like gender and labor, 
few studies have explored such dynamics for migrant children’s education.  Perhaps the 
only exception is Kwong (2004), which focuses on state-civil society relations in 
migrant children’s education; it, however, does not analyze district-level variations in 
detail and was also written prior to the emergence of actors including many of the 
NGOs now involved.  Important questions then arise concerning the impact of civil 
society in this policy area.  As Howell (2007, 21) puts it: “Have societal actors begun to 
carve out a public sphere that allows critical debate around issues that were otherwise 
regarded as only a matter for the Party/state?  Is governance becoming more plural, 
more democratic, more negotiated than before?”   
The rest of this chapter examines the civil society actors involved in migrant 
children’s education in Beijing, including their structure (who the key actors are and 
what activities they are engaged in), their motives for being involved and their 
relationship to the policy environment in which they operate (the extent to which they 
are able to interact with and attain recognition and support from the government), and 
174 
their capacity to impact the situations of migrant schools and their students.3  Evidence 
shows that, due largely to the perception of migrant children’s education as a policy 
area with potential implications for social instability, government actors in Beijing have, 
for the most part, chosen to either ignore or tolerate the civil society actors involved.  
The result has been a low level of state-civil society interaction in the policy area, and 
the role of these actors has been heavily defined by the views and concerns of the 
municipal and district governments, ultimately limiting their capacity to have a large-
scale impact on migrant children’s education in the city.  
 
The Role of Civil Society in Migrant Children’s Education in Beijing  
Not only is there a continued demand for migrant schools in Beijing (as 
established in Chapter 6), but the visibility of these schools has also increased, due in 
large part to the work of civil society.  As previously discussed, during the mid- to late 
1990s, the Chinese government saw migrant schools as illegal entities and had little 
knowledge about them.  Though still vulnerable to being shut down, most migrant 
schools in Beijing no longer operate as “underground” schools.  This section illustrates 
that migrant children’s education – and migrant schools in particular – has attracted 
attention from an increasing number of civil society actors in Beijing since the mid-
1990s.  They include academics and researchers, the media, university student 
organizations, and NGOs, as well as actors within the migrant community that often 
lack government recognition (including migrant school principals’ and teachers’ 
associations and parent activists).4  Evidence shows that the involvement of these 
                                                     
3
 These characteristics are primarily adapted from a framework discussed by Malena and Heinrich 
(2007, 341). 
4
 While the principals’ and teachers’ associations might be considered as being a part of migrant 
schools, they have become largely independent actors in their own right.  They can be seen as what 
Kaldor (2003) refers to as “social organizations” and are therefore included in this discussion. 
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various actors is driven by a combination of three key motives: to provide support 
directly to migrant schools and their students and teachers, to raise awareness about the 
problems of migrant schools and their students, and to influence government and policy 
(see Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1  The Primary Motives among Civil Society Actors Involved in 
Migrant Children’s Education in Beijing 
Actors 
Provide Support to 
Migrant Schools 
and Their Students 
and Teachers 
Raise Awareness 
about the Problems 
of Migrant Schools 
and Their Students 
Influence 
Government and 
Policy 
Academics & 
Researchers * * * 
Media  * * 
University Student 
Organizations *   
NGOs * * * 
Migrant School 
Principals’ Association *  * 
Migrant School 
Teachers’ Association * *  
Migrant Parent 
Activists   * 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2009-2010). 
 
In light of the differing district-level policy approaches and the general lack of 
support for migrant schools from the municipal government, evidence is used to 
evaluate the extent to which these actors have been able to – through their work and 
relationships – achieve these objectives and ultimately improve the situations of migrant 
schools and their students and why.  In conducting this evaluation, emphasis is placed 
on the fact that civil society actors typically seek out the migrant communities and 
schools they work with (rather than the other way around).  As one principal explained, 
each migrant school’s relationships “have a lot to do with the reputations of the school 
and the principal” (SU1P1), and actors like researchers and NGOs often recommend 
schools to others based on these reputations.  These actors can therefore significantly 
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affect the amount of external attention and support migrant schools in different districts 
receive, making a closer examination of their role critical.   
 
The Key Actors Involved 
Academics and researchers.  Although government and society were first made 
aware of migrant schools in Beijing through the efforts of a local researcher in 1996, 
few studies were conducted on the subject in Beijing during the late 1990s, key 
exceptions being Lu (2007) and Han (2001).  Very few have researched the subject 
continuously since the 1990s; based on fieldwork, many study the topic for a short 
period of time before moving on to other subjects, while others have only recently 
begun to study it.  This overall lack of sustained interest – due in part to the basic 
difficulties of conducting research on the subject and the resulting perception that there 
is little room for ongoing exploration – has contributed to a lack of extensive research 
on migrant children’s education.   
The role of academics and researchers in the area revolves primarily around 
research, usually with the goal of raising awareness about the problems of migrant 
schools and their students.  Some local researchers collaborate with researchers from 
outside of China, helping to increase awareness about the subject abroad.  Their work 
can also include organizing discussion forums with other scholars, government-based 
researchers, migrant school principals, and NGOs, as well as creating programs or 
organizations to support migrant schools and their students (e.g., by teaching migrant 
children about self-esteem or, in one case, subsidizing teachers’ salaries).  In addition, 
research may serve as a channel through which to influence policy.  Not only do many 
of the academics and researchers involved exchange information and ideas with 
government-based researchers at the central and municipal levels, but some also submit 
their research findings to the government.  The latter, however, depends on the nature of 
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the relationship between their institutions and the various government departments.  
Within the sample, for instance, only one institute submitted policy briefs based on their 
research to the central government several times a year.  According to an established 
researcher in the field, the government consulted academics and researchers more 
frequently in the early to mid-2000s, given its lack of knowledge about the subject at the 
time, but the level of interaction has somewhat declined, and their impact in the policy 
area is unclear.   
Moreover, there was a tendency among academics and researchers in the sample 
to focus their research on schools in districts like Chaoyang and Haidian (both of which 
have high concentrations of academic and research institutes), and to a lesser extent 
Shijingshan, Changping, and Daxing.  The focus on schools in less controversial 
districts has contributed to a general trend among many of them to disregard or 
downplay the importance of district-level variations in the policy area.  This has greatly 
shaped the existing body of research, as studies on the subject often provide evidence 
based on particular schools in these districts, rather than comparing district-level 
situations (e.g., Kwong 2004; Goodburn 2009).   
Migrant schools in different districts therefore receive differing amounts of 
attention and support from academics and researchers.  For example, four of the six 
schools visited in Haidian had regular contact with academics and researchers, 
compared to three of the seven schools visited in Shijingshan.  All four schools visited 
in Fengtai, however, had little to no previous contact with academics and researchers; at 
one of the district’s unlicensed schools, the principal noted that I was the first to visit 
the school since its creation in 2005 (FU1P1).  Interestingly, one of the existing contact 
lists of migrant schools in the city, compiled by a team of researchers, did not include 
any of the licensed or unlicensed schools in Fengtai that were visited during fieldwork 
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or mentioned by the officials and principals interviewed, further evidence that the 
district’s schools are isolated from the academic sphere.  The result has been a general 
lack of knowledge about Fengtai’s situation.  One prominent researcher, for instance, 
was unaware that the district had licensed three migrant schools.5  All of this is 
especially significant in light of their potential capacity to influence policy through 
research.  
 
The media.  As mentioned in Chapter 3, the media played a key role in bringing 
migrant children’s education to the attention of the government and society in the mid-
1990s.  Based on fieldwork, the earliest newspapers to report on the obstacles faced by 
migrant children in attaining education included Zhongguo jiaoyubao (China Education 
Daily), under the Ministry of Education; Guangming ribao (Guangming Daily), under 
the Propaganda Department of the CPC; and Nongmin ribao (Peasants’ Daily), under 
the Ministry of Agriculture.6  Though much of the media attention since then has also 
been from state-run media, independent media have played a role in reporting about the 
subject as well.  In recent years, much of the coverage, local and international, has been 
focused on the demolition and shutting down of migrant schools and the impact on the 
students (e.g., when the “Notice of the General Office of the Beijing Municipal People’s 
Government on the Work of Strengthening the Safety of Non-Approved Self-Run 
Migrant Schools” was issued in 2006, when several districts demolished over 30 
migrant schools in 2010, and when Haidian, Chaoyang, and Daxing made plans to close 
or demolish 24 migrant schools in 2011).7  In addition, local independent media play a 
                                                     
5
 One of the only studies to include Fengtai as a core case was Lu (2007), the research for which was 
primarily conducted in 1999-2000.  The other districts focused on were Chaoyang and Haidian. 
6
 See Jiao (1996) and Yuan (1997) for two early examples. 
7
 See, for instance, Ren and Mao (2006); Ni and Zhao (2010); Zhuang and Lin (2010); Shi, Wang, 
and Du (2011); and Zhang (2011).  Examples of international coverage include BBC News Asia-Pacific 
(2011) and Jacobs (2011). 
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role by helping to publicize NGO events and programs and are frequently present at 
relevant symposiums held by actors like researchers and NGOs.   
By bringing issues like demolition and closures to the public’s attention, the 
media have occasionally been able to put pressure on the municipal and district 
governments.  As shown in Chapter 5, the Shijingshan and especially Haidian officials 
interviewed discussed feeling such pressure at various times.  However, the media’s 
impact has varied.  Media coverage put some pressure on the municipal and Haidian 
district governments in 2006 and the Daxing district government in 2011 but was unable 
to stimulate much change when several districts, including Chaoyang, closed over 30 
schools in 2010 (see Chapter 6).  Though it is difficult to assess the precise factors 
influencing decision-making due to the lack of transparency, principals and researchers 
in the sample expressed that the media’s capacity to generate change in the policy area 
remains low.   
 
University student organizations.  University student groups were also among 
the earliest actors outside of the government to become involved.  During the late 1990s, 
the first researcher to come across migrant schools in Beijing recruited students from a 
local university to assist with research on rural development and migrant workers.  This 
led to the creation of a students’ association with a similar focus, which began 
volunteering at migrant schools around 2000.  The number of student groups doing 
volunteer work at migrant schools has increased over time, and these groups usually go 
to the schools on their own or through NGOs.  Their main objective is to provide 
support for migrant school students and improve the quality of education they receive, 
primarily by tutoring, teaching classes, organizing events, and donating school supplies. 
The overall involvement of such groups is still limited, and, while they may 
have a direct impact on the individual children they work with (e.g., by helping with 
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schoolwork and serving as role models), their capacity to have a large-scale, long-term 
impact is small.  Of the 22 migrant schools in the sample, nearly one-third had little to 
no interaction with student volunteers.8  Principals expressed that university students 
tend to visit their schools irregularly and infrequently or may simply organize one-off 
events.  Only about half of the principals expressed that university students came to 
their schools on a regular, usually weekly, basis.  The number of students that visit 
migrant schools to tutor students also tends to be small (e.g., fewer than ten students per 
visit), and student groups may only send volunteers to one or two schools each year.  
The limited involvement of these organizations is largely due to financial and time 
constraints, the high turnover rate among members, and the fact that migrant children’s 
education may not be the main focus of their voluntary work.  Conversations with 
student volunteers revealed that some principals may consequently prefer that university 
students do not come to their schools for reasons including concerns about the negative 
effects of short-term, unstable programs on the children and safety considerations when, 
for example, volunteers organize programs on weekends when schools are unstaffed.   
In other cases, schools did not have student volunteers because such groups had 
never contacted them.  Out of the four inner suburban districts, student groups tend to 
choose schools in Chaoyang, Haidian, and Shijingshan.  Here, distance is a key factor; 
many of the city’s major universities are in Haidian and Chaoyang, and it is easier for 
students to travel to migrant schools in nearby areas.  As a result, whereas all six 
schools visited in Haidian and about six of the seven schools visited in Shijingshan had 
relationships with university student volunteers, only one of the four schools visited in 
Fengtai (a licensed school) had university students coming on a weekly basis.  At one of 
                                                     
8
 The seven schools in the sample that had very little to no interaction with university students 
included three licensed and four unlicensed schools, illustrating that a license does not necessarily lead to 
stronger connections with such actors.   
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the unlicensed schools in Fengtai, the principal recalled that university students in 
Haidian had once contacted the school to arrange tutoring but pulled out after learning 
the school’s location (FU1P1).  What’s more, some student groups choose not to select 
migrant schools on their own and have instead become volunteers through NGOs, in 
which case schools are chosen by the NGOs themselves.  As will be discussed below, 
this can also lead to the exclusion of schools in particular districts.   
 
Non-governmental organizations.  There are an increasing number of NGOs 
working on migrant children’s education in Beijing.  The majority became involved in 
the mid-2000s when the issue had begun to attract more attention.9  These NGOs mainly 
organize programs and events for migrant schools and their students, sometimes through 
their own community centers, and are often present at relevant forums held by 
researchers and other organizations.  Their primary objectives include providing support 
for and improving the situations of migrant school students (e.g., through tutoring and 
teacher training); fostering the healthy growth and development of migrant children and 
encouraging their creativity through art, music, and sports; and increasing societal 
awareness about the problems migrant children face and engaging in policy advocacy.10  
The majority of the local NGOs in the sample relied, at least in part, on financial 
support from sources outside of mainland China (including Hong Kong), illustrating the 
important role of international funding in their survival.   
Within the sample, organizations varied in type, the nature of their work, and the 
extent to which their work was focused on migrant children’s education.  Though the 
local NGOs in the sample were all registered with the government, most focused on 
                                                     
9
 Based on fieldwork, the earliest NGO involved was created in the late 1990s by a researcher and 
provided community-based services for migrants.  Most, however, were either created in the mid-2000s 
or only started to pay attention to migrant children’s education in the mid-2000s.   
10
 See Appendix C for additional information about the work of these organizations. 
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providing services directly to particular migrant communities or migrant schools and 
were often relatively small in scale.  There were, of course, exceptions; for example, 
starting in 2007, one foundation sponsored the establishment of three non-governmental 
migrant schools in the city as part of its work in the area (YOF2S1).   
While a few NGOs in the sample were primarily engaged in community-based 
work, most served a number of communities and schools in various locations and 
districts.  NGOs that are physically based in migrant communities are, like migrant 
schools, also vulnerable to being demolished.  At one such organization, for instance, an 
interviewee described that it was already at its third location since its creation in the 
mid-2000s and was in the process of looking for a fourth:  
We only came here because of demolition in Haidian and Chaoyang.  It’s unstable … this is 
our biggest problem.…  Right now we have nowhere to move because so many other 
migrant villages are also being demolished.…  There are many obstacles.  It will be good if 
we can survive. (SOC1S1) 
The number of organizations that choose this model therefore remains limited. 
For NGOs that are not community-based, schools they work with are frequently 
chosen based on location, need, and the willingness of the principals to work with them.  
Due to limited resources, NGOs that work closely with individual schools often work 
with no more than ten schools, usually unlicensed ones.11  They also tend to concentrate 
their work in a few districts; among the NGOs in the sample, Chaoyang received the 
most attention, followed by Haidian, Shijingshan, Changping, and Daxing (see Table 
7.2).  Again, schools in Fengtai received considerably less attention.   
                                                     
11
 There were exceptions.  One organization in the sample, for instance, worked with six licensed 
schools and only one unlicensed school based on the fact that unlicensed schools are more likely to be 
closed or demolished at any given time and are therefore less stable (YOL4S2). 
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Table 7.2 NGOs in the Sample and the Districts Where They Work 
Location of NGO 
(District) 
Main District(s) Where They Work 
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1. Changping 
 *   * *     
2. Changping 
        *  
3. Chaoyang 
   * *      
4. Chaoyang 
 * *        
5. Chaoyang 
 * * * * * *    
6. Chaoyang 
 * * * * * *    
7. Chaoyang 
  * * *      
8. Chaoyang 
   *  *     
9. Chaoyang 
         * 
10. Dongcheng *  * *       
11. Dongcheng 
       *   
12. Shijingshan 
 *         
 
In addition to providing services for migrant communities and schools, NGOs 
help increase awareness about migrant children’s education.  One example is their role 
in bringing businesses into the picture.  As mentioned by staff at several NGOs, a small 
number of businesses have started to take interest in the area and, through NGOs, 
donate items to migrant schools and sponsor NGO events and programs; that is, NGOs 
provide them with information about and access to the schools.  However, their 
involvement is still limited.  Moreover, since NGOs tend to work with schools in 
particular districts, more isolated schools do not benefit from such interaction.   
Overall, the capacity of these NGOs to substantially improve the situations of 
migrant schools remains low.  First, their general inability to interact with the 
government has affected their capacity to have a significant, long-term impact on 
migrant schools and their students (see Table 7.3).  Their attempts to impact policy have 
included efforts with other actors like the media, researchers, and principals to put 
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pressure on the government.  For instance, at least two organizations in the sample 
interacted with Haidian officials in opposing the decision to shut down unlicensed 
migrant schools in 2006.  Yet such interaction has been infrequent, and most NGOs 
involved have not been able to build close working relationships with government 
actors.  Only two NGOs in the sample, both in Chaoyang, expressed having had some 
limited contact with municipal officials (e.g., in the labor bureau), while two others, in 
Changping and Chaoyang, expressed having had limited contact with their district 
education commission.  The majority did not have close relationships with the 
municipal and district education commissions. 
Table 7.3 The Limited Capacity of NGOs to Interact with the Government: 
Views of NGO Staff in the Sample  
Examples 
 “In terms of interaction with the government, I think this is an area where we haven’t 
done too well.…  We are currently working hard on this.…  We are hoping that [our 
projects] can acquire recognition from the education commission (for example, the 
Chaoyang district education commission).…  This kind of recognition is what 
migrant schools need the most.  Actually, I think that there are many things that we 
cannot change ourselves.…  The most important thing is for the government to pay 
more attention to and suggest ways in which we can resolve the problems.  The main 
force needs to come from the government.…  We haven’t been able to establish the 
channels.  We don’t have the capacity to build the relationships.  We don’t know how 
to access them.…  Ideally we would build relationships with a few municipal 
government officials, but, if that’s not possible, building relationships with the 
district government and education commission would also be very good” (YOL3S1). 
 “The main point is that government support is needed.…  [The work we do (like 
training and events)] cannot resolve many of the problems.…  Many [migrant school] 
principals are good people, and many teachers are good people.  But the efforts of 
[such] individuals cannot resolve the issues.  So, in this area, it’s very difficult for us 
without having support from the government” (SOC1S1). 
 “The government doesn’t have any interest [in interacting with us]” (POC1S1). 
 
Second, based on interviews, NGOs may sometimes encounter difficulties 
working at migrant schools, with further consequences for their capacity to improve the 
situations of the schools and their students.  Some principals, for example, have safety 
concerns when an organization wishes to run its programs during weekends when the 
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school is unstaffed.  In addition, some teachers and parents feel that participating in 
NGO programs would take valuable time away from the students’ schoolwork and 
subsequently affect their grades.   
 
Migrant school principals’ association.  In 1999, a group of principals created 
an association for migrant school principals, a notable development given the previously 
low level of interaction between them.12  A Hong Kong-based organization provided 
financial assistance, while a local university provided meeting space.  The association 
serves as a forum for principals to meet and share information about policy-related 
developments and key problems faced by their schools.  In the early stages of its 
existence, the main issues discussed centered on seeking legal status and stability.  By 
the late 2000s, its focus had extended to issues concerning the low salaries and lack of 
insurance among their teachers, demolition, and the need to eliminate tuition fees at 
migrant schools.  At the time of fieldwork, it included principals from most of the 
districts (including Haidian, Chaoyang, Shijingshan, Daxing, Tongzhou, Changping, 
Shunyi, Fangshan, Yanqing, Huairou, and Xuanwu).  According to a representative, the 
association lacks members from Fengtai due to the district’s history and the small 
number of remaining schools. 
Though the association is primarily a forum for principals, actors like academics 
and researchers, NGOs, lawyers, and the media have sometimes been invited to its 
meetings.  It has, however, had very little interaction with the municipal government, 
which sees it as a potential threat.  Indeed, past attempts to express its views to the 
government and make policy recommendations have been unsuccessful; the association 
has, for example, occasionally submitted reports to the municipal government and 
                                                     
12
 According to Lu (2007, 233-234), there was little interaction amongst migrant schools in the mid- 
to late 1990s.   
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education commission, but such efforts have not resulted in much action.  Moreover, the 
number and frequency of its meetings have declined due to the fact that, as an 
association without government authorization, it cannot hold meetings legally.  So, 
despite its relatively long history, its impact remains low (see Table 7.4).   
Table 7.4 The Existence of Migrant Schools’ Associations: Views of Principals 
in the Sample 
Examples 
On the Beijing-level association: 
 As one principal stated of the association: “We haven’t made too many 
accomplishments.…  The government manages governmental affairs.  We can only 
express our wishes” (HL1P1).   
On the Shijingshan association: 
 According to principals in the sample, Shijingshan’s migrant schools’ association 
was created around 2005 and was the first such district-level association in Beijing.  
It includes the district’s licensed and unlicensed migrant schools.  Though the 
association has occasionally brought issues to the district education commission, 
meetings are not held on a regular basis, and its influence remains very limited.   
On the lack of a Haidian association: 
 As one principal maintained: “Haidian was the leading district in shutting down 
migrant schools in 2006, so it doesn’t have any interest in [supporting a migrant 
schools’ association].…  Some [of the district’s migrant schools] have also become 
‘preschools’ and don’t call themselves primary schools anymore [making the 
existence of an association less likely].…  [Having a district-level association] has 
some effect.…  [Principals] can use it to report problems to the education 
commission” (HL1P1).  
On the lack of a Fengtai association: 
 According to principals in the district, migrant schools in Fengtai are relatively 
isolated from each other, and interaction between them – particularly between 
licensed and unlicensed schools and amongst unlicensed schools themselves – is very 
limited.  As a result, no such association has been created.   
 
There are also, at the district level, private (minban) education associations 
(which typically operate under the district education commission and include licensed 
migrant schools) and a small number of migrant schools’ associations.  Based on 
fieldwork, Chaoyang, Changping, Tongzhou, and Shijingshan each have a migrant 
schools’ association, though these associations are generally disorganized and meet 
infrequently.  Chaoyang’s migrant schools’ association and private (minban) education 
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association have somewhat better reputations.  According to a long-time principal in the 
district, its minban education association has served as a forum for the principals of 
licensed and unlicensed migrant schools to express their views to the district education 
commission and has, on occasion, been able to influence local decisions.  In 2008, for 
example, principals in the association met to discuss the use of school buses by migrant 
schools, which had been contributing to competition between the schools and had also 
raised safety concerns.  The association decided to eliminate the use of the buses and 
submitted a resolution to the district education commission, which approved the 
decision, allowing migrant children to attend migrant schools closest to their homes. 
Such occurrences, however, remain infrequent, and the overall capacity of the 
district-level associations to impact policy is low.  Most districts do not have one 
specifically for migrant schools, and the few associations that do exist usually do not 
meet regularly and receive little attention from the district governments (see Table 7.4 
above).  A model closer to the one found in Chaoyang has, thus far, not been adopted by 
other districts, and, at least among the other inner suburban districts, it is unlikely that 
they will be based on two factors: the district education commissions’ attitudes towards 
migrant schools in Shijingshan, Haidian, and Fengtai, and the increasingly aggressive 
demolition of migrant schools.  In terms of the latter, the number of migrant schools in 
each district has been declining, making it less likely that education commissions would 
want to devote time and resources into supporting such associations.   
 
Migrant school teachers’ association.  In 2009, a migrant school teachers’ 
association was also created.  Made up of and run by migrant school teachers, it 
receives support from a local NGO and a research center jointly run by a local 
university and a university in Hong Kong.  The association’s primary goals include 
improving the lives of migrant school teachers, strengthening their teaching ability, and 
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protecting their rights and ensuring that they enjoy the same treatment as public school 
teachers.  At the time of fieldwork, it had over 100 members, representing over 100 
licensed and unlicensed schools across almost all of the districts.  Similar to the migrant 
school principals’ association, however, it also lacks members from Fengtai. 
Though the organization has events or meetings about once a month, most of its 
focus is on publishing a monthly newspaper and magazine for migrant school teachers.  
Both publications serve as a channel through which teachers can write about their views, 
problems, concerns, and goals and discuss policies and developments.  According to an 
officer of the association:  
Most teachers aren’t able to watch television and cannot go on the internet.  Many don’t 
know how to use the internet or don’t have the resources to do so.  They don’t have internet 
cafes, and their schools may not have computers.  Schools may also not have newspapers.  
This school’s copy of the newspaper is bought by me every morning.  Many teachers don’t 
have televisions, and their schools don’t have televisions.…  Information about the schools, 
teachers, and students is put into the magazine so that teachers can all read it. (XL1T1) 
It is difficult to assess the association’s impact given its short history.  By mid-
2010, it had begun to build relationships with several NGOs, the local media, and 
academics, helping to increase awareness about the problems of migrant school teachers 
in the process.  Yet it has not been able to interact with the government and lacks direct 
channels to impact policy.  Though its influence may grow as it builds more 
relationships, there remain obstacles to its success as a potential forum for larger change.  
Not only does it lack government approval and an office of its own, but membership is 
still limited; many teachers interviewed had not heard of it, while others were too busy 
to participate or were simply uninterested.   
 
Migrant parent activists.  Based on interviews with principals, teachers, and 
parents, most migrant workers with children in migrant schools have not adopted 
strategies to try to change their children’s educational situations.  Most are too busy to 
spend time with their children and do not regularly interact with their children’s 
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principals and teachers, let alone actors like NGOs, academics, and the government.  In 
addition, most lack knowledge about their children’s rights, as well as the time and 
opportunities to try to understand the relevant policies.  The majority of parents 
interviewed emphasized that they are too poorly educated to understand the policies, 
frequently referring to themselves as “uncultured” (mei wenhua).13  When asked whom 
they turn to for help when it comes to their children’s education, parents said that they 
primarily rely on themselves (kao ziji) but may sometimes seek help or information 
from relatives, other community members, or migrant school teachers (see Table 7.5).  
None discussed taking any type of action beyond this.14   
Table 7.5 The Limited Involvement of Parents with Children in Migrant 
Schools: Views of Migrant Parents in the Sample 
Examples 
 When asked whether or not they have taken any action in response to problems 
concerning their children’s education, the parents in one family replied by stating that 
they are “uncultured,” so they can only seek their children’s teachers for help 
(FU2F1). 
 When asked whether or not she was familiar with the policy situation and her 
children’s educational rights, one parent responded by stating that it is very important 
to understand the policies, but they have had no opportunities to learn about them.  
She added that, even if their children’s teachers gave them such information, they 
would not be able to understand it, as they only have “primary school culture” 
(xiaoxue wenhua) (SL2F3). 
 As one parent expressed: “Our world is different.  We had very simple schooling.  
We don’t understand much” (HU2F1). 
 
In contrast, a small proportion of the more well-off migrant parents – mainly 
those whose children attend local public schools – have taken to activism in the area 
since the mid- to late 2000s.  These parents have begun to adopt action in the hopes of 
improving their children’s educational opportunities and ensuring that they are given the 
same treatment as local children (see Table 7.6 for an example).   
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 Most parents in the sample were either primary or middle school graduates, and a couple of the 
parents interviewed had had no previous schooling (see Appendix B). 
14
 There are, of course, exceptions.  See, for example, Shi, Wang, and Du (2011).   
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Table 7.6  The Story of One Migrant Parent and Activist Encountered during 
Fieldwork 
One migrant parent encountered has become active in lobbying on behalf of migrant 
children in Beijing.  Despite the family’s rural hukou status, the couple was not only able to 
pay the fees for their daughter to attend public primary and middle schools, but they also 
succeeded in using connections to enroll her in a local high school, generally unheard of due 
to the requirement for migrant children to take their university entrance examination in their 
place of household registration. 
In recent years, this parent has written letters to the central and municipal governments and 
has built relationships with the media and a few NGOs, as well as certain academics and 
university student groups.  However, the focus has ultimately been on issues concerning the 
university entrance exam and migrant children in public middle schools, due largely to the 
view that it is necessary to open the door for migrant children in public schools first.  Such 
activists have therefore had little contact with migrant schools and their students.   
 
Based on fieldwork, there have been two major cases of such action to date.  The 
first was an effort to have migrant children included in the computerized lottery system 
(diannao paiwei) for entry into Beijing’s public middle schools.  According to a leading 
parent involved, in early 2010, a group of migrant workers with children in public 
schools in Haidian organized a petition, as well as several rallies outside the Beijing and 
Haidian education commissions.  Initially the effort of a few parents, the group 
eventually grew to over 30, and more than 2,000 people signed the petition.  Though it 
cannot be said for certain, it is speculated that this effort – and the local media attention 
it attracted – played at least a small role in the decision that year to include migrant 
children in the lottery system for entry into public middle schools in Beijing (Yang 
2010).  Second, parents organized a petition to cancel the requirement for migrant 
children to return to their place of hukou registration for their university entrance exam 
(gaokao), a barrier that has prevented migrant children from attending high school in 
cities.  According to a parent involved, over 7,000 signatures had been collected by 
mid-2010.  In late 2010, Gongren ribao (Workers’ Daily) reported that the petition – 
signed by 13,000 people, about 90 percent of which were migrant parents in Beijing – 
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had been submitted to the government’s education departments but had yet to result in 
any response (Yang 2010). 
Both of these efforts were organized by migrant parents with children in public 
schools, with some support from a local NGO.  As one researcher put it, the parents 
involved have been relatively wealthier and more cultured.  As a result, the issues they 
address are not necessarily those most urgent to children in migrant schools.15  
Ultimately, their impact remains low; only a small proportion of migrant parents have 
become involved, and local government actors have generally avoided interacting with 
them.   
 
The Limited Impact of Civil Society  
As mentioned earlier, there are three key motives among the civil society actors 
involved: to provide support to migrant schools and their students and teachers, to raise 
awareness and spread information about the situations of migrant schools and their 
students, and to influence government and policy.  The above discussion illustrates that 
those actors aiming to influence government and policy have encountered many 
obstacles, and state-civil society interaction in the area remains limited.  In regards to 
providing support to and substantially improving the situations of migrant schools, 
evidence indicates that the overall impact of these actors has been low as well (see 
Table 7.7).  Based on the sample of schools, direct support from organizations or 
universities outside of mainland China has also been small in scale and is often limited 
to donations to a few select migrant schools.  In addition, the extent to which migrant 
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 Interestingly, a key parent activist involved expressed that, if the university entrance exam issue is 
resolved (and migrant children are allowed to remain in the cities for high school), then other key 
educational problems faced by migrant children, including those related to middle school education and 
the high school entrance exam, will no longer be issues.  One parent also maintained that research on 
compulsory education for migrant children is becoming outdated, and another asserted that researchers 
should focus more on issues concerning higher education.  Such assertions indicate that the views and 
problems of migrants with children in migrant schools remain largely overlooked by these activists.   
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schools benefit from the work of civil society varies between licensed schools, between 
licensed and unlicensed schools, and to a certain extent between unlicensed schools, 
illustrating the complex impact these actors have on the schools.   
Table 7.7 The Limited Impact of Civil Society: Views of Principals in the 
Sample 
Examples 
 As one principal maintained: “[Actors like] NGOs come and do a little tutoring and 
provide some help to the students, but they cannot resolve the basic problems.  The 
government is still the key” (HU1P1).  
 When asked about their sources of support, one principal replied: “It isn’t fixed.  In 
terms of regular support, [the main source of support] is the government.…  If you 
rely on [other actors] to try to resolve the problems, the impact will be limited.…  
The government has the real strength, so we have to rely on the government” 
(HL2P1). 
 At one licensed school, the principal expressed that the school has had extremely 
little interaction with actors like NGOs, academics, and the media and has to instead 
rely on the district education commission for any support or assistance (FL1P1). 
 According to one principal: “These actors don’t have much of an impact [on our 
school].  Researchers may come and conduct studies, but some are objective, and 
[their research] won’t immediately have an impact.…  They might have a larger 
impact on migrant children as a group [but they won’t have much impact on our 
school’s situation]” (PL1P1). 
 
What’s more, civil society actors have had a limited impact on the sharing of 
information, with major consequences for their existing knowledge about the local 
policy environment (and how it affects migrant schools and their students) and 
subsequently their ability to provide more targeted services and support.  While efforts 
by actors like NGOs and the media have helped increase public awareness about the 
general problems of migrant schools over time, there remain serious gaps in knowledge, 
particularly concerning policies at the central, municipal, and especially district levels.  
For example, among the individuals interviewed at the 12 local NGOs in the sample, 
half expressed that they were either unfamiliar with the municipal and district policies 
or had some knowledge of the municipal policies but no knowledge of district-level 
situations.  Most academics and researchers in the sample also did not have in-depth 
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knowledge about the district-level situations.  Such gaps in knowledge have had 
consequences for migrant families.  The majority of parents interviewed were 
unfamiliar with the policies and situations at the municipal and district levels, and only 
six families expressed having a little knowledge from watching the news or talking to 
friends and relatives.  None had received such information from other actors like NGOs.  
Yet nearly 90 percent stressed the importance of learning about the policies and the 
educational opportunities available to their children.   
 
Factors Limiting the Impact of Civil Society  
Four key factors have shaped the involvement of these actors and limited their 
capacity to have a large-scale impact.  First, the lack of transparency in decision-making 
and the low level of state-civil society interaction in the policy area limit their influence, 
and, based on fieldwork, the municipal and district governments generally either 
disregard or tolerate their existence.  The obstacles civil society actors face – both in 
building relationships with key actors in the municipal and district governments and in 
improving the situations of migrant schools – illustrate the continued dominance of the 
government in determining the fate of migrant schools and their students. 
A second factor involves the level of interaction between the various actors.  Not 
only is state-civil society interaction low, but there is also limited collaboration amongst 
many civil society actors themselves, as well as between civil society actors and many 
migrant schools (see Table 7.8).  There is, for instance, little collaboration between the 
principals’ and teachers’ associations.  Moreover, interaction between academics and 
researchers and many migrant schools remains limited, and families with children in 
these schools often lack the channels to interact with actors like researchers, NGOs, and 
the media.  There are of course exceptions; for example, many of the researchers and 
NGOs involved regularly exchange information and ideas with each other.  Overall, 
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however, there is still a lack of interaction in key areas in which closer collaboration 
could more greatly benefit migrant schools and their students.  
Table 7.8  General Levels of Interaction between Key Actors Involved 
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⊕⊕ Close interaction 
⊕ Interaction 
⊗ Limited interaction 
⊗⊗ Very little to no interaction 
*These relationships can vary 
to an extent between districts. 
 
Municipal Government -- ⊕⊕ ⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ 
District Governments* ⊕⊕ -- ⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ 
Academics/Researchers ⊗ ⊗ -- ⊕⊕ ⊕ ⊕⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊗ ⊗ 
Independent Media ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊕⊕ -- ⊕ ⊕⊕ ⊕ ⊕⊕ ⊗ ⊕⊕ 
University Student 
Organizations ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊕ ⊕ -- ⊕⊕ ⊗⊗ ⊕ ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ 
NGOs  ⊗⊗ ⊗ ⊕⊕ ⊕⊕ ⊕⊕ -- ⊕ ⊕⊕ ⊕ ⊗ 
Migrant School 
Principals’ Association  ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊕ ⊕ ⊗⊗ ⊕ -- ⊗⊗ ⊗ ⊗⊗ 
Migrant School 
Teachers’ Association  ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊕ ⊕⊕ ⊕ ⊕⊕ ⊗⊗ -- ⊗ ⊗⊗ 
Migrant Parents  
(from migrant schools) ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊕ ⊗ ⊗ -- ⊗⊗ 
Migrant Parents  
(from public schools) ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊗ ⊕⊕ ⊗⊗ ⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊗⊗ -- 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2009-2010). 
 
This limited interaction is due in part to the existence of tensions between 
certain actors.  For example, the lack of collaboration between the principals’ and 
teachers’ associations stems largely from concerns among many principals that their 
teachers will acquire too much power and make demands that they are unable to meet.  
Such principals have therefore adopted a position in which they “do not oppose [the 
teachers’ association] but also do not support [it]” (XL1T1).  In addition, a common 
view, especially among academics and researchers and some NGOs, is that migrant 
school principals run their schools like businesses (see Chapter 3).  As L. Wang (2008, 
693) points out: “It is a matter of growing concern that many [migrant schools] are run 
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essentially for profit rather than to provide basic education services.”  This view – based 
primarily on the unconfirmed observation of many academics and researchers that these 
principals pocket a substantial amount of the money earned through tuition after paying 
teachers’ salaries and other expenses like rent – can then affect the views of government 
officials, who may consult these academics and researchers.  Indeed, the perception of 
migrant school principals as profit-seeking individuals was mentioned by the Haidian 
official interviewed but not by the Shijingshan and Fengtai officials, particularly 
interesting in light of the higher level of interaction between researchers and the Haidian 
district government (see Chapter 5).  While many principals continue to see building 
relationships with academics and researchers as an opportunity to help their schools, 
this perception has inhibited the establishment of close relationships between certain 
key academics and researchers and government actors on the one hand and migrant 
schools on the other.  All of this sheds additional light on the complex factors shaping 
civil society involvement in the area, with implications for the capacity of these actors 
to collaborate and generate larger change. 
Third, district policy approaches and reputations have an important impact on 
the work of civil society actors in the policy area.  This is most apparent when looking 
at Fengtai, where licensed and unlicensed migrant schools are relatively isolated, not 
only from each other, but also from migrant schools in other districts and actors like 
NGOs, researchers, and university student groups.  When asked whether or not they 
organize events or programs in Fengtai or about their knowledge of the district’s 
situation, several NGOs, researchers, and even migrant school principals and teachers 
from other districts simply responded by saying that Fengtai no longer has many 
migrant schools, often emphasizing that there were none in the district at one point in 
time.  In other words, Fengtai has been brushed aside by many, even though it had 
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roughly the same number of migrant schools as Shijingshan at the time of fieldwork.  
Interestingly, among the unlicensed schools visited in Haidian, Shijingshan, and Fengtai, 
the school with the most connections (e.g., with researchers, NGOs, and universities) 
was located in Shijingshan, the least controversial of the three districts.  Thus, district-
level situations and policy approaches can significantly affect where civil society actors 
focus their work, with consequences for the amount of external support migrant schools 
in the different districts receive.   
Further complicating the situation is that the amount of interaction between the 
district education commissions and civil society actors also varies.  Based on interviews, 
Shijingshan’s education commission has occasionally consulted academics and 
researchers, whose expertise can help guide and inform policy decisions, but it has 
seldom interacted with other actors like NGOs.  Despite some tensions with the local 
media, Haidian’s education commission has developed close relationships with 
academics and researchers and has sometimes interacted with NGOs; in collaboration 
with one organization, for example, the district created an association that provides 
teacher training for a number of licensed and unlicensed migrant schools.  In contrast, 
Fengtai’s education commission has had very little contact with civil society actors like 
researchers and NGOs.   
These differences affect the extent to which pressure from such actors is able to 
influence district-level decision-making.  Indeed, unlike those in Fengtai, the officials in 
Shijingshan and especially Haidian expressed sometimes feeling pressure from the 
media, migrant school principals, and migrant parents.  As mentioned in Chapter 5, 
pressure from the media played a role in driving the Shijingshan education 
commission’s prompt response when the sudden closure of a migrant school by its 
principal left about 170 students without a school to attend.  In Haidian, pressure from 
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actors like the media and NGOs affected the education commission’s decision in 2006 
to allow schools it had tried to shut down to continue operation.  Though such 
occurrences have been relatively isolated and infrequent, they provide further evidence 
of the complex relationship between civil society involvement and district-level 
dynamics. 
A fourth factor affecting the work of many of these actors is related to location 
and distance.  As previously shown, the reality is that most NGOs in this area are 
located in Chaoyang and Changping, while many universities and research institutions 
are concentrated in Haidian and Chaoyang.  Distance has then become an additional 
factor limiting the number of civil society actors working with schools in particular 
districts. 
 
The Limited Impact of Civil Society and  
Continued Feelings of Exclusion among Principals, Teachers, and Families 
The above findings illustrate the complexity of civil society involvement in 
migrant children’s education in Beijing and have important implications for migrant 
schools and their students at both the municipal and district levels.  At the municipal 
level, evidence shows that there remain strong feelings of social exclusion among 
migrant school principals and teachers and families with children attending migrant 
schools, demonstrating not only that they do not receive much government support but 
that their situations have also not been significantly improved by civil society.  
Interviewees expressed feeling an overall lack of support and subsequently power to 
generate larger change (see Table 7.9). 
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Table 7.9  Continued Evidence of Exclusion: Views of Principals, Teachers, and 
Families in the Sample 
Migrant 
School 
Principals 
A Lack of Support and Action from the Government:  
 As one principal stated: “We principals are all tired.…  Beijing is 
doing subtraction.  That is, the number of migrant schools can only 
decrease and must not increase” (HL1P1). 
 According to one principal: “We have brought [many issues like 
teachers’ insurance] to the attention of the municipal education 
commission, as well as district education commission leaders.…  
You could say we have talked about the issues with officials at large 
meetings and small meetings.…  They don’t respond.  They say the 
problem[s] cannot be resolved.  We want to improve our teachers’ 
well-being and at least protect their livelihood.  But we cannot do it.  
We are powerless.  We aren’t able to do it.  Looking at the response 
of the government departments, what can we do?” (YL1P1).  
 One principal stated that he was familiar with the central and Beijing 
municipal policies but added: “Whether or not I’m familiar with 
them, what difference does it make?” (SU1P1). 
Feelings of Exclusion among Unlicensed Schools: 
 As one principal asserted: “We are a school that is not recognized by 
the education commission, that doesn’t have a license.  So we cannot 
get any financial assistance from society” (HU2P1). 
 When asked about the school’s lack of relationships with civil society 
actors, one principal simply said: “Schools without licenses are like 
children without hukou [hei hukou haizi]” (XU1P1).  
Migrant 
School 
Teachers 
A Lack of Support from the Government and Civil Society: 
 When asked about her interaction with actors like the district 
education commission or NGOs, one teacher said that she had never 
had any contact with government actors and had only occasionally 
interacted with a few NGOs, comparing migrant workers like herself 
to “people living in a crevice” (shenghuo zai jiafeng de ren) 
(SU2T3).  
 The following was translated from a quote made by a teacher in a 
2009 issue of the migrant school teachers’ association’s newspaper: 
“When [one migrant school was recently] demolished, the teachers 
did not get any compensation or assistance in finding another job.  
This reminds me of my own previous experience.  When the school 
[where I was teaching] was demolished, the principal was 
overwrought, and no one asked about where the teachers would go.  
We could only look for a way out by ourselves.  Demolition was 
inevitable, the school was powerless, and we migrant school teachers 
were even more of a disadvantaged group.  Who is to blame?  Who 
will resolve this?  It’s all empty talk.  Real implementation requires 
more time.  Our basic needs of clothing, food, housing, and transport 
for one day are inevitably linked to money.  Don’t wait, don’t ask, 
don’t delay.  We can only rely on ourselves.” 
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Migrant 
Families 
A Lack of Interaction with and Support from the Government: 
 When asked if they interacted with or received support from local 
government actors like the education commission, street office, or 
neighborhood committee, one parent quickly said: “No.”  Her 
daughter immediately chimed in saying: “We’re outsiders [waidi 
ren]” (FU2F1).  
A Lack of Channels to Acquire Information: 
 As one parent expressed, learning about the policies is very important 
because they want to “help their children find a way out [zhao 
chulu].”  The problem is that they do not have any opportunities to 
learn about the policy situation, and their school has not given them 
any relevant information about their children’s options (SU2F3).  
A Lack of Voice: 
 One parent expressed that understanding the policies is not that 
important because he is a migrant worker and any views he might 
raise would just be treated as “empty talk” (konghua) (SU2F1).  
Feelings of Social Exclusion: 
 As one parent summarized, the situation is “unfair,” as their children 
cannot get into “the good schools.”  As migrants, they “lack the 
conditions to compete with Beijing children” (SU2F3).  
 As one interviewee stated: “I have lived in Beijing for 30 years, and I 
haven’t even been integrated into society.  When I live in the city 
areas I am uncomfortable, but when I come [to this village] I feel 
comfortable.  I have been here for 30 years, my home is here.…  But 
it’s still difficult for me to become integrated.  To hope that migrant 
workers become integrated into society as soon as they come is a 
joke.  How can we be integrated?  We don’t have the conditions.  
Even if we were integrated, we would still be living in places like 
basements [dixia shi].  There is a lot of discrimination” (SOC1S1). 
 
At the same time, while difficult to measure given the problems concerning data 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, evidence shows that the level of exclusion experienced 
by principals, teachers, and families also differs across districts.  For migrant schools 
themselves, the limited interaction with and support from actors like researchers and 
NGOs can vary across districts.  The lack of training opportunities and insurance for 
migrant school teachers, as well as the lack of opportunities to engage with and learn 
from public school teachers, can vary between districts as well.  And although the lack 
of interaction between migrant school students and their public school counterparts is 
largely a general trend – and feelings of discrimination and unequal treatment were 
reflected by most families in the sample – migrant schools that are better connected are 
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more likely to have opportunities for such interaction, which means schools in districts 
like Chaoyang and Haidian.  Furthermore, the lack of channels through which migrant 
parents receive support and information about their children’s educational options is 
also a general trend, but the tendency for actors like NGOs to work in particular areas 
does exclude migrant communities in certain districts, the best example being those in 
Fengtai.  Such trends have implications for the extent to which migrant parents lack a 
voice.  For example, even though those involved in recent petitions and rallies were 
parents of migrant children attending public schools, the fact that they were 
predominantly from Haidian indicates that there are differences between the districts. 
Ultimately, there was a general feeling among migrant school principals and 
teachers in the sample that the municipal and district governments are focused more on 
issues of safety and public security than improving the schools and that civil society 
actors therefore lack the power to generate broader change.  As a result, a growing sense 
of disillusionment and hopelessness has emerged among a proportion of these principals 
and teachers.  Some, for instance, expressed that research and media coverage on the 
subject are essentially useless and will not lead to positive change for their schools or 
the larger problems of migrant children (see Table 7.10).   
 Table 7.10 A Growing Sense of Hopelessness: Views of Some Principals and 
Teachers in the Sample 
Examples 
 “The difficulties we face cannot be resolved.…  The issue should be resolved by 
society but they haven’t done anything” (HU4P1). 
 “Many [researchers] and many reporters come, but what can you all accomplish, 
what can you do for [migrant children and migrant schools]?” (SU3P1).  
 “Talking [about the problems migrant school teachers face] is of no use.…  There is 
no point.…  [Understanding the policies] is useless.…  The problems cannot be 
resolved.  Who would be willing to give money to a migrant school?” (HL2T1). 
 “Doing research and asking us questions cannot resolve any of our problems” 
(SU4T2).  
 
201 
Despite the above, it is vital not to discount the work of civil society, including 
the important impact it can have on specific migrant schools or communities, and there 
are reasons to remain hopeful about its future role.  Civil society actors have, thus far, 
played a critical part in bringing more attention to migrant children’s education in 
Beijing.  Their impact on the heightened visibility of migrant schools since the mid-
1990s – evidenced, for instance, by increased international media coverage – is 
especially noteworthy.  Many have also begun developing more innovative ways to 
assist migrant children that have gradually expanded the scope of civil society 
involvement in the policy area (the sponsoring of the creation of a few non-
governmental migrant schools by a local foundation being an example).   
 
Towards a More Comprehensive Understanding of the  
Policy Environment Surrounding Migrant Children’s Education in Beijing 
There is “enormous diversity in how [civil society] is understood and manifested 
in different contexts around the world” (Malena and Heinrich 2007, 339).  The role and 
impact of civil society actors can therefore vary considerably across different settings 
and policy areas (Edwards, Hulme, and Wallace 1999, 130; Malena and Heinrich 2007, 
341).  In the realm of migrant children’s education in Beijing, the increased 
involvement of civil society is notable given the overall lack of government and policy 
support for migrant schools and their students.  These actors do work that is of symbolic 
and political importance; that is, by working in an area such as migrant children’s 
education, they highlight the potential limitations of government authority and the 
possibilities for broader socio-political reform (see Howell 2003, 208).   
This chapter shows, however, that, despite their initial role in bringing migrant 
children’s education to the attention of the government and society, civil society actors 
in Beijing have been unable to have a large-scale impact in the policy area.  This is due 
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in large part to the low level of government support for their work and limited state-civil 
society interaction, which, as established earlier in the chapter, is an integral factor 
shaping the impact of civil society on welfare provision in China.  Based on fieldwork, 
the Beijing municipal and district governments have not taken discernible steps to 
control or absorb the civil society actors discussed above or given them extensive 
support or recognition.  Instead, they have primarily tolerated those actors that have 
refrained from openly opposing government objectives (including university student 
groups and most of the NGOs involved) and ignored those that lack government 
authorization and are seen as a potential threat to policy goals (mainly the principals’ 
and teachers’ associations and parent activists).  While coverage of key developments 
and problems by independent and state-run media has put pressure on local government 
actors on certain occasions, the capacity of the media to stimulate broader policy change 
is still low.  Academics and researchers are best-positioned to bring about larger change 
in the area, but their overall level of interaction with the government has somewhat 
declined since the early to mid-2000s, and their impact remains unclear.  In other words, 
in spite of their increased involvement since the mid- to late 1990s, civil society actors 
have not been able to play a substantial role in the policy process, providing a 
counterexample to the findings of Teets (2008, 3), who argues:  
Through the ability of these [civil society] organizations to transmit credible information to 
local government about societal interests and to transmit information to society and higher 
levels of government about local officials’ reputation and behavior, they facilitate more 
pluralism and accountability in the policy process at the local level.  
What’s more, a deeper exploration indicates that the role and impact of these actors 
have also been influenced by district-level dynamics, with consequences for the amount 
of attention and support migrant schools in different districts receive.   
The above exploration illustrates the complex, political nature of the policy 
environment surrounding migrant children’s education in Beijing.  Given that the policy 
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area has been closely linked to issues concerning migration and labor – an area of 
welfare provision in which civil society actors like NGOs have often had little policy 
impact (Cheng, Ngok, and Zhuang 2010) – it is perhaps not surprising that the actors 
discussed above have been unable to acquire much influence in the local policy process.  
This analysis provides an example of a case in which the role and impact of civil society 
actors involved in welfare provision are significantly shaped by the extent to which they 
are seen by the local government as representing issues that might provoke social 
instability, consistent with the arguments raised by Howell (2007, 19) and Cheng, Ngok, 
and Zhuang (2010, pp. 1089-1090, 1104).  These findings therefore strengthen the 
understanding of policy implementation in the area, including which actors are included 
or excluded and why, and shed further light on the range of factors affecting the 
situations of migrant schools and their students at the municipal and district levels, with 
subsequent implications for patterns of exclusion.   
Ultimately, while the lack of substantial government support for the work of the 
civil society actors discussed has had serious consequences for the role they are able to 
play, the increased involvement of civil society in what continues to be seen as a 
delicate policy area is, in itself, a significant indicator of the potential for larger change.  
Based on the findings discussed above and in previous chapters, the next and final 
chapter proposes ways in which both the government and civil society can work 
towards improving the situations of migrant schools and their students and highlights 
the importance of adopting a more collaborative approach.   
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CHAPTER 8 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF  
MIGRANT CHILDREN’S EDUCATION IN BEIJING 
 
 
 
As emphasized throughout this thesis, migrant schools remain a crucial source of 
education for migrant children in the capital city.  In light of the Beijing municipal and 
district policy approaches discussed, including recent rounds of demolition and efforts 
to close unlicensed migrant schools, the level of government and societal support these 
schools receive is, now more than ever, a subject of critical importance.  As the number 
of migrant families grows, the extent to which migrant children still face barriers in 
attaining basic education will have enormous consequences for the continued social 
exclusion of this segment of society.  This final chapter summarizes the key findings 
and implications of the study, discusses why it is both necessary and beneficial for the 
government to take immediate action, and provides a list of policy and program 
recommendations and suggestions for future research. 
 
The Complexities of Policy Implementation and  
Implications for Trends in Social Stratification 
As previously discussed, studies often emphasize the predominant role of the 
hukou system when accounting for the educational problems of migrant children in 
China.  However, central-level policy changes, as well as developments in cities like 
Shanghai, indicate that it is possible to challenge the impact of institutional barriers on 
the social exclusion of migrant children and the situations of migrant schools, even in 
cities with large migrant populations.  In other words, the hukou system, while 
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fundamentally important, must be considered alongside the complex effects of 
decentralization and local context.   
The empirical findings of this study can be summarized as follows.  Chapter 4 
shows that, whereas central policies on migrant children’s education have called for the 
increased management of and support for migrant schools, the Beijing municipal 
government has largely omitted the latter from its policies, primarily due to concerns 
about population growth and social instability.  Using Shijingshan, Fengtai, and Haidian 
districts as cases, Chapter 5 illustrates that policy implementation has been made more 
complicated due to district-level variations.  Based on the three trajectories identified, 
there are significant differences between what district governments, and district 
education commissions in particular, view as the main issue at hand, including the level 
of importance or urgency attached to it, and the approaches adopted in response.  
Though the district officials interviewed each conveyed a desire to ensure that migrant 
children receive compulsory education, the complex, political nature of educational 
provision for this group has meant that some districts are better able or equipped – or 
sometimes more willing – to address the issue than others.  The approaches adopted 
have been influenced by social, demographic, economic, and political factors, including 
the size of the district and its migrant population, the number of migrant schools, the 
district’s financial situation, other policy interests and priorities, and external pressures 
from actors like the media.  The factors that have been most instrumental in driving 
each district’s approach also vary, signifying that implementation does not operate in a 
systematic manner.   
Not only do these findings demonstrate the degree of flexibility given to district 
governments in the implementation process, but they also have implications for the 
situations of migrant schools and their students.  Chapter 6 shows that decentralization 
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has led to a gap between central-level policy ideals and the local reality in Beijing and 
that the situations of migrant schools in the city continue to be shaped by four key 
problem areas: a general lack of resources and poor physical conditions, a low quality of 
teaching, instability, and difficulties acquiring licenses.  Evidence indicates that the 
municipal and district-level approaches have had a critical impact on the survival and 
development of migrant schools in these four areas.  Only when both levels are 
considered can one begin to more fully understand the situations of these schools and 
their students.   
In addition, these policy approaches affect migrant schools indirectly, through 
civil society.  Given the policy environment in Beijing, the increased involvement of 
civil society actors is a significant development.  However, Chapter 7 illustrates that the 
capacity of these actors to generate larger policy change remains, on the whole, low.  
Most NGOs and university student organizations focus on providing services to migrant 
schools and migrant children directly, often on a small scale due to limited resources, 
and have lacked strong channels to interact with the government.  The principals’ and 
teachers’ associations and parent activists are seen as potential threats to policy goals 
and have generally been ignored by the government.  Though independent and state-run 
media frequently report on major policy decisions and developments, their capacity to 
stimulate change has been inconsistent, shedding light on the sometimes unpredictable 
nature of the decision-making process.  Academics and researchers are best positioned 
to influence policy, but their overall level of interaction with government actors in the 
area has somewhat declined since the early to mid-2000s, and their impact on the policy 
process remains unclear.  Limited collaboration amongst these various sets of actors has 
further inhibited the ability of civil society to generate policy change.  What’s more, 
district-level situations and policy approaches have influenced where these actors work, 
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and the extent to which district governments interact with and support them has affected 
their capacity to assist migrant schools and their students.  Ultimately, the municipal 
and district governments retain control of the policy process, with minimal external 
interference, and there has emerged a fundamental divide between the actors officially 
responsible for migrant children’s education (local governments and public schools) on 
the one hand, and the intended beneficiaries (migrant children and migrant schools) and 
civil society on the other.  
The outcomes of decentralized decision-making – and the reasons behind them – 
can be far from straightforward, and these findings demonstrate that the case of migrant 
children’s education in Beijing is no exception.  Drawing on the broader literatures on 
policy processes and decentralization, as well as literature on policy processes, 
migration, urbanization, and educational inequality in China, this analysis contributes a 
more nuanced understanding of the process by which policies in the area are 
implemented.  It shows that failing to analyze this process, including the roles of policy 
history and local context, would lead to an incomplete understanding of the diversity of 
factors affecting migrant schools and their students and subsequently patterns of social 
exclusion.  Though knowledge of the precise motives driving policy implementation is 
limited by the lack of transparent decision-making, these findings illustrate that 
implementation in this area is far from administrative in nature and is influenced by 
social, economic, and political considerations at the municipal and district levels, with 
direct consequences for migrant children’s education.  Thus, this study not only makes a 
valuable contribution to the conceptualization of policy processes in an urban Chinese 
context, but it also sheds light on the potential long-term effects of decentralization and 
differential policy implementation on trends in social stratification. 
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Towards Increased Social Stratification and Social Instability:  
The Costs of Inaction for Government and Society 
In light of the continued demand for migrant schools in Beijing and the absence 
of accessible alternatives, the lack of support and assistance to these schools will have 
serious implications for the educational opportunities available to migrant children and, 
subsequently, their growth and development.  As previously established, however, many 
municipal and district officials in Beijing still view migrant children’s education as a 
delicate policy area with consequences for population growth and social stability.  This 
constitutes a serious obstacle to reform, and adopting change will be challenging to say 
the least.  Yet educational provision for migrant children in Beijing has become an 
increasingly pressing issue, especially given recent demolitions and closures of migrant 
schools.  Based on fieldwork, this section highlights three reasons why it is in the best 
interests of the central, Beijing municipal, and district governments not to allow the 
current situation in Beijing to persist.   
First, if the demolition and shutting down of migrant schools in Beijing continue 
at the current rate, more and more migrant children will be left without schools to attend 
in the city.  Recent events indicate that it is unlikely that all, or even a majority, of the 
migrant children involved will be placed into public schools.  Instead, many will have to 
return to their “hometowns” for further schooling.  Though the exact proportion is 
unknown, estimates made by researchers and migrant school principals suggest that the 
situation is increasingly severe.  For example, as was discussed in Chapter 6, following 
the demolition and closures of 13 migrant schools in Haidian and Chaoyang districts in 
2011, it was estimated that a substantial number of children may have been unable to 
find new schools to attend and returned to their hometowns.  While this technically 
increases the percentage of migrant children attending public schools in Beijing, it is 
only because a proportion of the city’s migrant children have had to leave.   
209 
It may frequently be the case that, when migrant children return to their 
hometowns for further schooling, at least one parent stays in the city to support the 
family.  Any rise in the number of migrant children going back to their hometowns 
without their parents should be concerning for the Chinese government given the 
problems “left-behind” children typically face (see Chapter 2).1  As previously 
discussed, a growing percentage of migrant children are born and/or raised in cities and 
have not spent substantial periods of time living in rural areas.  Upon their return, many 
are left under the care of grandparents or other relatives and lack emotional and 
psychological support.  As a result, they may develop feelings of depression, anxiety, 
anger, and low self-confidence, all of which can affect their academic performance and 
growth and development.  Moreover, the curricula used by migrant schools and schools 
in their hometowns can sometimes differ, which can lead to a decline in student 
performance and subsequently self-esteem (see Lu 2007; China Labour Bulletin 2008).  
If the current situation in Beijing persists, migrant children who are unable to enroll in a 
migrant or public school upon reaching school age may have to return to their 
hometowns at an even earlier age and could be denied a chance for a better education 
and a childhood with their parents by their sides.  The potential consequences are severe; 
for example, as emphasized by China Labour Bulletin (2008), left-behind children are 
more vulnerable to commit or become victims of crimes.   
Second, if the current situation persists, migrant children who stay in Beijing are 
likely to face a range of difficulties that will ultimately create more problems for the 
municipal and district governments.  Children who are unable to enroll in public schools 
may keep bouncing from one migrant school to another as the government continues 
                                                     
1
 The problems of left-behind children have been attracting increasing government attention.  In 2007, 
for instance, the All-China Women’s Federation, the Ministry of Education, and several other 
departments in the central government initiated the “Same Sky” campaign, a major part of which involved 
creating a network of support for these children (Wang 2007). 
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demolishing and shutting them down, with major consequences for the quality and 
stability of the education received.  These children may end up entering the workforce 
after middle school or even earlier, contributing to a growing proportion of poorly 
educated, low-skilled migrant workers in the city.2  This will have implications for 
societal development that the government will not be able to ignore.  Not only would it 
negatively affect the migrant population itself, but it could also perpetuate or intensify 
trends in social stratification and exclusion, increase existing rural-urban disparities, and 
affect crime rates and social stability, the third of which has been a top concern driving 
the attitudes and approaches of the Beijing municipal and district governments towards 
migrant children’s education in the first place.  For the central government, continuing 
down the current path in Beijing would, by jeopardizing the growth and development of 
current and future generations of migrants, be detrimental to central-level efforts to 
reduce rural-urban inequalities, not to mention the building of a “harmonious society.” 
Third, migrant workers, who make up a significant proportion of Beijing’s 
population, take on a range of necessary jobs that local residents do not want – those 
typically referred to as “dirty, tiring, arduous, and dangerous” (zang lei ku xian) (HL1P1) 
– and make a critical contribution to the capital’s economy.  And, as pointed out by 
many during fieldwork, the city’s pursuit of urbanization, involving the rapid 
construction of new office and apartment buildings after the demolition of migrant 
enclaves, would not be possible without the use of migrant labor.  But the current policy 
environment concerning their children’s education could, if left unchanged, influence 
their decisions to stay in Beijing, particularly when other cities, including Shanghai, 
have been more supportive.  It could also lower the incentives for migrant workers with 
children to migrate to Beijing in the future (or lead to a higher proportion of migrant 
                                                     
2
 As mentioned in Chapter 6, it is often the better performing students who return to their hometowns 
for high school.   
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workers in Beijing who leave their children behind).  Thus, in the long run, it is in the 
best interests of the central, Beijing municipal, and district governments to ensure that 
the capital city does not continue down a path that threatens the existence of migrant 
schools and the education and growth and development of migrant children.   
 
Policy and Program Recommendations 
This study demonstrates that the Beijing municipal and district governments 
have fallen short of meeting the basic objectives stated in central policies and the basic 
needs of migrant children in migrant schools.  There is an urgent need for formal policy 
change, with a focus on how the municipal and district governments and civil society 
can work towards meeting these needs and objectives.  Before moving on, a few points 
should be emphasized.  First, given the complexity surrounding the problems discussed, 
it would be naïve to expect any change overnight.  As Hannum (1999, 193) reminds us, 
trying to balance economic and societal objectives is a particularly difficult policy 
problem for developing countries, China being no exception.  Second, there is no single 
solution to the problems discussed.  A range of local factors and constraints can 
influence how the municipal and district governments view and approach migrant 
children’s education.  It is necessary to target any general proposals towards the 
particular context in which they are to be implemented; this requires innovative 
approaches including, for example, involvement from important local stakeholders and 
the mobilization of resources, and these approaches can be tested through pilot 
programs.  As one researcher maintained, any solution should involve the use of 
“multiple levels, multiple channels, and multiple models” (GR1).  The following is a list 
of recommendations based on the study’s findings, with the ultimate goal of improving 
educational opportunities for migrant children in Beijing.  
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1) Clearer Standards for Policy Implementation 
Since the municipal and district governments continue to determine the fates of 
migrant schools in Beijing, it is useful to start with recommendations concerning policy 
implementation.  This thesis illustrates that the policy of “two priorities,” while a 
significant step forward, has given the Beijing municipal government the freedom to 
interpret central policies based on its views and concerns about population growth and 
social instability and district governments the flexibility to implement central and 
municipal policies based on local circumstances.  With decentralization in the delivery 
of services in China extending back to the 1980s (Davis 1989), it is uncertain whether 
the central government will create more specific guidelines for local governments in this 
area, especially in light of the differences between the pace and scale of reforms across 
localities.  It is therefore necessary in the immediate future to identify steps that can be 
adopted at the municipal and district levels. 
• More Specific Guidelines for Implementation: Ultimately, there needs to be a 
clearer baseline for districts to follow.  Beijing municipal policies are – not 
unlike their central-level counterparts – too vague in terms of the standards set 
and the language used, allowing districts to further diverge from central-level 
aspirations.  Municipal policies should more strictly adhere to the principles and 
standards in central policies, particularly those regarding migrant schools.  Once 
clearer guidelines are in place, the municipal government should enforce the 
standards and collaborate with the districts in their work.  District governments 
should then set clearer guidelines for actors at the sub-district level (e.g., street 
offices, neighborhood committees, and police stations).   
Necessary Conditions: To achieve better, more standardized implementation at 
the district level, the first step needs to be taken by the municipal government.  This 
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would greatly enhance the capacity to hold district governments accountable.  However, 
given the current policy environment in Beijing, it would be naïve to expect any sudden 
change.  There will need to be a greater recognition of the incentives discussed above 
and a change in the attitudes towards migrant children’s education among influential 
municipal officials.  Pressure from central-level leaders could be a potential stimulus for 
such change, though the likelihood of sustained pressure from the central government is 
unclear. 
 
2) Increased Support for Migrant Schools and Monitoring of Public Schools 
While the dual focus on the role of local governments and public schools is both 
pragmatic and necessary, a range of obstacles still prevent many migrant children from 
attending Beijing’s public schools, and migrant schools remain a critical source of 
education for these children.  It is therefore necessary to focus on both eliminating the 
barriers to public school education and improving the quality of migrant schools (see 
also Lu and Zhang 2004, 80-82; X. Wang 2008, 145-146).  Given the lack of an official, 
comprehensive list of migrant schools in Beijing and the high mobility of the schools, 
ensuring the inclusion of all migrant schools will be challenging.  The effort should be 
made to bring together existing lists and information compiled by the district education 
commissions, researchers, NGOs, and principals, and this information should be 
regularly updated based on demolitions and closures. 
• Management, Guidance, and Support for Migrant Schools: Since it is unlikely 
that all migrant children will be absorbed into Beijing’s public school system in 
the near future, the remaining migrant schools are valuable entities.  More 
concerted efforts to improve the quality of these schools and their capacity to 
serve migrant children should be made in the immediate term, with the longer-
term goal of ensuring that migrant children are more fully integrated into the 
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public school system or a system of public schools and government-subsidized 
migrant schools similar to that in Shanghai.   
o Management and Guidance: The municipal and district governments’ 
“management” of migrant schools is currently focused more on safety 
concerns than the goal of improving the quality of the schools.  While the 
focus on safety is certainly important and necessary, there is also an urgent 
need for more standardized management and guidance in areas like teaching 
so that the way these schools are run is not determined solely by individual 
principals, some of whom may lack adequate training and experience.  
o Support: The municipal and district governments should increase their 
support for licensed and unlicensed migrant schools, particularly in terms of 
financial assistance and efforts to improve the quality of teaching (as in 
Shanghai).  After demolition, migrant schools should be given assistance in 
finding new locations, teachers should be given more concrete support, and 
the allocation of students should be more systematic and transparent.   
• Closer Monitoring of Public Schools: Public schools in Beijing have had a 
substantial amount of freedom in determining the entrance requirements for 
migrant children, and the few standards that exist (e.g., the elimination of 
various fees) have often not been adequately enforced.  The municipal and 
district governments should create a system of checks and balances to ensure 
that fees are not charged and that the number of documents required is both 
consistent and reasonable.  
Necessary Conditions: The process by which migrant schools are improved and 
barriers to enrollment in public schools are eliminated will be gradual.  In order for 
these recommendations to be achieved, the guidelines should be explicitly defined in 
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municipal policies so that districts have a clear set of standards to follow.  The 
municipal government should also increase its share of the responsibility to eliminate 
disparities between districts in terms of the levels of assistance given to migrant schools. 
 
3) Increased Support for Migrant School Teachers  
At the Fifth High-Level Group Meeting on Education for All in November 2005, 
Premier Wen Jiabao asserted:  
[W]e are strengthening the ranks of teachers.  In China, respecting teachers is a traditional 
virtue.  The nearly 10 million primary school teachers in this country are held in high 
esteem for their contributions to education.  We have all along given major importance to 
setting up a sound teacher’s training system, and we have never stopped improving 
teachers’ working and living conditions.  In our rural areas and least developed regions, 
most teachers are on a government payroll. (Wen 2005) 
Migrant school teachers in Beijing, however, continue to receive low salaries, and most 
do not have insurance.  In addition, though some migrant schools receive teacher 
training from their district education commission or NGOs, many still lack regular 
opportunities for training.  The result has been a high proportion of poorly qualified 
teachers and high levels of teacher turnover, with consequences for the quality of 
education provided (see Lu and Zhang 2004, 75; Kwong 2006, 172).   
• Training: Lu and Zhang (2004, 82) suggest the establishment of “[s]pecific 
qualification requirements and assessment standards … for the school operators 
and a system of regular performance assessments for the teachers.”  To increase 
the likelihood that such requirements will be met, standardized trainings should 
be provided to all migrant school principals and teachers on a regular basis.  
These trainings should be the responsibility of the municipal and district 
education commissions and should involve teaching methods, curriculum, 
information about policies, and opportunities to exchange information and 
knowledge with public school principals and teachers.  Licensed and unlicensed 
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migrant schools across the districts should be included, so as not to widen the 
gap among migrant schools.   
• Subsidized Salaries and Insurance: The Beijing municipal government should 
subsidize migrant school teachers’ salaries, as has been done in Shanghai.  
Higher salaries and better treatment for these teachers would help the schools 
attract better quality teachers and lower teacher turnover.   
Necessary Conditions: Migrant school teachers have not been given adequate 
attention in the Beijing municipal and district policies.  If the quality of education at 
migrant schools is to be improved, municipal policies should introduce targeted 
measures to improve the teaching ability and treatment of these teachers. 
 
4) Increased State-Civil Society Collaboration  
While migrant children’s education is primarily the responsibility of the 
government, the potential contribution of civil society should not be overlooked.  The 
situation in Beijing calls for a more collaborative approach, in which the government 
should take advantage of the local knowledge, networks, and skills different sets of 
actors have to offer.  
• Greater Collaboration between Government and Civil Society: Improving the 
situations of migrant schools requires cooperation between the municipal and 
district governments and civil society.  This would enhance the capacity of 
actors like NGOs to assist migrant schools and would bring about a much 
needed change in the implementation process.  In building these relationships, 
the government and civil society should ensure that licensed and unlicensed 
migrant schools across the districts, including the more peripheral and poorer 
ones, receive appropriate levels of attention and support.   
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Necessary Conditions: In light of the current policy environment, these 
relationships will require time to build.  The effort can start with academics and 
researchers, who are best positioned to influence policy and can serve as a key link 
between the various actors.  Here, the continued perception of migrant school principals 
as profit-seeking individuals remains an obstacle, but the hope is that, with regular 
principal training and more systematic management of migrant schools by district 
governments, this will become less and less of a barrier.  Ultimately, the municipal and 
district governments should see building these relationships as beneficial, as a way to 
increase their outreach and reputation and as a channel through which they can lessen 
their own burden, since civil society can be a source of additional resources (e.g., 
knowledge, manpower, and funding).  For civil society actors, these relationships would 
boost their legitimacy, as well as enhance their understanding of the policy process and 
subsequently their capacity to generate larger change. 
 
5) More Systematic Dissemination of Information 
The channels through which migrant workers with children in migrant schools 
can get information about their children’s educational rights and options are limited.  
This has resulted in a general lack of knowledge and clarity about relevant policies and 
public school entrance requirements.   
• Disseminating Information to Migrant School Teachers and Parents: To 
ensure that parents receive the necessary information and support, increased 
interaction between civil society, migrant school teachers, and parents is 
required.  NGOs could, for example, create a simple publication for parents with 
summaries of relevant policies, information about NGO services and events, and 
a directory of nearby schools.  This could potentially be done in collaboration 
with the migrant school teachers’ association, which has publications of its own.  
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In cases where a publication may not be appropriate (e.g., for parents who are 
illiterate), NGO staff and volunteers could regularly visit migrant schools and 
communities to talk to teachers and parents about these topics.  Again, efforts 
should be made to include licensed and unlicensed schools across the districts. 
Necessary Conditions: The successful dissemination of information requires 
the civil society actors involved to first familiarize themselves with the policies.  As 
discussed in Chapter 7, many of these individuals lack a strong understanding of the 
local policies and situations, particularly at the district level.  Appropriate channels 
should therefore be created.  Academics and researchers generally have the greatest 
knowledge of the policies among these actors, though many are still unfamiliar with 
district-level dynamics.  The first step would be for them to enhance their knowledge of 
the municipal and district-level situations and share the information with actors like 
NGOs.   
 
6) Clearer Allocation and Use of Funding  
When it comes to government spending on migrant children’s education, two 
key problems have emerged.  First, financial disparities between districts have 
contributed to differences between policy approaches.  As Han (2009, 14) maintains: 
“At present the compulsory education finance system is mainly managed by the districts 
and counties, which has caused financial resources of compulsory education [to be] 
imbalanced.”  Second, a lack of transparency has greatly limited the knowledge of 
government expenditure in the area.   
• Increased Financial Support from the Municipal Government: Beijing 
municipal policies should more clearly spell out the distribution of financial 
responsibilities.  The municipal government should also increase its level of 
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financial support so that any constraints at the district level do not play such a 
large role in discouraging or restricting district governments in their work.3  
• Increased Spending on Migrant Schools: The municipal government’s promise 
of new desks, chairs, podiums, and lights (sanxin yiliang) only applies to 
licensed migrant schools, and the supplies that migrant schools receive from 
public schools are often inadequate (see Chapters 4 and 6).  For the quality of 
these schools to be improved, increased government spending is needed.  In 
addition, the current subsidy for students attending licensed migrant schools in 
Beijing is negligible, especially since most of the city’s migrant schools are 
unlicensed.  The municipal government should, in line with the Compulsory 
Education Law, ensure that all migrant school students are not required to pay 
tuition.  Eliminating tuition for these children would ultimately also increase the 
financial capacity of their parents to support their post-middle school education.   
Necessary Conditions: Given the lack of access to data concerning financial 
expenditure on migrant children’s education, these recommendations will be difficult to 
achieve.  Those best positioned to acquire the information to begin identifying areas for 
reform are researchers in universities or institutes that have close working relationships 
with the relevant government departments.  Areas in which further research would be 
especially beneficial include: trends in the use of educational funds on migrant schools 
relative to public schools; how the allocation of resources is determined and the impact 
on migrant schools in different districts; and the division of responsibilities and how, if 
at all, it is enforced. 
 
                                                     
3
 X. Wang (2008, 145), for example, suggests creating local systems of shared financial 
responsibility for migrant children’s education. 
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Future Research 
This study sheds important light on the growing urgency surrounding 
educational provision for migrant children in the capital city.  Still, despite the increased 
attention towards migrant children’s education from those within China and abroad, it 
remains an understudied topic, and there is much room for further study.  Future 
research can include a larger-scale comparison of the demolition and shutting down of 
migrant schools across districts in Beijing (including the extent to which schools are 
being closed and the approaches adopted towards the students and teachers).  More 
research can also be done on migrant children’s post-primary school education in 
different districts (e.g., the extent to which children receiving their primary school 
education in migrant schools are able to enroll in public middle schools).  A stronger 
knowledge of both would help in identifying more targeted measures to improve 
educational opportunities for migrant children in Beijing. 
Since policy processes are context-specific, this study’s findings cannot 
necessarily be applied to other cities.  A natural next step would be to conduct similar 
studies in other cities with large migrant populations.  For example, similar research in 
Shanghai would shed light on the extent to which recent steps taken by the municipal 
government have been translated at the district level.  Such research could also be 
conducted in cities like Wuhan and Xiamen to determine whether or not differential 
policy implementation affects cities with smaller migrant populations at a comparable 
level.   
Additionally, the questions raised by this study can be extended to other policy 
areas like healthcare and housing.  As discussed in Chapter 2, central-level leaders 
encouraged a shift towards the more positive treatment of migrant workers in the early 
2000s.  And there was, to an extent, a greater acceptance of migrant workers and a 
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willingness to recognize their contributions to society and economic growth throughout 
much of the decade.  Yet there is reason to suspect that this trend may be approaching 
its limits, at least in some localities.  The findings of this study and recent developments 
in Beijing suggest the reemergence (or perhaps intensification) of concerns about the 
potential threat of the increasing inflow of migrant workers to local living standards and 
the provision of services.  As migrant workers and their families continue to increase as 
a percentage of local populations in cities like Beijing, the general sense of growing 
economic difficulties and increasing competition for services and the benefits of 
economic growth may become more and more of an issue.  Further research is required.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
CODING OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
 
Migrant School Interviewees: Guide for Coding 
 
Category Code 
District 
Haidian H 
Shijingshan S 
Fengtai F 
Chaoyang Y 
Changping P 
Daxing X 
Type of School 
Licensed L + # 
Unlicensed U + # 
Public P + # 
Interviewee 
Principal P + # 
Teacher T + # 
Family F + # 
 
 
List of Migrant School Principals in the Sample 
 
Code District Legal Status 
HL1P1 Haidian Licensed (Unlicensed branch) 
HL1P2 Haidian Licensed (Unlicensed branch) 
HL1P3 Haidian Licensed (Unlicensed branch) 
HL2P1 Haidian Licensed 
HU1P1 Haidian Unlicensed 
HU2P1 Haidian Unlicensed 
HU3P1 Haidian Unlicensed 
HU4P1 Haidian Unlicensed 
SL1P1 Shijingshan Licensed 
SL2P1 Shijingshan Licensed 
SL3P1 Shijingshan Licensed 
SU1P1 Shijingshan Unlicensed 
SU2P1 Shijingshan Unlicensed 
SU3P1 Shijingshan Unlicensed 
SU4P1 Shijingshan Unlicensed 
FL1P1 Fengtai Licensed 
FL2P1 Fengtai Licensed 
FU1P1 Fengtai Unlicensed 
FU2P1 Fengtai Unlicensed 
YL1P1 Chaoyang Licensed 
YL2P1 Chaoyang Licensed 
PL1P1 Changping Licensed 
PU1P1 Changping Unlicensed 
XU1P1 Daxing Unlicensed 
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List of Migrant School Teachers in the Sample 
 
Code District Gender 
HL1T1 Haidian Female 
HL1T2 Haidian Female 
HL1T3 Haidian Female 
HL2T1 Haidian  Male 
HL2T2 Haidian  Female 
HL2T3* Haidian Female 
HU2T1 Haidian Female 
HU2T2 Haidian Female 
HU3T1 Haidian Female 
SU1T1 Shijingshan Female 
SU2T1 Shijingshan Female 
SU2T2 Shijingshan Male 
SU2T3 Shijingshan Female 
SU4T1 Shijingshan Male 
SU4T2 Shijingshan Male 
FL2T1 Fengtai Female 
FL2T2 Fengtai Female 
FL2T3 Fengtai Female 
FL2T4 Fengtai Female 
FL2T5 Fengtai Female 
FL2T6 Fengtai Female 
FL2T7 Fengtai Female 
FU1T1 Fengtai Female 
FU2T1 Fengtai Male 
YL2T1 Chaoyang Female 
YL2T2 Chaoyang Female 
PU2T1 Changping Female 
XL1T1* Daxing Male 
* These teachers are not counted as being part of the core sample of teachers interviewed. 
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List of Migrant Families in the Sample 
 
Code District 
Student Total Number 
of Children in 
the Family Gender Age Grade 
HL1F1 Haidian Female 10 5 2 
HL1F2 Haidian Female 8 2 2 
HL1F3 Haidian Female 12 6 2 
HL1F4 Haidian Male 10 3 1 
HL1F5 Haidian Female 9 4 3 
HL1F6 Haidian Female 12 5 1 
HL1F7 Haidian Female 12 5 1 
HL2F1 Haidian Female 14 7 2 
HL2F2 Haidian Female 12 7 1 
HL2F3 Haidian Male 13 7 2 
HL2F4 Haidian Male 14 7 3 
HU2F1 Haidian Female 16 6 3 
HU2F2 Haidian Female 11 4 3 
HU2F3 Haidian Female 10 3 3 
SL2F1 Shijingshan Female 10 5 2 
SL2F2 Shijingshan Male 8 3 1 
SL2F3 Shijingshan Male 11 3 3 
SL2F4 Shijingshan Male 11 4 2 
SL2F5 Shijingshan Female 9  2 2 
SL2F6 Shijingshan Female 12 5 2 
SL2F7 Shijingshan Female 7 1 2 
SL2F8 Shijingshan Female 8 1 1 
SU1F1 Shijingshan Male 9 4 2 
SU1F2 Shijingshan Female 9 3 3 
SU1F3 Shijingshan Male 11 5 4 
SU1F4 Shijingshan Male 9 3 2 
SU2F1 Shijingshan Male 13 6 4 
SU2F2 Shijingshan Female 11 4 3 
SU2F3 Shijingshan Female 12 6 2 
SP1F1 Shijingshan Male 12 6  2 
FL2F1 Fengtai Male 10 4 2 
FL2F2 Fengtai Female 9 4 1 
FL2F3 Fengtai Male 5 Preschool 1 
FU1F1 Fengtai Female 11 4 5 
FU1F2 Fengtai Male 10 4 1 
FU1F3 Fengtai Female 11 5 1 
FU2F1 Fengtai Male 10 2 3 
FU2F2 Fengtai Female 15 8 4 
FP1F1 Fengtai Male 8 1 1 
FP2F1 Fengtai Female 8 2 1 
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List of Government-Based Researchers in the Sample 
 
Code Level of Government 
GR1 Central 
GR2 Central 
 
 
List of Academics and Researchers in the Sample 
 
Code District 
A1 Chaoyang 
A2 Chaoyang 
A3 Haidian 
A4 Haidian 
A5 Haidian 
A6 Haidian 
A7 Haidian 
A8 Haidian 
A9 Haidian 
 
 
List of University Students in the Sample 
 
Code District 
U1S1 Haidian 
U2S1 Haidian 
U2S2 Haidian 
U3S1 Chaoyang 
U4S1 Chaoyang 
 
 
List of Organizations in the Sample 
 
Category Code District 
Local NGO 
POL1S1 Changping 
YOL1S1 Chaoyang YOL1S2 
YOL2S1 Chaoyang 
YOL3S1 Chaoyang 
YOL4S1 
Chaoyang YOL4S2 
YOL4S3 
YOL5S1 Chaoyang 
COL1S1 Dongcheng 
Local NGO  
(community-based) 
POC1S1 Changping 
YOC1S1 Chaoyang 
COC1S1 Dongcheng 
SOC1S1 Shijingshan SOC1S2 
Foundation YOF1S1 Chaoyang YOF2S1 Chaoyang 
International Organization YOI1S1 Chaoyang 
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APPENDIX B 
 
MIGRANT FAMILIES IN THE SAMPLE 
 
 
Main Composition of the Migrant Families in the Sample 
 
District 
Total 
Number of 
Children 
Number of 
Children 
in Beijing 
Number of 
Children in 
Primary or 
Middle 
School 
Number of 
Children in 
Primary or 
Middle 
School in 
Beijing  
Number of 
Children in 
Migrant 
School in 
Beijing 
Number of 
Children in 
Public 
School in 
Beijing 
H
a
id
ia
n
 
2 1 1 1 1 0 
2 1 2 1 1 0 
2 2 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 
3 3 3 3 3 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 
2 2 2 2 2 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 
2 2 2 2 1 1 
3 2 1 1 1 0 
3 1 2 1 1 0 
3 2 3 2 2 0 
3 2 1 1 2* 0 
Sh
iji
n
gs
ha
n
 
2 2 1 1 2* 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 
3 3 2 2 2 0 
2 2 1 1 1 0 
2 1 2 1 1 0 
2 2 2 2 2 0 
2 1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 
2 2 1 1 1 0 
3 3 2 2 2 0 
4 4 4 4 4 0 
2 2 1 1 2* 0 
4 4 2 2 2 0 
3 3 2 2 2* 1 
2 2 2 2 1 1 
2 2 1 1 0 1 
Fe
n
gt
a
i 
2 1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 0 0 1* 0 
5 1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 
3 3 2 2 2 0 
4 4 4 4 4 0 
1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 0 1 
Note: An * indicates that the number includes one child who was in a preschool class at a migrant school. 
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Educational Attainment and Monthly Salaries of Migrant Parents in the Sample 
 
 
Type of 
School 
Attended 
by 
Student  
Educational Attainment Salary (RMB/month) 
Father Mother Father Mother Total 
H
a
id
ia
n
 
L (UL)  University High school 3,000 1,500 4,500 
L (UL) Middle school Did not finish middle  NA NA 5-6,000 
L (UL) High school Junior college/vocational <2,000 1,100 <3,100 
L (UL) Middle school High school 2,000 >1,000 >3,000 
L (UL) Primary school Middle school >1,000 >1,000 >2,000 
L (UL) Middle school High school 3-4,000 3-4,000 6-8,000 
L (UL) Middle school High school 12,000 3,000 15,000 
L Primary school Did not finish primary NA NA 2-3,000 
L High school High school 3,000 1,000 4,000 
L Middle school Did not finish primary NA NA 5-6,000 
L  Middle school Did not finish primary NA NA 3-4,000 
UL Middle school Primary school NA NA 2,000 
UL Primary school Middle school >1,500 1,200 >2,700 
UL Unknown (divorced) No schooling -- 900 900 
Sh
iji
n
gs
ha
n
 
L High school High school >2,000 0 >2,000 
L Did not finish primary High school 3,000 0 3,000 
L Did not finish primary Did not finish primary -- -- -- 
L Middle school Middle school NA NA 2,000 
L High school Middle school NA NA >1,000 
L High school Primary school 3,000 1,200 3,200 
L Primary school Middle school 1,300 1,000 2,300 
L High school Middle school NA NA 2,000 
UL Did not finish middle Primary school >3,000 >1,000 >4,000 
UL Primary school Did not finish primary 1,000 1,500 2,500 
UL Did not finish middle Did not finish primary 2,000 2,000 4,000 
UL Middle school Primary school NA NA >10,000 
UL Middle school Middle school >3,000 0 >3,000 
UL Middle school Middle school >4,000 0 >4,000 
UL Primary school Did not finish primary 1-2,000 1,300 2-3,000 
P  Middle school Middle school >2,000 0 >2,000 
Fe
n
gt
ai
 
L Middle school Junior college/vocational -- 1,000 -- 
L Junior college/vocational Junior college/vocational 1,000 900 1,900 
L Middle school Junior college/vocational 2,000 >900 >2,900 
UL Middle school Middle school NA NA -- 
UL Middle school Primary school >1,000 1-2,000 2-3,000 
UL Middle school Middle school -- -- >3,000 
UL No schooling Did not finish primary 3,000 0 3,000 
UL Primary school Primary school NA NA 2-3,000 
P High school Junior college/vocational >2,000 800 >2,800 
P Junior college/vocational Junior college/vocational >4,000 >1,000 >5,000 
Note:  
“L” refers to licensed migrant schools, “UL” refers to unlicensed migrant schools, “L (UL)” refers to the 
unlicensed branch of a licensed migrant school, and “P” refers to public schools. 
Areas marked “--” in the salary column signify parents who were uncomfortable revealing their salaries.  Those 
marked with “NA” signify families where parents worked together and did not make separate incomes.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE SAMPLE 
 
 
General Information about the Local NGOs in the Sample 
 
Year 
Founded Mission Main Scope of Work in the Area 
1996 To provide support and assistance to the 
poor, with the goal of ensuring that their 
basic needs are met 
 Runs a migrant workers’ event center  
 Assists 11 migrant schools in areas concerning 
funding, books, and equipment  
1996 
 
 
To provide services for female migrant 
workers, protect their legal rights and 
interests, and promote their personal 
development 
 Does work concerning migrant women’s 
survival and development, the protection of 
migrant women’s rights, and migrant children’s 
education 
 Provides guidance for students and parents and 
training for teachers at seven migrant schools 
1999 
 
 
To facilitate the social integration of 
migrant workers and  promote their 
equal treatment in society 
 Conducts research on issues concerning 
migrant workers and their families and 
sometimes submits the findings to the 
government 
 Runs a community center that houses a library 
for migrant families and a collection of news 
and relevant information 
 Organizes educational activities and counseling 
for migrant children on topics related to 
education, city life, and health and safety  
 Organizes seminars for migrant parents on 
topics like parenting, legal issues, and their 
children’s education 
2002 
 
 
To provide cultural education services 
for migrant workers; to promote migrant 
children’s healthy growth and cultural 
development, increase social awareness, 
and encourage policy advocacy 
 Runs a museum dedicated to the culture and art 
of migrant workers and coordinates an arts 
festival for migrant children  
 Provides services and events for 11 migrant 
schools 
 Distributes a monthly publication on issues 
concerning migrants to over 30 migrant schools  
2003 
 
 
To empower migrant workers and 
promote the harmonious development of 
urban and rural areas, with a focus on 
policy advocacy and the education of 
citizens  
 Runs programs concerning migrant children’s 
growth and development, provides training for 
migrant school teachers and migrant parents, 
and offers health services in migrant 
communities 
 Produced a publication series documenting the 
needs and experiences of migrant workers 
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2004 
 
 
To promote educational equality; to 
promote the healthy growth and 
development of migrant children and 
provide services related to their 
education  
 Organizes events and symposiums related to 
migrant children’s education for parents, 
teachers, volunteers, and others to discuss 
relevant issues  
 Runs a children’s center at a migrant school  
2005 
 
To provide services to migrant workers, 
including those related to migrant 
children’s education 
 Runs an activity center for the women and 
children of a migrant community 
 Organizes participatory trainings and seminars 
 Provides services for preschool children  
 Sells clothes to residents of the community at 
low prices 
2006 
 
 
To provide services to migrant children 
and migrant parents and improve the 
situations of migrant school teachers 
 Offers services and programs for migrant 
children and their parents, including a library 
for migrant children and computer training for 
parents  
 Organizes programs for migrant school 
teachers 
2006 
 
 
To provide services and support to 
migrant children and youth through a 
range of programs in schools and 
migrant communities 
 Runs migrant community centers and offers 
tutoring and after-school programs for students, 
organizes seminars and workshops for families, 
and provides various types of training 
(including vocational training and migrant 
school teacher training)  
 Works to enhance the capacity of NGOs to 
serve migrant communities through the sharing 
of resources and information 
2007 
 
 
To provide funds and resources for 
public welfare projects and 
organizations, with a focus on 
improving educational opportunities for 
migrant children  
 Provides grants for non-profit organizations 
working on migrant children’s education  
 Sponsors the creation of non-governmental 
schools for migrant children 
2007 
 
 
To serve and support migrant workers 
and their families  
 Organizes events and provides services for the 
residents of a migrant community  
 Advocates for the rights of migrant workers 
and the educational rights of migrant children 
(especially those attending public schools) 
 Does not work with migrant schools or their 
students 
2008 To provide services and events for 
migrant children 
 Works primarily in conjunction with other 
NGOs (by supporting or contributing to their 
programs) 
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APPENDIX D 
 
POLICY DOCUMENTS AND LEGISLATION CITED 
 
 
Central Policies and Legislation 
 
Month/Year Issuing Body Document Title 
Adopted in 
December 1982 
Adopted at the Fifth 
Session of the Fifth 
National People’s 
Congress 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China  
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa 
Adopted in April 
1986 
Effective as of 
July 1986 
Adopted at the Fourth 
Session of the Sixth 
National People’s 
Congress 
Compulsory Education Law of the People’s 
Republic of China 
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yiwu jiaoyufa 
Adopted in 
March 1995 
Effective as of 
September 1995  
Adopted at the Third 
Session of the Eighth 
National People’s 
Congress 
Education Law of the People’s Republic of China  
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyufa 
April 1996 State Education 
Commission 
“Trial Measures for the Schooling of Children and 
Youth among the Floating Population in Cities and 
Towns”  
Chengzhen liudong renkou zhong shiling ertong 
shaonian jiuxue banfa (shixing) 
March 1998 State Education 
Commission, Public 
Security Bureau 
“Provisional Measures for the Schooling of 
Children and Youth in the Floating Population” 
Liudong ertong shaonian jiuxue zanxing banfa 
May 2001 State Council “Decision of the State Council on the Reform and 
Development of Basic Education” 
Guowuyuan guanyu jichu jiaoyu gaige yu fazhan 
de jueding 
Adopted in 
December 2002 
Effective as of 
September 2003 
Adopted at the Thirty-
First Session of the 
Standing Committee 
of the Ninth National 
People’s Congress 
Law on Promoting Private Education 
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minban jiaoyu 
cujinfa 
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January 2003 General Office of the 
State Council 
“Circular of the General Office of the State 
Council on Strengthening Employment 
Management and Service Work for Rural Migrant 
Workers”  
Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu zuohao nongmin 
jincheng wugong jiuye guanli he fuwu gongzuo de 
tongzhi 
September 2003 Ministry of Education, 
State Commission 
Office for Public 
Sector Reform, 
Ministry of Public 
Security, National 
Development and 
Reform Commission, 
Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security 
“Suggestions to Provide Better Compulsory 
Education to the Children of Migrant Workers in 
Cities” 
Guanyu jinyibu zuohao jincheng wugong jiuye 
nongmin zinü yiwu jiaoyu gongzuo de yijian 
December 2003 Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security, 
Ministry of Public 
Security, Ministry of 
Education, National 
Population and Family 
Planning Commission 
“Notification on Issues Concerning the 
Incorporation of Management Funds for Migrant 
Workers and Other Related Funds into the Scope 
of the Financial Budget and Expenditure” 
Guanyu jiang nongmingong guanli deng youguan 
jingfei naru caizheng yusuan zhichu fanwei 
youguan wenti de tongzhi 
March 2004 Ministry of Finance “Notification on Regulating the Management of 
Fees and Promoting Higher Incomes for Peasants” 
Guanyu guifan shoufei guanli cujin nongmin 
zengjia shouru de tongzhi 
May 2005 Ministry of Education “Suggestions of the Ministry of Education on 
Further Promoting the Balanced Development of 
Compulsory Education” 
Jiaoyubu guanyu jinyibu tuijin yiwu jiaoyu 
junheng fazhan de ruogan yijian 
January 2006 State Council “Opinions of the State Council on Solving the 
Problems of Migrant Workers” 
Guowuyuan guanyu jiejue nongmingong wenti de 
ruogan yijian 
May 2006 Ministry of Education “Suggestions of the Ministry of Education on 
Implementing ‘Opinions of the State Council on 
Solving the Problems of Migrant Workers’” 
Jiaoyubu guanyu jiaoyu xitong guanche luoshi 
“Guowuyuan guanyu jiejue nongmingong wenti de 
ruogan yijian” de shishi yijian 
250 
Adopted in June 
2006 
Effective as of 
September 2006 
Adopted at the 
Twenty-Second 
Session of the 
Standing Committee 
of the Tenth National 
People’s Congress 
Compulsory Education Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (2006 Amendment) 
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yiwu jiaoyufa (2006 
xiuding)  
August 2008 State Council “Notification of the State Council on Waiving 
Tuition and Miscellaneous Fees for Compulsory 
School-Aged Children in Cities” 
Guowuyuan guanyu zuohao mianchu chengshi 
yiwu jiaoyu jieduan xuesheng xuezafei gongzuo de 
tongzhi 
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Beijing Municipal Policies 
 
Month/Year Issuing Body Document Title 
August 2001 Beijing Municipal 
People’s Government 
“Suggestions of the Beijing Municipal People’s 
Government on Implementing ‘Decision of the 
State Council on the Reform and Development of 
Basic Education” 
Beijingshi renmin zhengfu guanche guowuyuan 
guanyu jichu jiaoyu gaige yu fazhan jueding de 
yijian 
March 2002 Beijing Municipal 
Education 
Commission 
“Provisional Measures for the Implementation of 
Compulsory Education for Children and Youth of 
the Floating Population in Beijing” 
Beijingshi dui liudong renkou zhong shiling ertong 
shaonian shishi yiwu jiaoyu de zanxing banfa 
August 2004 Beijing Municipal 
Education 
Commission, Beijing 
Municipal 
Development and 
Reform Commission, 
Beijing Municipal 
Commission Office 
for Public Sector 
Reform, Beijing 
Municipal Public 
Security Bureau, 
Beijing Municipal 
Finance Bureau, 
Beijing Municipal 
Bureau of Civil 
Affairs, Beijing 
Municipal Health 
Bureau, Beijing 
Municipal Bureau of 
Labor and Social 
Security, Beijing 
Municipal Bureau of 
Land and Resources, 
Beijing Municipal 
Education Supervision 
Office 
“Suggestions on Implementing the General Office 
of the State Council’s Working Documents on 
Providing Better Compulsory Education to the 
Children of Migrant Workers in Cities” 
Guanyu guanche guowuyuan bangongting jinyibu 
zuohao jincheng wugong jiuye nongmin zinü yiwu 
jiaoyu gongzuo wenjian de yijian 
September 2005 Beijing Municipal 
Education 
Commission 
“Notice of the Beijing Municipal Education 
Commission on the Work of Strengthening the 
Management of Self-Run Migrant Schools” 
Beijingshi jiaoyu weiyuanhui guanyu jiaqiang 
liudong renkou ziban xuexiao guanli gongzuo de 
tongzhi 
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July 2006 General Office of the 
Beijing Municipal 
People’s Government 
“Notice of the General Office of the Beijing 
Municipal People’s Government on the Work of 
Strengthening the Safety of Non-Approved Self-
Run Migrant Schools” 
Beijingshi renmin zhengfu bangongting guanyu 
jinyibu jiaqiang weijing pizhun liudong renyuan 
ziban xuexiao anquan gongzuo de tongzhi 
November 2008 General Office of the 
Beijing Municipal 
People’s Government 
“Suggestions of the General Office of the Beijing 
Municipal People’s Government on Implementing 
the Spirit of the State Council’s Working 
Documents on Waiving Tuition and Miscellaneous 
Fees for Compulsory School-Aged Children in 
Cities”  
Beijingshi renmin zhengfu bangongting guanyu 
guanche guowuyuan zuohao mianchu chengshi 
yiwu jiaoyu jieduan xuesheng xuezafei gongzuo 
wenjian jingshen de yijian 
Adopted in 
November 2008 
Effective as of 
March 2009 
Adopted at the 
Seventh Session of the 
Standing Committee 
of the Thirteenth 
Beijing People’s 
Congress 
“Beijing Measures for Implementing the 
Compulsory Education Law (2008 Amendment)” 
Beijingshi shishi Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
yiwu jiaoyufa banfa (2008 xiuding)  
December 2008 Beijing Municipal 
Education 
Commission, Beijing 
Municipal Finance 
Bureau 
“Suggestions of the Beijing Municipal Education 
Commission and Beijing Municipal Finance 
Bureau to Provide Better Compulsory Education to 
the Children of Migrant Workers in Beijing” 
Beijingshi jiaoyu weiyuanhui Beijingshi caizhengju 
guanyu jinyibu zuohao laijing wugong renyuan 
suiqian zinü zai Jing jieshou yiwu jiaoyu gongzuo 
de yijian 
December 2008 Beijing Municipal 
Education 
Commission 
“Notice of the Beijing Municipal Education 
Commission on Implementing Matters Concerning 
the Suggestions to Provide Better Compulsory 
Education to the Children of Migrant Workers in 
Beijing” 
Beijingshi jiaoyu weiyuanhui guanyu luoshi jinyibu 
zuohao laijing wugong renyuan suiqian zinü zai 
Jing jieshou yiwu jiaoyu gongzuo yijian youguan 
shixiang de tongzhi 
 
